This Week In Security: Insecure Chargers, Request Forgeries, And Kernel Security

The folks at Pen Test Partners decided to take a look at electric vehicle chargers. Many of these chargers are WiFi-connected, and let you check your vehicle’s charge state via the cloud. How well are they secured? Predictably, not as well as they could be.

The worst of the devices tested, Project EV, didn’t actually have any user authentication on the server side API. Knowing the serial number was enough to access the account and control the device. The serial numbers are predictable, so taking over every Project EV charger connected to the internet would have been trivial. On top of that, arbitrary firmware could be loaded remotely onto the hardware was possible, representing a real potential problem.

The EVBox platform had a different problem, where an authenticated user could simply specify a security role. The tenantadmin role was of particular interest here, working as a superadmin that could see and manage multiple accounts. This flaw was patched within an impressive 24 hours. The EVBox charger, as well as several other devices they checked had fundamental security weaknesses due to their use of Raspberry Pi hardware in the product. Edit: The EVBox was *not* one of the devices using the Pi in the end product.

Wait, What About the Raspberry Pi?

Apparently the opinion that a Raspberry Pi didn’t belong in IoT hardware caught Pen Test Partners some flack, because a few days later they published a follow-up post explaining their rationale. To put it simply, the Pi can’t do secure boot, and it can’t do encrypted storage. Several of the flaws they found in the chargers mentioned above were discovered because the device filesystems were wide open for inspection. A processor that can handle device encryption, ideally better than the TPM and Windows Bitlocker combination we covered last week, gives some real security against such an attack. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Insecure Chargers, Request Forgeries, And Kernel Security”

This Week In Security: Fail2RCE, TPM Sniffing, Fishy Leaks, And Decompiling

Fail2ban is a great tool for dynamically blocking IP addresses that show bad behavior, like making repeated login attempts. It was just announced that a vulnerability could allow an attacker to take over a machine by being blocked by Fail2ban. The problem is in the mail-whois action, where an email is sent to the administrator containing the whois information. Whois information is potentially attacker controlled data, and Fail2ban doesn’t properly sterilize the input before piping it into the mail binary. Mailutils has a feature that uses the tilde key as an escape sequence, allowing commands to be run while composing a message. Fail2ban doesn’t sanitize those tilde commands, so malicious whois data can trivially run commands on the system. Whois is one of the old-school unix protocols that runs in the clear, so a MItM attack makes this particularly easy. If you use Fail2ban, make sure to update to 0.10.7 or 0.11.3, or purge any use of mail-whois from your active configs. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Fail2RCE, TPM Sniffing, Fishy Leaks, And Decompiling”

This Week In Security: NSO, Print Spooler, And A Mysterious Decryptor

The NSO Group has been in the news again recently, with multiple stories reporting on their Pegasus spyware product. The research and reporting spearheaded by Amnesty International is collectively known as “The Pegasus project”. This project made waves on the 18th, when multiple news outlets reported on a list of 50,000 phone numbers that are reported as “potential surveillance targets.” There are plenty of interesting people to be found on this list, like 14 heads of state and many journalists.

There are plenty of questions, too. Like what exactly is this list, and where did it come from? Amnesty international has pointed out that it is not a list of people actively being targeted. They’ve reported that of the devices associated with an entry on the list that they have been able to check, roughly 50% have shown signs of Pegasus spyware. The Guardian was part of the initial coordinated release, and has some impressive non-details to add:

The presence of a phone number in the data does not reveal whether a device was infected with Pegasus or subject to an attempted hack. However, the consortium believes the data is indicative of the potential targets NSO’s government clients identified in advance of possible surveillance attempts.

