

Hacking Closed-Source


The Power of Reverse Engineering Real-World Products

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HACKADAYberlin 2023




Me age 14:
Open-source software
evangelist.



Me now:
Open the source software
evangelist.


Time

00:08⁵³

 x 003



School 🎓



Programming a DCF77 receiver in Assembly.
C is hard and has so many different instructions.



Studying 🎓

Nothing I learned at the Linux User Group is relevant for my studies.

What am I even studying?

Is anything of this relevant to security?

That M.Sc. IT Security sounds interesting...

I still know nothing, maybe I should stay for a PhD?

“We have that fitness tracker firmware and nobody has the time to look into it.”

FileAnalysisGraphNavigationSelectToolsWindowHelp

Functions - 1461 items

Name	Location	Function Signat...	Function Size
FUN_08023308	08023308	undefined F...	6
FUN_08023314	08023314	undefined F...	30
FUN_080233c4	080233c4	undefined F...	200
FUN_0802348c	0802348c	undefined F...	68
FUN_080234d0	080234d0	undefined F...	68
FUN_08023514	08023514	undefined F...	82
FUN_08023566	08023566	undefined F...	106
FUN_080235d0	080235d0	undefined F...	60
FUN_080235f8	080235f8	undefined F...	44
FUN_08023940	08023940	undefined F...	186
FUN_080239fa	080239fa	undefined F...	90
FUN_08023a54	08023a54	undefined F...	140
FUN_08023af0	08023af0	undefined F...	120
FUN_08023b68	08023b68	undefined F...	82
FUN_08023db8	08023db8	undefined F...	136
FUN_08023e4c	08023e4c	undefined F...	374
FUN_0802408c	0802408c	undefined F...	1812
FUN_080247a0	080247a0	undefined F...	94
FUN_080247fe	080247fe	undefined F...	412
FUN_0802499a	0802499a	undefined F...	16
FUN_080249aa	080249aa	undefined F...	56
FUN_08024a54	08024a54	undefined F...	206
switchcase_01_06	08024b22	undefined F...	170
FUN_08025098	08025098	undefined F...	36
FUN_080250c4	080250c4	undefined F...	30
FUN_080250e8	080250e8	undefined F...	546
FUN_0802530a	0802530a	undefined F...	482
FUN_08025528	08025528	undefined F...	234
FUN_08025612	08025612	undefined F...	112
FUN_08025682	08025682	undefined F...	280
FUN_0802579a	0802579a	undefined F...	112
FUN_0802584c	0802584c	undefined F...	2
FUN_0802584e	0802584e	undefined F...	2
FUN_08025850	08025850	undefined F...	44
FUN_0802587c	0802587c	undefined F...	70
FUN_080258c4	080258c4	undefined F...	60
FUN_08025900	08025900	undefined F...	30
FUN_08025920	08025920	undefined F...	30
FUN_08025940	08025940	undefined F...	30
FUN_08025960	08025960	undefined F...	30
FUN_08025980	08025980	undefined F...	30
FUN_080259a0	080259a0	undefined F...	30
FUN_080259be	080259be	undefined F...	2
FUN_080259c0	080259c0	undefined F...	46
FUN_080259ee	080259ee	undefined F...	82
FUN_08025a40	08025a40	undefined F...	30
FUN_08025a5e	08025a5e	undefined F...	34
FUN_08025a80	08025a80	undefined F...	18
FUN_08025a92	08025a92	undefined F...	52
FUN_08025ac8	08025ac8	undefined F...	30
FUN_08025ae6	08025ae6	undefined F...	20
FUN_08025da8	08025da8	undefined F...	460
FUN_08026024	08026024	undefined F...	44
FUN_0802606c	0802606c	undefined F...	324
thunk_FUN_0800e124	080261b0	thunk undef...	4
FUN_080261b4	080261b4	undefined F...	140
FUN_0802625c	0802625c	undefined F...	514
FUN_0802647c	0802647c	undefined F...	2
FUN_08026680	08026680	undefined F...	206
print_serial	08026778	undefined F...	34
FUN_0802766c	0802766c	undefined F...	22
FUN_08027682	08027682	undefined F...	4
thunk_FUN_0802768c	08027686	thunk undef...	4
FUN_0802768c	0802768c	undefined F...	14
FUN_080276c0	080276c0	undefined F...	16

Filter:

Program TreesFunctions

Listing: flexFlashAll.bin v1

***** FUNCTION *****

***** undefined FUN_08023a54() *****

r0:1<RETURN>

FUN_08023a54+1XREF[0,1]: 08025b64(*)

FUN_08023a54

08023a54 10 b5push{r4,r}

08023a56 df f8 b4 05ldr.w r0=>s_Device_Record:_080277b8, [PTR_s_Device_Re... = "Device Record:\r\n" = 080277b8 int printf(char * __format, ...) = 20004658 = ??

