This Week In Security: Broken Embargoes, UEFI Overflow, Wormable Tailscale, Starlink Ad Snooping, And A DHS Directory Dump

Last week brought us at least two broken embargoes: php2shell leaked onto Hacker News a day early, and a batch of Linux kernel bugs landed on the public kernel mailing list instead of the private security list. This week has been slightly less exciting overall, fortunately, but Akamai’s security team published a pointed essay titled “TLP Is Not a Suggestion”, and it’s hard to argue with the timing.

When a researcher finds a serious bug, the usual process is “coordinated disclosure”. The developers get time to build a fix, and downstream vendors get advance notice under embargo so patches and protections are ready the moment details go public. The Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) is the vocabulary everyone uses to say who may know what: TLP:RED for named recipients only, TLP:AMBER for an organization and its clients on a need-to-know basis, TLP:GREEN for a trusted community, and TLP:CLEAR for anyone. It has no legal teeth whatsoever. It’s not classified data in a legal sense. It works because everyone involved agrees to make it work.

Akamai’s complaint isn’t really about the original php2shell leak, but about what came after: vendors and researchers racing to confirm, reproduce, and publish first. According to Akamai, a researcher published a reconstruction of the bug before the patch existed, and exploitation attempts started before most admins knew there was anything to patch. They draw parallels to Heartbleed in 2014, where a handful of companies got early notice and then advertised that they were already safe while Linux distributions were caught flat-footed, and to Meltdown and Spectre in 2018, where a six-month embargo collapsed six days early.

In the rush to publish, it’s also become less clear what the actual severity of the bug is in the real world. It clearly exists, and is of concern, but groups are still struggling to prove a complete exploit path, with several challenges showing results but nothing definitive so far.

Their advice boils down to “protect first, publish second”: push the detection rules and virtual patches, tell your customers privately, and save the blog post for after the official advisory. With AI tooling shrinking the time between “details exist” and “working exploit” to hours, the cost of a broken embargo is going up, not down.

Continue reading “This Week In Security: Broken Embargoes, UEFI Overflow, Wormable Tailscale, Starlink Ad Snooping, And A DHS Directory Dump” →

This Week In Security: Record Patch Tuesday, PHP’s Bad Time, The Oldest Vuln, AI Armies, And More

It’s no longer a proper month without Microsoft breaking its own record for security fixes, and October’s Patch Tuesday was no exception. Brian Krebs brings the roundup: more than 1,400 vulnerabilities fixed in a single batch, dwarfing September’s record of nearly 1,000, which itself was about ten times the normal monthly load. According to Tenable, Microsoft has now passed 4,000 CVEs for the year with two months still to go.

Only one of the fixes is for a vulnerability already being exploited in the wild: CVE-2026-96951, a security feature bypass in the Windows Shell affecting Windows 10, 11, and some Server versions. A .NET Framework bypass, CVE-2026-108398, was publicly disclosed before the patch, giving attackers a head start, and with modern AI tooling, it seems like not much of a head start is needed. At least 78 of the bugs are rated critical, and most of those allow remote code execution with little or no user interaction. Windows 10 holdouts can relax a little: Microsoft quietly extended free updates through October 2027.  Given the pace of exploitation, this is probably the only way to prevent an Internet-scale meltdown.

Microsoft credits LLM-driven bug hunting for the volume, which leaves the poor admins who have to test and deploy all of this in an unenviable spot. Fortra’s analysis shows that only 26 Microsoft vulnerabilities have landed in the CISA KEV catalog of actively exploited bugs so far this year, so start there. For the rest, the SANS Internet Storm Center and Cisco Talos have the usual breakdowns by severity. Or, you know, just patch everything and hope for the best, which is roughly what everyone does anyhow.

Continue reading “This Week In Security: Record Patch Tuesday, PHP’s Bad Time, The Oldest Vuln, AI Armies, And More” →

This Week In Security: Critical DNS Keys Rotated, Hacking Freezers Isn’t Cool, OpenAI Spies On Itself, And Advanced Hardware Wallet Hacks

Critical Internet keys changed this week. Did you notice?  The keys behind DNSSEC, the system for cryptographically validating DNS responses, rolled over on October 11 2026. This is the second time the DNSSEC keys have rotated since the system was implemented, and the first time in 2018 didn’t exactly go entirely smoothly.

