This Week In Security: What’s In A Name, The AI Bugpocalypse Hits Everyone, OpenWRT Flaws, And Duress Passwords

The great thing about standards is there’s so many to pick from, right?. (Insert obligatory XKCD #927 here.) Several companies have developed naming schemes to refer to groups of attacks, and now Google has too.

Sometimes, malware, ransomware, or exploit groups name themselves: “Shinyhunters”, “LapSus$”, “Cl0p”, “Lockbit”, and so on. For the groups that don’t advertise their presence, identification and naming can be more difficult. Mostly state-run affairs that didn’t want to draw attention to themselves, these Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) groups were originally simply given numbers. APT28 refers to the Russian GRU Intelligence Directorate suspected of hacking the Democratic Party email servers, APT38 is a North Korean governmental agency involved in financial and crypto currency theft.

Multiple companies and agencies have developed naming schemes to make referring to threat groups easier, typically including a regional identifier as well. CrowdStrike naming uses name groups like “Bear” group for suspected Russian actors, “Panda” for China, “Spider” for unattributed crime groups, while Microsoft uses “Blizzard”, “Typhoon”, and “Tempest”.

Google, deciding there weren’t enough classifications already, now introduces “RELIC”, “CASTLE”, and “COMET”. Of course, each naming organization has dozens of other classification groups as well, but now the next time you hear about an attack being attributed to “Scattered Spider” you know it’s the CrowdStrike name for a crime group.

Critical OpenWRT DHCP Flaw Fixed

The Hacker News reports on a major release of OpenWRT which includes fixes to the odhcpd server, the embedded DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 server written by OpenWRT.

The bug is a straight-forward stack style attack where a buffer is allocated, but not length-checked against the data required to reply to a malformed request. OpenWRT runs on a wide range of devices, but one of the most popular legacy platforms still in use, the MIPS processor architecture, lacks most modern security protections against stack-based attacks, making this attack sting more than it might on other architectures.

The latest OpenWRT releases also fix issues in the uhttpd embedded web server, multiple issues in the LUCI web configuration interface that allowed attackers to inject cross-site scripting content and Linux kernel security fixes. If you run a direct OpenWRT build on your equipment, update! These bugs will have an extremely long tail however, with tens of thousands, or likely more, OpenWRT-based devices that will never see updates.

The company behind several of the findings, Hacker House, say they used multiple AI tools and both open and frontier models to discover the bugs, then manual review and testing to confirm before reporting.

Cisco to Stop Assigning (some) CVEs

Cisco has announced it is moving to a twice-monthly patch cycle. Additionally, Cisco will no longer assign CVEs to each bug in the release.

Cisco says this is in reaction to the rapid increase in bugs found by AI tools, and that “Assessing security risk CVE-by-CVE and applying point mitigations is no longer fit for purpose.” Cisco will still assign a CVE to a bug that “requires compensating controls” or is known to be exploited.

It seems like it will be business as usual for the most severe bugs, but it will be interesting to see what happens when exploits are found for bugs which did not get a CVE in a prior release.

Microsoft Suggests Three-Day Patch Race

Microsoft is now recommending a 3 day patch window for new patches. This is, to say the least, an “aggressive” schedule for applying new patches, given the recent track record of issues introduced by patches.

A update that crashes is inconvenient on a home computer — even more so if it’s your parent’s computer — but could be catastrophic when it brings down an entire corporate fleet. Most large organizations have their own internal patch schedules and internal testing requirements before patches are deployed, delaying the patch process further.

Systems like the CISA KEV database, a list of vulnerabilities known to be actively exploited, are in place to help identify the most important issues. With repeated record-breaking numbers of vulnerabilities pushed in Patch Tuesday and the decreasing support of the KEV and related vulnerability indexing systems, the load on IT departments and administrators is becoming impossible.

The AI “bugpocalypse” is finding record numbers of vulnerabilities, while also closing the timeline between bug to exploit to hours in some cases. The time between bug and exploit then drives the patch cycle, which means less testing. With less testing, the patches are less stable, leading to less trust in rapidly installing them.

Oracle Patches Almost 1500 CVEs

Moving directly from the impacts of the flood of Microsoft security issues, the July 2026 patch set from Oracle included fixes for 1499 security issues and 1434 CVEs over 334 Oracle products.