Amazon’s AWS was named as part of the C&C structure of Pegasus, and in response, they have pulled the plug on accounts linked to NSO. For their part, NSO denies the validity of the list altogether. Continue reading “This Week In Security: NSO, Print Spooler, And A Mysterious Decryptor”

This Week In Security: REvil Goes Dark, Kaseya Cleanup, Android Updates, And Terrible Firmware

The funniest thing happened to REvil this week. Their online presence seems to have disappeared.
Their Tor sites as well as conventional sites all went down about the same time Tuesday morning, leading to speculation that they may have been hit by a law enforcement operation. This comes on the heels of a renewed push by the US for other countries, notably Russia, to crack down on ransomware groups operating within their borders. If it is a coordinated takedown, it’s likely a response to the extremely widespread 4th of July campaign launched via the Kaseya platform. Seriously, if you’re going to do something that risks ticking off Americans, don’t do it on the day we’re celebrating national pride by blowing stuff up.

Speaking of Kaseya, they have finished their analysis, and published a guide for safely powering on their VSA on-premise hardware. Now that the fixes are available, more information about the attack itself is being released. Truesec researchers have been following this story in real time, and even provided information about the attack back to Kaseya, based on their observations. Their analysis shows that 4 separate vulnerabilities were involved in the attack. First up is an authentication bypass. It takes advantage of code that looks something like this: Continue reading “This Week In Security: REvil Goes Dark, Kaseya Cleanup, Android Updates, And Terrible Firmware”

This Week In Security: Print Nightmare Continues, Ransomware Goes Bigger, And ATM Jackpots!

For the second time, Microsoft has attempted and failed to patch the PrintNightmare vulnerability. Tracked initially as CVE-2021-1675, and the second RCE as CVE-2021-34527. We warned you about this last week, but a few more details are available now. The original reporter, [Yunhai Zhang] confirms our suspicions, stating on Twitter that “it seems that they just test with the test case in my report”.

Microsoft has now shipped an out-of-band patch to address the problem, with the caveat that it’s known not to be a perfect fix, but should eliminate the RCE element of the vulnerability. Except … if the server in question has the point and print feature installed, it’s probably still vulnerable. And to make it even more interesting, Microsoft says they have already seen this vulnerability getting exploited in the wild. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Print Nightmare Continues, Ransomware Goes Bigger, And ATM Jackpots!”

This Week In Security: Bad Signs From Microsoft, An Epyc VM Escape

Code signing is the silver bullet that will save us from malware, right? Not so much, particularly when vendors can be convinced to sign malicious code. Researchers at G DATA got a hit on a Windows kernel driver, indicating it might be malicious. That seemed strange, since the driver was properly signed by Microsoft. Upon further investigation, it became clear that this really was malware. The file was reported to Microsoft, the signature revoked, and the malware added to the Windows Defender definitions.

The official response from Microsoft is odd. They start off by assuring everyone that their driver signing process wasn’t actually compromised, like you would. The next part is weird. Talking about the people behind the malware: “The actor’s goal is to use the driver to spoof their geo-location to cheat the system and play from anywhere. The malware enables them to gain an advantage in games and possibly exploit other players by compromising their accounts through common tools like keyloggers.” This doesn’t seem to really match the observed behavior of the malware — it seemed to be decoding SSL connections and sending the data to the C&C server. We’ll update you if we hear anything more on this one.
Continue reading “This Week In Security: Bad Signs From Microsoft, An Epyc VM Escape”

This Week In Security: Schemeflood, Modern Wardialing, And More!

There’s been yet another technique discovered to fingerprint users, and this one can even work in the Tor browser. Scheme flooding works by making calls to application URLs, something like steam://browsemedia. If your machine supports the requested custom URL, a pop-up is displayed, asking permission to launch the external application. That pop-up can be detected by JavaScript in the browser. Detect enough apps, and you can build a reasonable fingerprint of the system the test is run on. Unlike some previous fingerprinting techniques, this one isn’t browser dependent — it will theoretically give the same results for any browser. This means even the Tor browser, or any browser being used over the Tor network, can give your potentially unique set of installed programs away.

Now for the good news. The Chrome devs are already working on this issue, and in fact, Chrome on my Linux desktop didn’t respond to the probes in a useful way. Feel free to check out the demo, and see if the results are accurate. And as for Tor, you really should be running that on a dedicated system or in a VM if you really need to stay anonymous. And disable JavaScript if you don’t want the Internet to run code on your computer.
Continue reading “This Week In Security: Schemeflood, Modern Wardialing, And More!”