08023a5a fe f7 29 fc bl printf r0, [PTR_DAT_08024010] = 20004658 = ??

08023a62 90 f9 05 05ldr.s.w r1, [r0, #0x5] =>DAT_2000465d = 77

08023a66 df f8 ac 05ldr.w r0=>s_Prod_id_%6d_08027864, [PTR_s_Prod_id_%6... = " Prod id:\t%6d\r\n" = 08027864 int printf(char * __format, ...) = 20004658 = ??

08023a6a fe f7 21 fc bl printf r0=>s_Serial#_0x_080279ec, [PTR_s_Serial#_0x_... = " Serial#\t0x" = 080279ec int printf(char * __format, ...) = 20004658 = ??

08023a72 fe f7 1d fc bl printf r4, #0x0

08023a76 00 24movs b

08023a78 07 e0LAB_08023a8a

LAB_08023a7aXREF[1]: 08023a8c(j)

08023a7e 21 fc 05ldr.w r0, [r4, r0] =>DAT_20004658 = 20004658 = ??

08023a80 df f8 ac 05ldr.w r0=>DAT_08027b1c, [PTR_DAT_08023fd0] = 25h % = 08027b1c int printf(char * __format, ...) = 20004658 = ??

08023a84 fe f7 14 fc bl printf r4, r4, #0x1

08023a88 64 1caddsb

LAB_08023a8aXREF[1]: 08023a78(j)

08023a8a 05 2ccmp r4, #0x5

08023a8c f5 d3bcc LAB_08023a7a

08023a8e c9 a0adr r0=>LAB_08023db4, [0x8023db4]

08023a90 fe f7 0e fc bl printf r0, [PTR_DAT_08024010] = 20004658 = ??

08023a94 df f8 78 05ldr.w r3, [r0, #0xa] =>DAT_20004662 = 77

08023a98 b0 f9 0a 30ldr.s.w r0, [PTR_DAT_08024010] = 20004658 = ??

08023a9c df f8 70 05ldr.w r2, [r0, #0x8] =>DAT_20004660 = 77

08023aa0 b0 f9 08 20ldr.s.w r0, [PTR_DAT_08024010] = 20004658 = ??

08023aa4 df f8 68 05ldr.w r1, [r0, #0x6] =>DAT_2000465e = 77

08023aa8 b0 f9 06 10ldr.s.w r0=>s_Cal_xyz_%6d_%6d_080275f4, [PTR_s_Ca... = " Cal xyz\t%6d\t%6d\t%6d\r\n" = 080275f4 int printf(char * __format, ...) = 20004658 = ??

08023ab0 fe f7 fe fb bl printf r0=>s_Enc_key_0x_080279f8, [PTR_s_Enc_key_0x_... = " Enc key\t0x" = 080279f8 int printf(char * __format, ...) = 20004658 = ??

08023ab4 df f8 68 05ldr.w r0=>s_Enc_key_0x_080279f8, [PTR_s_Enc_key_0x_... = 25h % = 080279f8 int printf(char * __format, ...) = 20004658 = ??

08023ab8 fe f7 fa fb bl printf r4, #0x0

08023abc 00 24movs b

08023abe 09 e0LAB_08023ad4

LAB_08023ac0XREF[1]: 08023ad6(j)

08023ac0 df f8 ac 05ldr.w r0, [PTR_DAT_08024010] = 20004658 = ??

08023ac4 20 18addsb r0, r4, r0

08023ac6 90 f8 20 10ldr.b.w r1, [r0, #0x20] =>DAT_20004678 = 25h % = 08027b1c int printf(char * __format, ...) = 20004658 = ??

08023aca df f8 04 05ldr.w r0=>DAT_08027b1c, [PTR_DAT_08023fd0]

08023ace fe f7 ef fb bl printf r4, r4, #0x1

08023ad2 64 1caddsb

LAB_08023ad4XREF[1]: 08023abe(j)

08023ad4 10 2ccmp r4, #0x10

08023ad6 f3 d3bcc LAB_08023ac0

08023ad8 b6 a0adr r0=>LAB_08023db4, [0x8023db4]

08023ada fe f7 e9 fb bl printf {r4, pc}

08023ade 10 bdpop

LAB_08023ae0+1XREF[0,1]: 08025c00(*)

08023ae0 80 b5push{r7, r}

08023ae2 df f8 40 05ldr.w r0=>s_Shutting_USART_off_0802760c, [PTR_s_Shutt... = "Shutting USART off\r\n" = 0802760c int printf(char * __format, ...) = 20004658 = ??