DNS is what resolves a host name and turns it into an IP address. It underpins web browsing, email, and just about every other connection. It’s also a very early Internet protocol, written in both a simpler, less paranoid era, and an era where encryption was computationally expensive and legally problematic. DNS offers little protection against malicious actors spoofing responses, and the impacts range from phishing to redirecting email to just about any other manipulation of connections you can image.

DNSSEC addresses this by creating a chain of trust between DNS resolvers — the servers that forward the DNS query into the DNS infrastructure and return the results — and the global DNS servers. Part of this chain of trust is the root key that each resolver must have and trust, and this key is what changed this week.  DNSSEC resolvers automatically watch for a new root of trust key, but the key must be signed by the previous root of trust, and is checked for at least 30 days before it is trusted.  If someone were able to issue a bogus certificate, they would have to maintain control of the infrastructure for over a month before DNS resolvers would trust it.

The process of distributing the new key actually began more than a year ago, on January 11, 2025, to give DNSSEC resolvers time to get the new key. DNSSEC services should have had plenty of time to obtain and trust the new key, and unless DNS stopped working for you this week, they did their job.

The next major change for DNSSEC will require more profound changes to deploy a new signing algorithm that will be post-quantum secure.

Continue reading “This Week In Security: Critical DNS Keys Rotated, Hacking Freezers Isn’t Cool, OpenAI Spies On Itself, And Advanced Hardware Wallet Hacks” →

This Week In Security: New Spectre Attacks, Crushing Quantity Of Linux Vulns, Google Gets Too Much AI, And Hacking Lawnmowers

Just-in-time, or JIT, compilation could be considered a fundamental backbone of modern computing.  JIT compilation turns scripting languages like JavaScript or intermediary binary forms like Web Assembly into native code on the fly, giving web apps, and things that are web apps under the covers like Electron-based tools, near native speed.  A new paper explores leveraging JIT systems to revive Spectre-v2 attacks against processors.

Most modern processors gain performance by using a trick called “speculative execution”.  The processor guesses the likely result of a compare, and begins executing some of the next instructions before the results are actually known.  If the processor guessed right, things continue and there is a speed gain because it can jump ahead, but if the processor guessed wrong, any instructions that were run and any side effects of running them are discarded and execution resumes on the actual path.  In theory, anyhow.

In practice, the Spectre class of attacks targets branch prediction. It was discovered that when the wrong branch was chosen, not all of the results were truly hidden; Patterns of failures in guessing branches can be used to leak behavior processing encryption keys and other activities. The attacks evolved with the research dubbed Spectre-V2, which showed that non-privileged contexts, like non-root users and virtual machines, could poison the instruction prediction and use it to read arbitrary memory.  Fixes to the Linux kernel and other platforms were required to mitigate the worst of the effects.

The paper shows that by using self-modifying code in the JIT, the processor can be tricked into loading cached versions of the instructions.  The fixes to the kernel to prevent Spectre attacks include identifying malicious code patterns that attack the branch prediction, and stopping or changing them:  By causing the CPU to execute the cached copy of instructions instead of the live copy, the attack ignores the fixed instructions entirely and can attack the branch prediction algorithm.

To prove the attack is feasible in the real world, the researchers targeted several JIT compilers, including the SpiderMonkey JavaScript engine used by Firefox, the eBPF JIT found in the Linux kernel, and GraalVM, the JIT used in Python.  They found success with each, demonstrating that the attack is at least plausible.

Research like this is unlikely to be an instant world-melter, and will help find possible mitigations in the future to prevent these sorts of attacks.  Operating systems that support a high-security “lock-down” mode, like macOS and iOS, often disable JIT entirely, out of concern about these sorts of attacks.  There’s probably no need to start disabling JIT on every system, but attacks like these have a tendency to evolve.

Continue reading “This Week In Security: New Spectre Attacks, Crushing Quantity Of Linux Vulns, Google Gets Too Much AI, And Hacking Lawnmowers” →

This Week In Security: ShinyHunters Won’t Dox The FBI, Pentagon Data Stolen, And OBS Vulnerable

404 Media reports that the ShinyHunters group who stole multiple terabytes of FBI employee data say they do not plan to release the data.