Oracle is also pressuring administrators to move to a monthly patch cycle, but acknowledges “transitioning to a monthly security patching cadence may require updates to existing operational processes”. Not to worry – there is a Oracle consulting service you can hire to help you patch your Oracle problems.

Linux Patches 323 CVEs in Two Days

After announcing over 400 CVEs in the Linux kernel last week, Linux mainters have announced an additional 323 in the last three days alone. The vulnerabilities cover Bluetooth, Ethernet, USB gadget mode, WiFi drivers, virtualization systems, SMB file sharing, and of course more.

One benefit to the architecture of the Linux kernel is that typically all the fixes will arrive in a single kernel update, but when almost every week brings critical updates and a new kernel, patch fatigue is a real thing. Either users stop applying every update, or the uptime and testing requirements of a company prohibits constantly updating and changing servers.

Duress Passwords Aren’t Necessarily a Good Thing

The security-hardened Android variant Graphene, is in the news this week for the use of duress passwords.

A duress password is a mechanism where a second PIN or password can be used to initiate a device wipe. The hope is that in a situation where you are compelled to unlock a device, providing a password which then wipes the device is a preferable option.

The legality of a duress password depends on the environment it is used in. The United States Customs and Border Patrol claims that by wiping a device during an inspection at the US border, Samuel Tunick destroyed evidence and property in violation of federal laws. The issue is compounded because the stop happened at a border, where many US laws against search, seizure, and the availability of a lawyer are suspended, even for US citizens.

The inclusion of duress passwords, and their cousin hidden encrypted volumes, can sound like a good idea, but can place users in serious danger when in situations with less strict rules of law. Having the ability to wipe data sounds great in isolation, but protestors, human rights workers, and other targeted groups have faced direct and physical threats under some regimes. Facing retaliation for wiping a device, or facing physical violence before providing an unlock code out of fear that it might wipe a device, can be a real risk for some.

FreeBSD Fixes a WireGuard Bug

FreeBSD has issued a security update pertaining to the WireGuard VPN implementation.

WireGuard is a modern VPN with excellent performance even on low-end systems, and which has implementations on basically every platform. The FreeBSD implementation, however, didn’t fully validate VPN packets, accepting packets without checking one of the cryptographic validation measures.

Attackers are able to inject data to a FreeBSD WireGuard implementation if they are able to guess some attributes of the connection, and able to fully modify the data in the VPN if they are able to intercept the packets.

The bug impacts any FreeBSD user of WireGuard. FreeBSD has released updated kernels.

This Week In Security: AI Is A Mess, Hacking Car Chargers, An OpenSSL DoS, And Factories Under Attack

[Ayush Paul] posts about extracting data from Claude agents while it accesses web data to fulfill user requests.

But it wasn’t that easy. [Ayush] discovered that Anthropic anticipated many of the attacks, and set up guardrails in an attempt to keep the agent from accessing arbitrary web sites. For Claude to access a website, the user has to specify it, it must be the results of a web search, or it must be referenced by a website previously specified by the user or returned in a search.

To convince the Claude agent to navigate a malicious site designed to extract data, Ayush formed a false warning that Cloudflare was blocking the agent for authentication purposes, and asked it to spell out the name of the agents owner by clicking a list of alphabetical links. Of course Claude trusts Cloudflare and wants to be helpful, so it cheerfully completed the task.

Once the agent is trapped in the false authentication loop, it can be interrogated for all sorts of information it knows about the owner: Ayush was able to convince it to disclose employer, and even data about the user that could be linked to security questions, like their home town.

Since Claude can be detected by the user agent (the field attached to web requests that tells the web server what sort of browser is requesting the page) custom information can be fed to the bot while users see a normal website; clicking a link looks completely normal, but asking an agent to summarize the site triggers fooling the bot into spilling the beans.

After reporting the issue, Ayush was told that Anthropic had already identified the issue internally, and eventually prevented the attack for now by preventing the agent from following links on external pages.

Grok sends entire codebases

Cereblab discovered that the Grok coding agent uploaded the entire content of the codebase it’s working with – and all Git history – to xAI servers, almost immediately. Even when told to never upload a file, the agent would reply “OK”, and then begin uploading the code bundle anyway.