08023ae6 fe f7 e3 fb bl printf FUN_080222fa

08023aea fe f7 06 fc bl undefined FUN_080222fa()

08023aee 01 bdpop {r0, pc}

***** FUNCTION *****

***** undefined FUN_08023af0() *****

r0:1<RETURN>

Stack[-0x18]:1 local_18XREF[1]: 08023b36(R)

Stack[-0x19]:1 local_19XREF[1]: 08023b3c(R)

Stack[-0x1a]:1 local_1aXREF[1]: 08023b42(R)

Stack[-0x1b]:1 local_1bXREF[1]: 08023b48(R)

Decompile: FUN_08023a54 - (flexFlashAll.bin v1)

1

2void FUN_08023a54(void)

3

4{

5

6int uVar1;

7

8printf("Device Record:\r\n");

9printf(" Prod id:\t%6d\r\n", (int)DAT_2000465d);

10printf(" Serial#\t0x");

11for (uVar1 = 0; uVar1 < 5; uVar1 = uVar1 + 1) {

12printf("%02X", (uint)(byte *)((int)DAT_20004658 + uVar1));

13}

14printf("\r\n");

15printf(" Cal xyz\t%6d\t%6d\t%6d\r\n", (int)DAT_2000465e, (int)DAT_20004660, (int)DAT_20004662);

16for (uVar1 = 0; uVar1 < 0x10; uVar1 = uVar1 + 1) {

17printf("%02X", (uint)(byte) (DAT_20004678)[uVar1]);

18}

19printf("\r\n");

20return;

21}

22}

Defined Strings - 200 items

Location	String Value	String Representation	Data Type
08026d7c	Failed! Expecting 6byte seri...	"Failed! Expecting 6byte ser...	ds
08026db8	Expect orientation x, y, z. ...	"Expect orientation x, y, z. ...	ds
08026df0	Selftest values should be b...	"Selftest values should be b...	ds
08026e28	(z-cal z-center x y z-range...	"(z-cal z-center x y z-rang...	ds
08026e5c	(- 0 1) ChargerTempSense ...	"(- 0 1) ChargerTempSense ...	ds
08026e90	(32/16/0)Start/stop output...	"(32/16/0)Start/stop output...	ds
08026ec4	print last-received DTM co...	"print last-received DTM co...	ds
08026ef4	Firmware version %d.%02d ...	"Firmware version %d.%02d ...	ds
08026f20	(id, lumens, startMS, onMS, ...	"(id, lumens, startMS, onMS, ...	ds
08026f4c	No load voltage %d Voltage...	"No load voltage %d Voltage...	ds
08026fa4	(mV) roll all gpio, look for ...	"(mV) roll all gpio, look for ...	ds
08026fc4	Standard Manufacturing Te...	"Standard Manufacturing Te...	ds
08026ff4	[32bytes hex] set/get EE op...	"[32bytes hex] set/get EE op...	ds
0802701c	start DTM test mode for AC...	"start DTM test mode for AC...	ds
08027044	stop DTM test mode for AC...	"stop DTM test mode for AC...	ds
0802706c	Starting accelerometer calib...	"Starting accelerometer calib...	ds
080270b8	(id, lumens, rampMS) ramp ...	"(id, lumens, rampMS) ramp...	ds
080270dc	(percent) show progress bar...	"(percent) show progress bar...	ds
08027100	(type, lumens, rampMS) test...	"(type, lumens, rampMS) tes...	ds
08027124	(on) turn on test mode, turn...	"(on) turn on test mode, tur...	ds
08027148	(1/0)Start/stop vibration pa...	"(1/0)Start/stop vibration p...	ds
0802716c	Clear minute, summary, an...	"Clear minute, summary, an...	ds
08027190	(16bytes hex) Set encryptio...	"(16bytes hex) Set encryptio...	ds

Filter:

08023a54FUN_08023a54push {r4, r}

staring intensifies

Years of learning random things
suddenly make sense.




```
#pragma NEXMON targetregion "patch"
```

```
#include <firmware_version.h>
```


```
#include <patcher.h>
```

```
#include <wrapper.h>
```

```
#include "stm32.h"
```

```
int hook_get_steps() {  
    int steps = *((int *) 0x20003B54);  
    steps = steps * 100;  
    return steps;  
}
```

```
__attribute__((at(0x8014304, "", CHIP_VER_FITBIT, FW_VER_FITBIT)))  
BPatch(hook_get_steps, hook_get_steps);
```



**Everything is
open-source now.**



◀◀ **REW**

Forward Engineering 🦥

```
reversing-lab — vim hello.c — 60x9
#include <stdio.h>

int main() {
    printf("Hello reverse engineers!!!11\n");
    return 0;
}

~
"hello.c" 7L, 90B written
```



```
reversing-lab — root@ubuntu-focal: /vagrant...
[root@ubuntu-focal:/vagrant# gcc hello.c ]
[root@ubuntu-focal:/vagrant# ./a.out ]
Hello reverse engineers!!!11
root@ubuntu-focal:/vagrant#
```

