FLOSS Weekly Episode 840: End-of-10; Not Just Some Guy In A Van

This week Jonathan chats with Joseph P. De Veaugh-Geiss about KDE’s eco initiative and the End of 10 campaign! Is Open Source really a win for environmentalism? How does the End of 10 campaign tie in? And what does Pewdiepie have to do with it? Watch to find out!

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This Week In Security: Anthropic, Coinbase, And Oops Hunting

Anthropic has had an eventful couple weeks, and we have two separate write-ups to cover. The first is a vulnerability in the Antropic MCP Inspector, CVE-2025-49596. We’ve talked a bit about the Module Context Protocol (MCP), the framework that provides a structure for AI agents to discover and make use of software tools. MCP Inspector is an Open Source tool that proxies MCP connections, and provides debugging information for developers.

MCP Inspector is one of those tools that is intended to be run only on secure networks, and doesn’t implement any security or authentication controls. If you can make a network connection to the tool, you can control it. and MCP Inspector has the /sse endpoint, which allows running shell commands as a feature. This would all be fine, so long as everyone using the tool understands that it is not to be exposed to the open Internet. Except there’s another security quirk that intersects with this one. The 0.0.0.0 localhost bypass.

The “0.0.0.0 day exploit” is a bypass in essentially all the modern browsers, where localhost can be accessed on MacOS and Linux machines by making requests to 0.0.0.0. Browsers and security programs already block access to localhost itself, and 127.0.0.1, but this bypass means that websites can either request 0.0.0.0 directly, or rebind a domain name to 0.0.0.0, and then make requests.

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This Week In Security: MegaOWNed, Store Danger, And FileFix

Earlier this year, I was required to move my server to a different datacenter. The tech that helped handle the logistics suggested I assign one of my public IPs to the server’s Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) port, so I could access the controls there if something went sideways. I passed on the offer, and not only because IPv4 addresses are a scarce commodity these days. No, I’ve never trusted a server’s built-in BMC. For reasons like this MegaOWN of MegaRAC, courtesy of a CVSS 10.0 CVE, under active exploitation in the wild.

This vulnerability was discovered by Eclypsium back in March and it’s a pretty simple authentication bypass, exploited by setting an X-Server-Addr header to the device IP address and adding an extra colon symbol to that string. Send this along inside an HTTP request, and it’s automatically allowed without authentication. This was assigned CVE-2024-54085, and for servers with the BMC accessible from the Internet, it scores that scorching 10.0 CVSS.

We’re talking about this now, because CISA has added this CVE to the official list of vulnerabilities known to be exploited in the wild. And it’s hardly surprising, as this is a near-trivial vulnerability to exploit, and it’s not particularly challenging to find web interfaces for the MegaRAC devices using tools like Shodan and others.

There’s a particularly ugly scenario that’s likely to play out here: Embedded malware. This vulnerability could be chained with others, and the OS running on the BMC itself could be permanently modified. It would be very difficult to disinfect and then verify the integrity of one of these embedded systems, short of physically removing and replacing the flash chip. And malware running from this very advantageous position very nearly have the keys to the kingdom, particularly if the architecture connects the BMC controller over the PCIe bus, which includes Direct Memory Access.

This brings us to the really bad news. These devices are everywhere. The list of hardware that ships with the MegaRAC Redfish UI includes select units from “AMD, Ampere Computing, ASRock, ARM, Fujitsu, Gigabyte, Huawei, Nvidia, Supermicro, and Qualcomm”. Some of these vendors have released patches. But at this point, any of the vulnerable devices on the Internet, still unpatched, should probably be considered compromised. Continue reading “This Week In Security: MegaOWNed, Store Danger, And FileFix”

This Week In Security: That Time I Caused A 9.5 CVE, IOS Spyware, And The Day The Internet Went Down

Meshtastic just released an eye-watering 9.5 CVSS CVE, warning about public/private keys being re-used among devices. And I’m the one that wrote the code. Not to mention, I triaged and fixed it. And I’m part of Meshtastic Solutions, the company associated with the project. This is is the story of how we got here, and a bit of perspective.

First things first, what kind of keys are we talking about, and what does Meshtastic use them for? These are X25519 keys, used specifically for encrypting and authenticating Direct Messages (DMs), as well as optionally for authorizing remote administration actions. It is, by the way, this remote administration scenario using a compromised key, that leads to such a high CVSS rating. Before version 2.5 of Meshtastic, the only cryptography in place was simple AES-CTR encryption using shared symmetric keys, still in use for multi-user channels. The problem was that DMs were also encrypted with this channel key, and just sent with the “to” field populated. Anyone with the channel key could read the DM.

I re-worked an old pull request that generated X25519 keys on boot, using the rweather/crypto library. This sentence highlights two separate problems, that both can lead to unintentional key re-use. First, the keys are generated at first boot. I was made painfully aware that this was a weakness, when a user sent an email to the project warning us that he had purchased two devices, and they had matching keys out of the box. When the vendor had manufactured this device, they flashed Meshtastic on one device, let it boot up once, and then use a debugger to copy off a “golden image” of the flash. Then every other device in that particular manufacturing run was flashed with this golden image — containing same private key. sigh

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