While working towards his Computing and Information Systems degree at the University of London, [Jason Fenech] submitted an interesting proposal for generating random numbers using nothing more exotic than an aquarium and a sufficiently high resolution camera. Not only does his BubbleRNG make a rather relaxing sound while in operation, but according to tools such as ENT, NIST-STS, and DieHard, appears to be a source of true randomness.
If you want to build your own BubbleRNG, all you need is a tank of water and some air pumps to generate the bubbles. A webcam looking down on the surface of the water captures the chaos that ensues when the columns of bubbles generated by each pump collide. In the video after the break [Jason] uses two pumps, but considering they’re cheaper than lava lamps, we’d probably chuck a few more into the mix. To be on the safe side, he mentions that the placement and number of pumps should be arbitrary and not repeated on subsequent installations.
To turn this tiny maelstrom into a source of random numbers, OpenCV is first used to identify the bubbles in the video stream that are between a user-supplied minimum and maximum radius. The software then captures the X and Y coordinates of each bubble, and the resulting values are shuffled around and XOR’d until a stream of random numbers comes out the other end. What you do with this cheap source of infinite improbability is, of course, up to you.
While this project has been floating around (no pun intended) the Internet for a few years now, it seems to have gone largely overlooked, and was only just brought to our attention thanks to a tip from one of our illustrious readers. An excellent reminder that if you see something interesting out there, we’d love to hear about it.
CVE-2019-5700 is a vulnerability in the Nvidia Tegra bootloader, discovered by [Ryan Grachek], and breaking first here at Hackaday. To understand the vulnerability, one first has to understand a bit about the Tegra boot process. When the device is powered on, a irom firmware loads the next stage of the boot process from the device’s flash memory, and validates the signature on that binary. As an aside, we’ve covered a similar vulnerability in that irom code called selfblow.
On Tegra T4 devices, irom loads a single bootloader.bin, which in turn boots the system image. The K1 boot stack uses an additional bootloader stage, nvtboot, which loads the secure OS kernel before handing control to bootloader.bin. Later devices add additional stages, but that isn’t important for understanding this. The vulnerability uses an Android boot image, and the magic happens in the header. Part of this boot image is an optional second stage bootloader, which is very rarely used in practice. The header of this boot image specifies the size in bytes of each element, as well as what memory location to load that element to. What [Ryan] realized is that while it’s usually ignored, the information about the second stage bootloader is honored by the official Nvidia bootloader.bin, but neither the size nor memory location are sanity checked. The images are copied to their final position before the cryptographic verification happens. As a result, an Android image can overwrite the running bootloader code. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Tegra Bootjacking, Leaking SSH, And StrandHogg”→
When you’re a nation state, secure communications are key to protecting your sovereignty and keeping your best laid plans under wraps. For the USA, this requirement led to the development of a series of secure telephony networks over the years. John McMaster found himself interested in investigating the workings of the STU-III secure telephone, and set out to replicate the secure keys used with this system.
[John] had a particular affinity for the STU-III for its method of encrypting phone calls. A physical device known as a Crypto Ignition Key had to be inserted into the telephone, and turned with a satisfying clunk to enable encryption. This physical key contains digital encryption keys that, in combination with those in the telephone, are used to encrypt the call. The tactile interface gives very clear feedback to the user about securing the communication channel. Wishing to learn more, John began to research the system further and attempted to source some hardware to tinker with.
As John explains in his Hackaday Superconference talk embeded below, he was able to source a civilian-model STU-III handset but the keys proved difficult to find. As carriers of encryption keys, it’s likely that most were destroyed as per security protocol when reaching their expiry date. However, after laying his hands on a broken key, he was able to create a CAD model and produce a mechanically compatible prototype that would fit in the slot and turn correctly.
Malware embedded in office documents has been a popular attack for years. Many of those attacks have been fixed, and essentially all the current attacks are unworkable when a document is opened in protected view. There are ways around this, like putting a notice at the top of a document, requesting that the user turn off protected view. [Curtis Brazzell] has been researching phishing, and how attacks can work around mitigations like protected view. He noticed that one of his booby-trapped documents phoned home before it was opened. How exactly? The preview pane.
The Windows Explorer interface has a built-in preview pane, and it helpfully supports Microsoft Office formats. The problem is that the preview isn’t generated using protected view, at least when previewing Word documents. Generating the preview is enough to trigger loading of remote content, and could feasibly be used to trigger other vulnerabilities. [Curtis] notified Microsoft about the issue, and the response was slightly disappointing. His discovery is officially considered a bug, but not a vulnerability.
Researchers at Kaspersky took a hard look at several VNC implementations, and uncovered a total of 37 CVEs so far. It seems that several VNC projects share a rather old code-base, and it contains a plethora of potential bugs. VNC should be treated similarly to RDP — don’t expose it to the internet, and don’t connect to unknown servers. The protocol wasn’t written with security in mind, and none of the implementations have been sufficiently security hardened.
Examples of flaws include: Checking that a message doesn’t overflow the buffer after having copied it into said buffer. Another code snippet reads a variable length message into a fixed length buffer without any length checks. That particular function was originally written at AT&T labs back in the late 90s, and has been copied into multiple projects since then.
There is another WhatsApp flaw, but instead of malicious GIFs, this time it’s malicious mp4 files. Facebook announced the vulnerability late last week. An update has been released, so first go make sure WhatsApp is updated. Facebook’s advisory is a bit light on the details, simply saying that a “stack-based buffer overflow” was possible as a result of “parsing the elementary stream metadata of an mp4 file”.
Most readers will be familiar with the ESP32, Espressif’s dual-core processor with integrated WiFi and Bluetooth. Few of us though will have explored all of its features, including its built-in encryption facilities and secure booting capability. With these, a developer can protect and secure their code, and keep their devices secure.
That sense of security may now be illusory though, thanks to [LimitedResults] who has developed a series of attacks on the chip that compromise its crypto core, secure boot, and flash encryption. This enables both the chance of arbitrary code execution and firmware extraction on locked-down ESP32 devices.
To achieve all this he used a glitching technique on the device’s power supply, inserting a carefully timed glitch in the rail to coincide with a particular instruction being executed. For those of us who are not experts in this technique, he provides a basic primer with a description of his home-made glitcher made using a CMOS switch chip.
It appears that there is no solution to this attack short of new silicon, however, it should be borne in mind that it’s something that depends upon a specialist hacker with a well-equipped bench, and is thus only likely to be a significant headache to manufacturers. But it undermines a key feature of a major line of microcontrollers, and as such it remains a significant piece of work.
An issue was discovered in libarchivethrough Google’s ClusterFuzz project. Libarchive is a compression and decompression library, widely used in utilities. The issue here is how the library recovers from a malformed archive. Hitting an invalid header causes the memory in use to be freed. The problem is that it’s possible for file processing to continue even after that working memory has been freed, leading to all kinds of problems. So far an actual exploit hasn’t been revealed, but it’s likely that one is possible. The problem was fixed back in May, but the issue was just announced to give time for that update to percolate down to users.