Reverse Engineering 🧐

```
reversing-lab — vim hello.c — 60x9
#include <stdio.h>

int main() {
    printf("Hello reverse engineers!!!11\n");
    return 0;
}

~
"hello.c" 7L, 90B written
```

```
reversing-lab — root@ubuntu-focal: /vagrant...
[root@ubuntu-focal:/vagrant# gcc hello.c ]
[root@ubuntu-focal:/vagrant# ./a.out ]
Hello reverse engineers!!!11
root@ubuntu-focal:/vagrant#
```



Why reverse engineer something?


- Most software ships as binary without source code.
- Even if you have source code, libraries and system components used by a program might be binary-only.
- When analyzing real-world software, reverse engineering is indispensable.

```
000d5090 d6 06 00 11 7b 03 08 4b 37 03 08 0b da ff ff 17 x00{.*K|7.....x
000d50a0 f7 03 1f 2a f6 03 15 2a 05 00 00 14 97 00 80 52 x...*.*|00...xR
000d50b0 17 00 b0 72 02 00 00 14 f7 03 00 2a f3 17 40 f9 00xr00...*0*x
000d50c0 f8 27 40 b9 fb 67 47 29 68 02 40 f9 08 29 40 f9 x'@xxgG|h@x*)@x
000d50d0 c8 05 00 b4 4c 68 00 94 e2 03 16 2a 39 03 16 0b x0xLh0x|x*9*
000d50e0 00 01 3f d6 28 00 80 52 08 00 a2 72 1f 00 08 6b 00?x(0xR|0xr00k
000d50f0 e8 17 9f 1a 1b 01 1b 2a 37 01 00 35 5a 03 16 4b x...*.*|705Z..K
000d5100 5a f5 ff 35 06 00 00 14 e0 0f 01 32 12 00 00 14 Zx5000|x*2000
000d5110 e0 07 01 32 10 00 00 14 f7 03 1f 2a 89 00 80 52 x0200|x...x0xR
000d5120 09 00 b0 72 2a 00 80 52 28 4d 00 11 ff 02 00 71 00r0xR|(M0x00q
000d5130 0a 00 a2 72 48 01 88 1a 7f 03 00 72 08 11 97 1a 00rHxx|00r...x
000d5140 29 31 00 11 3f 07 00 71 09 01 89 1a 1f 01 00 71 100?00q|_...00q
000d5150 20 a1 88 1a fd 7b 4c a9 f4 4f 4b a9 f6 57 4a a9 xx{x{Lx|xOKxxWJx
000d5160 f8 5f 49 a9 fa 67 48 a9 fc 6f 47 a9 ff 43 03 91 x_IxxgHx|xOGxxCx
000d5170 c0 03 5f d6 28 57 28 30 1f 20 03 d5 e8 00 00 f9 x.(W(0|...x0x
000d5180 28 3f 82 52 05 00 00 14 88 56 28 30 1f 20 03 d5 (?xR000|xV(0...x
000d5190 e8 0b 00 f9 c8 40 82 52 69 55 28 10 40 54 28 70 x0xx0xR|iU(0T(p
000d51a0 1f 20 03 d5 1f 20 03 d5 60 4f 00 94 ff 03 01 d1 x...x|x`00xxxx
000d51b0 f4 4f 02 a9 fd 7b 03 a9 fd c3 00 91 e2 03 1f 2a x0xx{x|x0xxxx
000d51c0 15 53 00 94 7f fe ff 97 88 02 40 f9 08 3d 40 f9 xS0x...x|x0x=0x
000d51d0 88 01 00 b4 ef 51 00 94 00 01 3f d6 0d 5e 00 94 x0xxQ0x|0?x_00x
000d51e0 e3 03 1f 2a 66 fe ff 97 79 6e 00 94 e9 51 00 94 x...fxxx|yn0xxQ0x
000d51f0 fd 7b 43 a9 f4 4f 42 a9 ff 03 01 91 cf fe ff 17 x{Cxx0Bx|x.....x
000d5200 ca 52 28 30 09 52 28 10 e0 50 28 70 1f 20 03 d5 xR(0_R(0|xP(p...x
000d5210 e8 48 82 52 1f 20 03 d5 1f 20 03 d5 1a 4f 00 94 xHxR...x|x...00x
000d5220 ff c3 00 d1 f4 4f 01 a9 fd 7b 02 a9 fd 83 00 91 xx0xx0x|x{...x0x
000d5230 f3 03 01 aa f4 03 00 aa 68 12 40 b9 e8 00 00 34 x...x0x|h@xx004
000d5240 7d 6b 00 94 e8 0f 40 b9 89 02 40 f9 28 25 00 78 }k0xx0x|x@x(%0x
000d5250 89 02 00 f9 f9 ff ff 17 fd 7b 42 a9 38 50 00 14 x0xxxxx|x{BxP00
000d5260 f6 57 bd a9 f4 4f 01 a9 fd 7b 02 a9 fd 83 00 91 xWxxxx0x|x{...x0x
