This Week In Security: Echospoofing, Ransomware Records, And Github Attestations

It’s a bit of bitter irony, when a security product gets used maliciously, to pull off the exact attack it was designed to prevent. Enter Proofpoint, and the EchoSpoofing attack. Proofpoint offers an email security product, filtering spam and malicious incoming emails, and also handling SPF, DKIM, and DMARC headers on outgoing email. How does an external service provide those email authentication headers?

One of the cardinal sins of running an email server is to allow open relaying. That’s when anyone can forward email though an SMTP server without authentication. What we have here is two nearly open relays, that wound up with spoofed emails getting authenticated just like the real thing. The first offender is Microsoft’s Office365, which seems to completely skip checking for email spoofing when using SMTP relaying from an allowed IP address. This means a valid Office365 account allows sending emails as any address. The other half relies on the way Proofpoint works normally, accepting SMTP traffic from certain IP addresses, and adding the authentication headers to those emails. There’s an option in Proofpoint to add the Microsoft Office 365 servers to that list, and apparently quite a few companies simply select that option.

The end result is that a clever spammer can send millions of completely legitimate looking emails every day, that look very convincing even to sophisticated users. At six months of activity, averaging three millions emails a day, this campaign managed just over half a billion malicious emails from multiple high-profile domains.

The good news here is that Proofpoint and Guardio discovered the scheme, and worked with Microsoft to develop the X-OriginatorOrg header that is now applied to every email sent from or through the Office365 servers. This header marks the account tenant the email belongs to, giving vendors like Proofpoint a simple way to determine email validity. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Echospoofing, Ransomware Records, And Github Attestations”

This Week In Security: EvilVideo, Crowdstrike, And InSecure Boot

First up this week is the story of EvilVideo, a clever telegram exploit that disguises an APK as a video file. The earliest record we have of this exploit is on June 6th when it was advertised on a hacking forum.

Researchers at ESET discovered a demo of the exploit, and were able to disclose it to Telegram on June 26th. It was finally patched on July 11. While it was advertised as a “one-click” exploit, that’s being a bit generous, as the ESET demo video shows. But it was a clever exploit. The central trick is that an APK file can be sent in a Telegram chat, and it displays what looks like a video preview. Tap the “video” file to watch it, and Telegram prompts you to play it with an external player. But it turns out the external player in this case is Android itself, which prompts the target to install the APK. Sneaky.

Continue reading “This Week In Security: EvilVideo, Crowdstrike, And InSecure Boot”

This Week In Security: Snowflake, The CVD Tension, And Kaspersky’s Exit — And Breaking BSOD

In the past week, AT&T has announced an absolutely massive data breach. This is sort of a multi-layered story, but it gives me an opportunity to use my favorite piece of snarky IT commentary: The cloud is a fancy way to talk about someone else’s servers. And when that provider has a security problem, chances are, so do you.

The provider in question is Snowflake, who first made the news in the Ticketmaster breach. As far as anyone can tell, Snowflake has not actually been directly breached, though it seems that researchers at Hudson Rock briefly reported otherwise. That post has not only been taken down, but also scrubbed from the wayback machine, apparently in response to a legal threat from Snowflake. Ironically, Snowflake has confirmed that one of their former employees was compromised, but Snowflake is certain that nothing sensitive was available from the compromised account.

At this point, it seems that the twin problems are that big organizations aren’t properly enforcing security policy like Two Factor Authentication, and Snowflake just doesn’t provide the tools to set effective security policy. The Mandiant report indicates that all the breaches were the result of credential stealers and other credential-based techniques like credential stuffing. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Snowflake, The CVD Tension, And Kaspersky’s Exit — And Breaking BSOD”

This Week In Security: Blast-RADIUS, Gitlab, And Plormbing

The RADIUS authentication scheme, short for “Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service”, has been widely deployed for user authentication in all sorts of scenarios. It’s a bit odd, in that individual users authenticate to a “RADIUS Client”, sometimes called a Network Access Server (NAS). In response to an authentication request, a NAS packages up the authentication details, and sends it to a central RADIUS server for verification. The server then sends back a judgement on the authentication request, and if successful the user is authenticated to the NAS/client.

