Maybe you suspected this already, but researchers at MSU Computer Science just published a paper explaining just how easy it is to spoof a fingerprint scanner with a ink-jet printed scan of a finger.
We’re not talking about casting a new finger using superglue or anything, but rather using conductive ink you can literally print — on paper. A paper-printed-fingerprint that will unlock your smartphone. We’ve already told you fingerprints suck for security, but hopefully this drives the point home.
[Kai Cao] and [Anil K Jain] released this paper (Direct PDF link) outlining their technique. Using an existing scan of a fingerprint (which can be taken from your phone’s scanner), the image is mirrored, and then printed using a regular ink-jet printer, with all of its color cartridges replaced with AgIC4 silver conductive ink. Continue reading “Finger Print Scanners Really Aren’t That Secure”→
As the year of 2005 was drawing to a close, a website known as Myspace was basking in popularity. With millions of users, the site was the most popular social networking site in the world. It was unique in that it let users use HTML code to customize their Myspace page. Most of us, c’mon…admit it….had a Myspace page. The coding part was fun! But not everything was changeable with code. You could only upload up to 12 images and the Relationship Status drop-down menu only had a few options to choose from. These limitations did not sit well with [Samy Kamkar], a 19 year old hacker out of Los Angeles.
It didn’t take [Samy] long to figure out how to trick the site to let him upload more images and change his relationship status to a customized “in a hot relationship”. After hoodwinking the Myspace site with some simple hacks, he realized he could do just about anything he wanted to with it. And this is where things get interesting. It took just over a week to develop a script that would force people who visited his page to add him as a friend. But that wasn’t enough. He then programmed the script to copy itself onto the visitor’s page. [Samy] had developed a self-propagating worm.
The script went live as [Samy] went to bed. He woke up the next morning with 200 friends requests. An hour later the number had doubled. [Samy] got worried and sent an anonymous email to the webmaster warning of the worm. It was ignored. By 1:30PM that day, he had over 6,000 friends request. And like any good hacker worth his weight in floppy drives, his sense of humor had him program the script to also add his name to each visitor’s Heroes List. This angered many people, who deleted him from their page, only to get reinfected moments later when they visited another (infected) page.
[Samy’s] script was raging out of control. As the evening closed in, his friends count had reached 919,664. It would top the 1 million mark just before Myspace took their servers offline to figure out what was going on. Two hours later, the site was back up. [Samy’s] profile page had been deleted.
[Samy] had used a technique known as cross-site scripting (XSS) to pull off his hack. We’ll touch on XSS in a later article. For now, we’re going to stick to the basics – proper passwords and SQL Injection.
If we were to express an official view of the what these guys did once they hacked into a Target store’s PA system, we’d have to go with definitely uncool. However, it’s good to know that phone phreaking and good ol’ social engineering isn’t dead yet. Many of us got our start by playing with the systems around us.
Anyone could call into a Target store and request to be transferred to the PA’s extension code, which was the same everywhere. If the person transferring the call wasn’t quick on their feet, the caller would then be patched directly into the stores PA system. The kicker? Target had no way of stopping the PA until the caller hung-up. It’s the way the system was designed.
The hack itself is embarrassingly simple. The PA is attached to the in-store phone network. This is pretty standard. We’ve all seen a sales associate go up to phone in a store, dial a number, and make an announcement throughout the store. Where Target went wrong is improper separation of systems, and poorly thought out standardization.
The weakest link in security is always the people it’s designed for, not the one’s it’s designed to keep out. It’s a fun little prank, and hopefully Target has it sorted out now.
Not a day goes by without another IoT security hack. If you’re wondering why you don’t want your front doorbell connected to the Internet, this hack should convince you.
The hack is unfathomably stupid. You press the button on the back of the unit that pairs the doorbell with your home WiFi network, and it transmits the password in the clear. Sigh. It’s since been fixed, and we suppose that’s a good thing, but we can’t resist thinking for a moment about an alternative implementation.
Imagine, like all previous non-IoT wireless doorbells, that the doorbell transmitted a not-very coded signal over an open frequency like 433 MHz to a receiver inside your home. Do the same with the video stream. Now the receiver can be connected to the Internet, and can be significantly more secure because it’s behind your locked front door. The attack surface presented to the outside world by the doorbell itself is small, and limited to faking a doorbell press or showing you pictures you don’t want to see. Yawn.
But because the outside doorbell unit could be connected to a network, it was. Now the attack surface extends into your home’s network, and if you’re like most people, the WiFi router was your only real defense.
Now we love the IoT, in principle. There are tons of interesting applications that need the sort of bandwidth or remote availability that the Internet provides. We’re just not convinced yet that a doorbell, or a fridge for that matter, meet the criteria. But it does add a hundred bucks to the price tag, so that’s good, right? What do you think? When does the risk of IoT justify the reward?