000d5270 28 24 41 29 2a 10 40 b9 2b 00 40 f9 08 01 09 4b ($A)*0x|+0x...K
000d5280 f4 03 00 aa 5f 01 08 6b 00 00 40 f9 f3 03 01 aa x0x...k|00@xxxx
000d5290 56 31 88 1a 61 09 09 8b c2 f6 7e d3 55 01 16 4b V1xa_x|x~xU0K
000d52a0 32 b9 fc 97 15 01 00 34 88 02 40 f9 61 02 40 f9 2xxx...04|x@xa0x
000d52b0 a2 f6 7e d3 00 09 16 8b 2c b9 fc 97 68 12 40 b9 xx~x0...x|x,xh0x
000d52c0 06 00 00 14 69 a2 41 29 6a 0a 40 b9 29 01 08 0b 000i0A|j_0x|...
000d52d0 3f 01 0a 6b f5 03 89 1a 75 0e 00 b9 89 02 40 f9 ?_kxxx|u0xxx0x
000d52e0 fd 7b 42 a9 e0 03 1f 2a 28 41 28 8b 7f 12 00 b9 x{Bxxxxx|(A(x00x
000d52f0 88 02 00 f9 f4 4f 41 a9 f6 57 c3 a8 c0 03 5f d6 x0xx0Ax|xWxxx...x
000d5300 ff c3 00 d1 f4 4f 01 a9 fd 7b 02 a9 fd 83 00 91 xx0xx0x|x{...x0x
000d5310 f3 03 01 aa f4 03 00 aa 68 12 40 b9 08 01 00 34 x...x0x|h0x004
000d5320 45 6b 00 94 88 02 40 f9 e9 0f 40 b9 0a 05 00 91 Ek0xx0x|x0x_00x
000d5330 8a 02 00 f9 09 01 00 39 f8 ff ff 17 fd 7b 42 a9 x0x...09|xxxx{xBx
000d5340 ff 4f 00 14 29 10 40 b9 e9 01 00 34 29 00 40 f9 x00...0x|x04)00x
000d5350 2a 0c 40 b9 e8 03 00 aa e0 03 1f 2a 29 79 6a b8 *_0xx0x|x...y|x
000d5360 09 01 00 b9 29 20 41 29 2b 10 40 b9 08 05 00 11 _0x) A|+0x...0
000d5370 0a 09 c9 1a 48 a1 09 1b 69 05 00 51 28 a0 01 29 _xHx...i0Q(x)
000d5380 c0 03 5f d6 80 00 80 52 bf 5b 00 14 f4 4f be a9 x_x0xR|x[0x0xx
000d5390 fd 7b 01 a9 fd 43 00 91 f3 03 00 aa 00 5c 40 b9 x{...C0x|x0x0\0x
000d53a0 f4 03 01 aa fb d7 ff 97 28 f8 a9 10 1f 20 03 d5 x...xxxxx|(xxx...x
000d53b0 68 d2 09 a9 a0 00 00 34 60 5a 40 b9 fd 7b 41 a9 hx_x004|^0xx{Ax
000d53c0 f4 4f c2 a8 dc d7 ff 17 fd 7b 41 a9 f4 4f c2 a8 x0xxxxx|x{Axx0xx
000d53d0 c0 03 5f d6 ff c3 00 d1 fd 7b 02 a9 fd 83 00 91 x...x0x|x{...x0x
000d53e0 9e 59 00 94 84 00 00 b4 e3 03 1f aa fd 7b 42 a9 xY0xx00x|x...x{Bx
000d53f0 4d 4f 00 14 2a 43 28 30 69 42 28 10 40 41 28 70 M00*0C(0|ib(0@A(p
000d5400 1f 20 03 d5 68 28 80 52 1f 20 03 d5 1f 20 03 d5 x...h(xR|...x...x
000d5410 9d 4e 00 94 ff c3 00 d1 fd 7b 02 a9 fd 83 00 91 xN0xxxx0x|x{...x0x
000d5420 88 00 40 f9 1f 01 02 eb 62 00 00 54 b6 67 00 94 x0x...x|x00Tg0x
000d5430 0f 00 00 14 e8 03 01 2a e9 03 1f aa 3f 01 02 eb 000...x|x...x?0x
000d5440 22 01 00 54 0a 60 40 39 8a 01 00 36 0a 04 40 f9 "0T_'09|x*06_00x
000d5450 0b 01 09 8b 6a 69 6a b8 6a 68 29 b8 29 11 00 91 x...xjix|jh)x)0x
000d5460 f7 ff ff 17 e0 03 1f 2a 82 00 00 f9 fd 7b 42 a9 xxx...x|x0xx{Bx
000d5470 ff c3 00 91 c0 03 5f d6 ca db 27 10 c9 c3 27 70 xx0xx...x|x'0xx'p
000d5480 20 3d 28 70 1f 20 03 d5 c8 5b 80 52 1f 20 03 d5 =(p...x|x[xR...x
000d5490 1f 20 03 d5 7c 4e 00 94 ff 83 02 d1 f4 4f 08 a9 x...x|N0x|x...x00x
000d54a0 fd 7b 09 a9 fd 43 02 91 f3 03 01 2a e1 03 02 aa x{...x0x|x...x0x
000d54b0 30 5d 00 94 d0 6a 00 94 f4 60 00 94 81 02 80 52 0]0xxj0x|x`0xx0xR
000d54c0 f3 0b 00 b9 c4 ff ff 97 fd 7b 4a a9 95 60 00 14 x0xxxxx|x{Ixx'00
```