Known for ransomware and extortion of innumerable companies and government agencies, ShinyHunters used a zero-day vulnerability in Oracle PeopleSoft to compromise the employment site of the FBI and pivot into scraping the content of FBI AWS instances, claiming to have the full employment and health data of all FBI agents, employees, and spouses.

The hacker group took exception to an FBI press release that claimed that the group over-stated stolen data and that they directly harass victims and victim’s families.  The group publicized the FBI data breach, demanding a retraction of the statements, and it was generally assumed that the group would follow their typical methods of releasing the data publicly if the demands were not met.

The group has told 404 media that they had always agreed internally to not release the stolen data, saying “This was all a marketing campaign to protect our business and actively combat disinformation”.  Meanwhile the FBI continues the investigation, and Shiny Hunters may be hoping to defer some of the ire.

Continue reading “This Week In Security: ShinyHunters Won’t Dox The FBI, Pentagon Data Stolen, And OBS Vulnerable” →

This Week In Security: FBI Gets Hacked, Muse Vulnerable To ClickFix, Popular Rust Developers At Risk, And New Attacks Against RSA

The prolific ShinyHunters group has announced it used a zero-day vulnerability in Oracle PeopleSoft to exploit the FBI jobs website and gain access to the AWS GovCloud instances and dump 2 TB of employee data. GovCloud being a special, locked-down version of the Amazon Web Services cloud for US government users.

ShinyHunters has previously been involved in dozens of high-profile hacks and ransomware incidents.  Some of the highest-profile incidents include Jaguar-Land Rover, causing a measurable impact on the UK GDP, Grubhub, Carnival Cruise Lines, Rockstar Games, and multiple universities and educational institutions, casinos, and other government agencies.  ShinyHunters has also been credited with the hack of the Canvas educational program in the spring of 2026 where data including test results and chat logs of hundreds of millions of students, teachers, and staff was stolen.  ShinyHunters has generally been identified as an international group of criminals, often teenagers, who will demand a BitCoin ransom of several million US dollars, with the threat of the stolen data being leaked if the victims do not pay.

On May 15, 2026 the FBI released a bulletin on the activities of ShinyHunters, focusing on the Canvas educational hack.  In the report, the FBI said that the group uses “harassment strategies, sending threatening text messages and phone calls to victims and their family members”.  ShinyHunters says that this is not accurate, and that they will release the FBI employee data, including information of employees and their family members, if the agency does not retract the statements, telling The Register “I have been doing my very best to combat these allegations, and this is the best way to do it”.

Continue reading “This Week In Security: FBI Gets Hacked, Muse Vulnerable To ClickFix, Popular Rust Developers At Risk, And New Attacks Against RSA” →

A laptop is shown set up on a desk next to a spectrum analyser, an SDR, and two antennas. The antennas are aimed toward assorted electronics, including headphones and a phone handset.

Reviving TEMPEST Attacks With An Injected Signal

TEMPEST attacks are often the most effective way to break air-gapped security: rather than directly accessing a computer, the attacker records the system’s unintended radio emissions and uses them to reconstruct its internal operations. This kind of attack was much more effective in the days of noisy, high-voltage CRT displays, and has gradually become less effective as electronics migrate to quieter, less powerful components. A group of researchers, however, has found that even modern electronics can become effective TEMPEST transmitters when irradiated with an RF signal.

The RF a device emits depends on the unintentional antennas in its internal structure. These are difficult to eliminate, and it’s usually not worth the effort; they’re usually small enough that they only effectively radiate at much higher frequencies than the electronics carry. The researchers’ technique, called InjectEave, radiated these electronics with a radio frequency tuned to their internal antennas, injecting that frequency into the circuit. Nonlinear electronic components, such as amplifiers, then mix the injected frequency with the internal signal, creating RF sidebands. This mixed signal then radiates out of the device and can be picked up and demodulated to recover the device’s internal signal.

Continue reading “Reviving TEMPEST Attacks With An Injected Signal” →