The scheme was updated to its current form in 1994, back when MD5 was considered a cryptographically good hash. It’s been demonstrated that MD5 has problems, most notably a chosen-prefix collision attack demonstrated in 2007. The basis of this collision attack is that given two arbitrary messages, it is possible to find a pair of values that, when appended to the end of those messages, result in matching md5 hashes for each combined message. It turns out this is directly applicable to RADIUS.
Continue reading “This Week In Security: Blast-RADIUS, Gitlab, And Plormbing”

This Week In Security: Hide Yo SSH, Polyfill, And Packing It Up

The big news this week was that OpenSSH has an unauthorized Remote Code Execution exploit. Or more precisely, it had one that was fixed in 2006, that was unintentionally re-introduced in version 8.5p1 from 2021. The flaw is a signal handler race condition, where async-unsafe code gets called from within the SIGALARM handler. What does that mean?
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This Week In Security: Kaspersky Ban, Project Naptime, And More

The hot news this week is that Kaspersky is banned in the USA. More specifically, Kaspersky products will be banned from sale in the US starting on September 29. This ban will extend to blocking software updates, though it’s unclear how that will actually be accomplished. It’s reasonable to assume that payment processors will block payments to Kaspersky, but will ISPs be required to block traffic that could contain antivirus updates?

WordPress Plugin Backdoor

A Quartet of WordPress plugins have been found to have recently included backdoor code. It’s a collection of five Open Source plugins, seemingly developed by unrelated people. Malicious updates first showed up on June 21st, and it appears that all five plugins are shipping the same malicious code.

Rabbit AI API

The Rabbit R1 was released to less than thunderous applause. The idea is a personal AI device, but the execution has been disappointing, to the point of reviewers suggesting some of the earlier claims were fabricated. Now it seems there’s a serious security issue, in the form of exposed API keys that have *way* too many privileges.

The research seems to be done by the rabbitude group, who found the keys back in May. Of the things allowed by access to the API keys, the most worrying for user privacy was access to every text-to-speech call. Rabbitude states in their June 25 post, that “rabbit inc has known that we have had their elevenlabs (tts) api key for a month, but they have taken no action to rotate the api keys.” On the other hand, rabbit pushed a statement on the 26th, claiming they were just then made aware of the issue, and made the needed key rotations right away.

Continue reading “This Week In Security: Kaspersky Ban, Project Naptime, And More”

This Week In Security: Chat Control, Vulnerability Extortion, And Emoji Malware

Way back in 2020, I actually read the proposed US legislation known as EARN IT, and with some controversy, concluded that much of the criticism of that bill was inaccurate. Well what’s old is new again, except this time it’s the European Union that’s wrestling with how to police online Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM). And from what I can tell of reading the actual legislation (pdf), this time it really is that bad.

The legislation lays out two primary goals, both of them problematic. The first is detection, or what some are calling “upload moderation”. The technical details are completely omitted here, simply stating that services “… take reasonable measures to mitigate the risk of their services being misused for such abuse …” The implication here is that providers would do some sort of automated scanning to detect illicit text or visuals, but exactly what constitutes “reasonable measures” is left unspecified.

The second goal is the detection order. It’s worth pointing out that interpersonal communication services are explicitly mentioned as required to implement these goals. From the bill:

Providers of hosting services and providers of interpersonal communications services that have received a detection order shall execute it by installing and operating technologies approved by the Commission to detect the dissemination of known or new child sexual abuse material or the solicitation of children…

This bill is careful not to prohibit end-to-end encryption, nor require that such encryption be backdoored. Instead, it requires that the apps themselves be backdoored, to spy on users before encryption happens. No wonder Meredith Whittaker has promised to pull the Signal app out of the EU if it becomes law. As this scanning is done prior to encryption, it’s technically not breaking end-to-end encryption.

You may wonder why that’s such a big deal. Why is it a non-negotiable for the Signal app to not look for CSAM in messages prior to encryption? For starters, it’s a violation of user trust and an intentional weakening of the security of the Signal system. But maybe most importantly, it puts a mechanism in place that will undoubtedly prove too tempting for future governments. If Signal can be forced into looking for CSAM in the EU, why not anti-government speech in China?

Continue reading “This Week In Security: Chat Control, Vulnerability Extortion, And Emoji Malware”