Binary

Static Reverse Engineering

Decompiled




The screenshot displays the CodeBrowser application interface for the file `hwiocft/a.out`. The interface is divided into three main panes:

- Bytes: a.out** (Left Pane): Shows the raw binary data in hexadecimal and ASCII. The address `00101158` is highlighted, corresponding to the instruction `CALL 0x00101050` in the disassembly.
- Listing: a.out** (Middle Pane): Shows the disassembled assembly code. The instruction `CALL <EXTERNAL>::puts` at address `00101158` is highlighted. A red arrow points from this instruction to the decompiled code.
- Decompile: main - (a....** (Right Pane): Shows the decompiled C code. The function `main` is defined, and the `puts` function call is highlighted, corresponding to the assembly instruction in the middle pane.

At the bottom of the window, the status bar shows the current address `00101158`, the function name `main`, and the instruction `CALL 0x00101050`.

Disassembled

Dynamic Analysis (e.g. gdb)



```
reversing-lab — root@ubuntu-focal: /vagrant — ssh • vagrant ssh — 96x30
Reading symbols from a.out...
(No debugging symbols found in a.out)
(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x1149
(gdb) break puts
Breakpoint 2 at 0x1050
(gdb) run
Starting program: /vagrant/a.out

Breakpoint 1, 0x000055555555149 in main ()
(gdb) continue
Continuing.



Breakpoint 2, __GI__IO_puts (str=0x555555556004 "Hello reverse engineers
33      ioputs.c: No such file or directory.
(gdb) bt
#0 __GI__IO_puts (str=0x555555556004 "Hello reverse engineers!!!11") at
#1 0x00005555555515d in main ()
(gdb) disas main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x000055555555149 <+0>:      endbr64
0x00005555555514d <+4>:      push    %rbp
0x00005555555514e <+5>:      mov     %rsp,%rbp
0x000055555555151 <+8>:      lea     0xeac(%rip),%rdi
0x000055555555158 <+15>:     callq  0x55555555050 <puts@plt>
0x00005555555515d <+20>:     mov     $0x0,%eax
0x000055555555162 <+25>:     pop     %rbp
0x000055555555163 <+26>:     retq
End of assembler dump.
(gdb)
```

Rebased after loading

```
reversing-lab — root@ubuntu-focal: /vagrant — ssh • vagrant ssh — 96x29
(gdb) info registers
rax      0x55555555149      93824992235849
rbx      0x55555555170      93824992235888
rcx      0x55555555170      93824992235888
rdx      0x7fffffff648      140737488348744
rsi      0x7fffffff638      140737488348728
rdi      0x555555556004      93824992239620
rbp      0x7fffffff540      0x7fffffff540
rsp      0x7fffffff538      0x7fffffff538
r8       0x0               0
r9       0x7ffff7fe0d50      140737354009936
r10      0x0               0
r11      0x0               0
r12      0x55555555060      93824992235616
r13      0x7fffffff630      140737488348720
r14      0x0               0
r15      0x0               0
rip      0x7ffff7e53450      0x7ffff7e53450 <__GI__IO_puts>
eflags   0x246             [ PF ZF IF ]
cs       0x33             51
ss       0x2b             43
ds       0x0               0
es       0x0               0
fs       0x0               0
gs       0x0               0
(gdb) x/20c $rdi
0x555555556004: 72 'H' 101 'e' 108 'l' 108 'l' 111 'o' 32 ' ' 114 'r' 101 'e'
0x55555555600c: 118 'v' 101 'e' 114 'r' 115 's' 101 'e' 32 ' ' 101 'e' 110 'n'
0x555555556014: 103 'g' 105 'i' 110 'n' 101 'e'
```

puts argument
is located in rdi

Static vs. Dynamic

- Static 
 - Everything is in the binary!
 - Extensive staring will bring back (almost) the original source code.
- Dynamic 
 - Execute the binary and wait what happens.
 - Very fast if you know what you're looking for.
 - Might miss details and certain conditions that first have to be found statically.