The SimpliSafe home security system is two basic components, a keyboard and a base station. Sensors such as smoke detectors, switches, and motion sensors can be added to this system, all without a wired installation. Yes, this security system is completely wireless. Yes, you can still buy a software defined radio for ten dollars. Yes, the device has both “simple” and “safe” in its name. We all know where this is going, right?
Last week, [Andrew Zonenberg] at IOActive published a security vulnerability for the SimpliSafe wireless home security system. As you would expect from an off-the-shelf, wireless, DIY security system, the keypad and base station use standard 433 MHz and 315 MHz ISM band transmitters and receivers. [Dr. Zonenberg]’s attack on the system didn’t use SDR; instead, test points on the transmitters were tapped and messages between the keypad and base station were received in cleartext. When the correct PIN is entered in the keypad, the base station replies with a ‘PIN entered’ packet. Replaying this packet with a 433 MHz transmitter will disable the security system.
[Michael Ossmann] took this one step further with a software defined radio. [Ossmann] used a HackRF One to monitor the transmissions from the keypad and turned to a cheap USB SDR dongle to capture packets. Replaying keypad transmissions were easy, but with a little bit more work new attacks can be found. The system can be commanded to enter test mode even when the system is armed bypassing notifications to the owner.
It’s a hilarious failure of wireless security, especially given the fact that this exploit can be performed by anyone with $100 in equipment. With a little more effort, an attacker can execute a PIN replay from a mile away. Sadly, failures of security of this magnitude are becoming increasingly common. There will assuredly be more attacks of this kind in the future, at least until hardware manufacturers start taking the security (of their security products) seriously.
What is most impressive here is not that Linux Mint was compromised, but the response and security measures that were already in place that prevented this from becoming a bigger problem. First, it was detected the same day that it was a problem, so the vulnerability only lasted less than a day. Second, it only affected downloads of a specific version, and only if they clicked a specific link, so anyone who was downloading from a direct HTTP request or a torrent is unaffected. Third, they were able to track down the names of three people in Bulgaria who are responsible for this hack.
As far as the forum compromise, the breech netted usernames, emails, and encrypted passwords, as well as personal information that forum users may have entered in signatures or private messages. It’s always nice to see when compromised sites are not storing passwords in plain text, though.
There is one security measure which should have protected against this and failed for a couple of reasons, and that’s the signature. Normally, the file download is accompanied by a signature which is generated from the file, like an MD5 or SHA checksum. By generating the checksum of the downloaded ISO file and comparing it to the reported signature on the web site, one can confirm that the file has downloaded correctly and that it is the same file. In this case anyone downloading the bad ISO should have caught that the downloaded file was not the official one because the signatures did not match. This can fail. Most people are too lazy to check (and there is no automated checking process). More importantly, because the attackers controlled the web site, they could change the site to report any signature they wanted, including the signature for the bad ISO file.
If you are affected by this, you should change your password on the forum and anywhere you use the same email/password. More importantly, as great as the verification signature is, shouldn’t there be a better way to verify so that people use it regularly and so that it can’t be compromised so easily?
There are two sides to every coin. Instead of swiping or using a chip reader with your credit card, some companies offer wireless cards that you hold up to a reader for just an instant. How convenient for you and for anyone who might what to read that data for their own use. The same goes for RFID enabled passports, and the now ubiquitous keycards used for door access at businesses and hotels. I’m sure you can opt-out of one of these credit cards, but Gerald in human resources isn’t going to issue you a metal key — you’re stuck hauling around that RFID card.
It is unlikely that someone surreptitiously reading your card will unlock your secrets. The contactless credit cards and the keylock cards are actually calculating a response based on a stored key pair. But you absolutely could be tracked by the unique IDs in your cards. Are you being logged when passing by an open reader? And other devices, like public transit cards, may have more information stored on them that could be harvested. It’s not entirely paranoid to want to silence these signals when you’re not using them.
One solution is to all of this is to protect your wallet from would-be RFID pirates. At this point all I’m sure everyone is thinking of a tin-foil card case. Sure, that might work unless the malicious reader is very powerful. But there’s a much more interesting way to protect against this: active RFID scrambling with a project called GuardBunny. It’s a card that you place next to whatever you want to protect. It’s not really RFID — I’ll get that in a moment — but is activated the same way and spews erroneous bits back at any card reader. Kristin Paget has been working on GuardBunny for several years now. As of late she’s had less time for active development, but is doing a great thing by letting version 1 out into the world for others to hack on. In her talk at Shmoocon 2016 she walked through the design, demonstrated its functionality, and shared some suggestions for further improvement.