You'll need different tools for both analysis methods.



Hooking

**The heavy lifting of
reverse engineering.**

Hooking

Print beneficiary->name
and credit

Change beneficiary
or credit

```
int handle_transfer(struct account* beneficiary, int credit) {  
    // nothing was transferred, keep the money  
    if !account_exists(beneficiary)  
        return 0;  
  
    // transfer and confirm money  
    beneficiary->value += credit;  
    return credit;  
}
```

Return 0 to pretend we
didn't get the money 💰

Hooking Methods

Static 🐢

Patch the binary, then run it.


Dynamic 🐰

Run the binary, then patch it.

Keep most of the program intact, only hook very specific parts.



**Reversing
Firmware**

“What you’re doing is really challenging.”

 Play CTFs if you would like to know a difficulty level or get a solution later on.

You wouldn't simply attach gdb
... or would you?

Running gdb on the Fitbit
requires patched firmware.



Code? Data?

Your disassembler might get 25% of function starts wrong on raw Arm firmware.

SoK: All You Ever Wanted to Know About x86/x64 Binary Disassembly But Were Afraid to Ask

Chengbin Pang*^{‡§} Ruotong Yu* Yaohui Chen[†] Eric Koskinen* Georgios Portokalidis* Bing Mao[‡] Jun Xu*
*Stevens Institute of Technology [†]Facebook Inc. [‡]Nanjing University

Abstract—Disassembly of binary code is hard, but necessary for improving the security of binary software. Over the past few decades, research in binary disassembly has produced many tools and frameworks, which have been made available to researchers and security professionals. These tools employ a variety of strategies that grant them different characteristics. The lack of systematic

TABLE I: The group of open-source tools that our study covers and representative works that use those tools.

Tool (Version)	Source (Release Date)	Public Use
PSI (1.0)	Website [63]	
Uproot		



Reversing Open-Source

- What you're reversing might be open-source.
- Look for specific libraries, e.g., encryption, real-time operating systems, ...
- Get different firmware versions for your target!

00081560	32 32 32 00 4c e4 05 00 3e 24 00 00 01 08 6e 04	222.L...>\$....n.
00081570	02 00 00 00 34 4e 56 60 78 e4 05 00 02 20 00 004NV`x.... ..
00081580	1b 00 20 00 28 00 0f 0f 0f 00 00 00 6c e5 05 00	.. .(.....1...
00081590	00 00 00 00 43 6f 70 79 72 69 67 68 74 20 28 63Copyright (c
000815a0	29 20 31 39 39 36 2d 32 30 30 33 20 45 78 70 72) 1996-2003 Expr
000815b0	65	ess Logic Inc. *
000815c0	20	ThreadX ATMEL/G
000815d0	72	reen Hills Versi
000815e0	6f 6e 20 47 34 2e 30 62 2e 34 2e 30 63 20 2a 00	on G4.0b.4.0c *.
000815f0	47 2d 47 42 2d 47 4c 2d 4d 2d 44 2d 44 4c 2d 4b	G-GB-GL-M-D-DL-K
00081600	4d 4c 2d 43 4d 52 2d 48 4d 52 2d 4d 4c 32 2d 47	ML-CMR-HMR-ML2-G
00081610	5a 2d 4b 48 32 2d 43 4d 2d 52 50 2d 54 43 2d 4e	Z-KH2-CM-RP-TC-N
00081620	48 2d 54 44 2d 41 50 2d 48 41 2d 47 46 2d 44 44	H-TD-AP-HA-GF-DD
00081630	2d 41 54 2d 4d 46 2d 4d 53 2d 44 57 2d 55 53 41	-AT-MF-MS-DW-USA
00081640	2d 43 41 2d 53 44 2d 53 44 53 55 00 05 00 00 00	-CA-SD-SDSU.....
00081650	08 00 0f 00 1a 00 00 00 28 46 6c 6f 61 74 69 6e(Floatin
00081660	67 20 70 6f 69 6e 74 20 6f 75 74 70 75 74 20 75	g point output u
00081670	6e 73 75 70 70 6f 72 74 65 64 20 77 2f 2d 6e 6f	nsupported w/-no

There's ThreadX documentation and newer versions are open-source!

From the Bluetooth firmware that Dennis and me were staring on for multiple months, older BCM20702 version.

```

002069d0  00 00 00 00 55 45 55 51 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 |.....UEUQ.....|
002069e0  01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 10 0d 20 00 |.....|
002069f0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
00206a00  /* Define queue control specific data definitions. */ |... ..|
00206a10  #define TX_QUEUE_ID      ((ULONG) 0x51554555) |..j .li .UEUQ|
00206a20  https://github.com/azure-rtos/threadx/blob/master/common/inc/tx\_queue.h |.....|
00206a30  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....Dj .|
00206a40  d4 69 20 00 55 45 55 51 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 |.i .UEUQ.....|
00206a50  20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 7c 6a 20 00 | .....|j .|
00206a60  7c 6b 20 00 7c 6a 20 00 7c 6a 20 00 00 00 00 00 ||k .|j .|j .....|
00206a70  00 00 00 00 90 33 20 00 0c 6a 20 00 00 00 00 00 |.....3 ..j .....|
00206a80  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
00206a90  * |.....|
00206b70  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4e 44 56 44 |.....NDVD|
00206b80  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 6b 20 00 |.....k .|
00206b90  01 00 00 00 ac 9c 20 00 44 35 20 00 00 00 00 00 |.....D5 .....|
00206ba0  4c 36 20 00 7f a7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |L6 .....|
00206bb0  00 00 00 00 45 a7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |....E.....|
00206bc0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 52 48 54 6b 02 00 00 |.....DRHTk...|
00206bd0  80 6d 20 00 6c 6c 20 00 47 6e 20 00 dc 01 00 00 |.m .ll .Gn .....|

```

Even if you don't find source code for an RTOS,
reversing semantics of threads, queues, etc.
will be a great starting point!


Encryption

- Cryptographic algorithms use magic numbers.
- XTEA encryption delta value: 0x9E3779B9
- ...how many encryption libraries supporting 32bit Arm are there?

Search Memory - "9E3779B9" - (flexFlashAll.bin v1) (2 entries)		
Location	Label	Code Unit
08002a84	xtea_bytes	undefined4 9E3779B9h
0800eaf8	xtea_bytes2	undefined4 9E3779B9h

Statically-Linked Libraries

- If code from multiple libraries/modules is included in the same binary, the compiler tends to keep them in the same location.
- Some libraries/algorithms/specifications are open-source, search for weird numbers online.
- Check if nearby functions and xrefs belong to the same library. Note that cross-references are not always found by the disassembler!




Symbols

- Raw firmware flash dumps don't contain symbols.
- SDKs might still contain symbols to link components into the firmware!

Reviewer 2:

"Does it work on the latest firmware?"

Reverse Engineering without Symbols



Reverse Engineering with Symbols

```
thread_Create(ptr, name, prio,  
func, 0, 0, stack_size)
```

blueRF_Rd(addr)

diag_logLcpPkt()


DHM_LMPTx(conn, buff)

LM_LmpInfoTableBPCS

lm_handleEvents()

bthci_cmd_vs_HandleSuper_Duper_Peek_Poke()

main()




Real-World Targets

Specify a Goal

- Can we send custom data or waveforms with this Wi-Fi chip?
- Could this protocol be more performant when we change the scheduling?
- How does Apple's Bluetooth stack behave when we pick a high Ratchet during the MagicPairing algorithm?

Anything that keeps you motivated!



- 
- What you're looking for might not exist.
 - Real-world targets are overwhelmingly large.
 - Most bugs are relatively simple (compared to advanced CTFs).
 - Certain attack vectors might've been extensively tested by someone else before.

A 3D maze made of white walls on a grey floor. Several insects are placed within the maze: a blue fly in the upper left, a ladybug in the lower left, an ant in the lower center, and a yellow caterpillar in the lower right. Red arrows trace paths through the maze. One path starts from the top, moves right, then turns left and then right, ending with an arrow pointing towards the center. Another path starts from the right side, moves left, then turns right and then left, ending with an arrow pointing towards the center. A third path starts from the bottom left, moves right, then turns left and then right, ending with an arrow pointing towards the center. A fourth path starts from the bottom right, moves left, then turns right and then left, ending with an arrow pointing towards the center.

Wrong
decisions...

Where to
start?

Meanwhile,
another
researcher

Getting Started

Great Resources

- begin.re
Get started with Windows/x86 reverse engineering and hack Minesweeper.
- ragingrock.com/AndroidAppRE
Learn how to reverse engineer Android apps (Java/x64) to uncover malware functionality.



Don't give up staring!

Q&A



youtube.com/@jiskac



[@jiska@chaos.social](https://chaos.social/@jiska)



github.com/seemoo-lab



jclassen@seemoo.de