If uploading your code to a remote server isn’t bad enough, and this could be extremely bad in some situations involving sensitive company code, including the entire Git history means that previously deleted files, like accidentally committed secrets or authentication credentials and tokens, were also leaked. Attempting to opt out by disabling options to improve the model by uploading code had no effect.

After gaining attention, Grok has added a privacy option to opt out of data retention. xAI has committed to deleting the retained uploaded code, but it is unclear if users will be told when their data has been removed. To actually prevent the agent from uploading local files to the xAI servers, even temporarily, a global flag “disable_codebase_upload” is required. Watch out, the privacy retention flags are only per-session!

Continue reading “This Week In Security: AI Is A Mess, Hacking Car Chargers, An OpenSSL DoS, And Factories Under Attack”

The ESP32 Bluetooth Backdoor That Wasn’t

Recently there was a panicked scrambling after the announcement by [Tarlogic] of a ‘backdoor’ found in Espressif’s popular ESP32 MCUs. Specifically a backdoor on  the Bluetooth side that would give a lot of control over the system to any attacker. As [Xeno Kovah] explains, much about these claims is exaggerated, and calling it a ‘backdoor’ is far beyond the scope of what was actually discovered.

To summarize the original findings, the researchers found a number of vendor-specific commands (VSCs) in the (publicly available) ESP32 ROM that can be sent via the host-controller interface (HCI) between the software and the Bluetooth PHY. They found that these VSCs could do things like writing and reading the firmware in the PHY, as well as send low-level packets.

The thing about VSCs is of course that these are a standard feature with Bluetooth controllers, with each manufacturer implementing a range of these for use with their own software SDK. These VSCs allow for updating firmware, report temperatures and features like debugging, and are generally documented (except for Broadcom).

Effectively, [Xeno] makes the point that VSCs are a standard feature in Bluetooth controllers, which – like most features – can also be abused. [Tarlogic] has since updated their article as well to distance themselves from the ‘backdoor’ term and instead want to call these VSCs a ‘hidden feature’. That said, if these VSCs in ESP32 chips are a security risk, then as [Xeno] duly notes, millions of BT controllers from Texas Instruments, Broadcom and others with similar VSCs would similarly be a security risk.

Getting Root On Cheap WiFi Repeaters, The Long Way Around

What can you do with a cheap Linux machine with limited flash and only a single free GPIO line? Probably not much, but sometimes, just getting root to prove you can is the main goal of a project. If that happens to lead somewhere useful, well, that’s just icing on the cake.

Like many interesting stories, this one starts on AliExpress, where [Easton] spied some low-cost WiFi repeaters, the ones that plug directly into the wall and extend your wireless network another few meters or so. Unable to resist the siren song, a few of these dongles showed up in the mailbox, ripe for the hacking. Spoiler alert: although the attempt on the first device had some success by getting a console session through the UART port and resetting the root password, [Easton] ended up bricking the repeater while trying to install an OpenWRT image.

The second attempt, this time on a different but similar device, proved more fruitful. The rudimentary web UI provided no easy path in, although it did a pretty good job enumerating the hardware [Easton] was working with. With the UART route only likely to provide temptation to brick this one too, [Easton] turned to a security advisory about a vulnerability that allows remote code execution through a specially crafted SSID. That means getting root on these dongles is as simple as a curl command — no hardware hacks needed!

As for what to do with a bunch of little plug-in Linux boxes with WiFi, we’ll leave that up to your imagination. We like [Easton]’s idea of running something like Pi-Hole on them; maybe Home Assistant would be possible, but these are pretty resource-constrained machines. Still, the lessons learned here are valuable, and at this price point, let the games begin.

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Hackaday Links: June 23, 2024

When a ransomware attack targets something like a hospital, it quickly becomes a high-profile event that understandably results in public outrage. Hospitals are supposed to be backstops for society, a place to go when it all goes wrong, and paralyzing their operations for monetary gain by taking over their information systems is just beyond the pale. Tactically, though, it makes sense; their unique position in society seems to make it more likely that they’ll pay up.

Which is why the ongoing cyberattack against car dealerships is a little perplexing — can you think of a less sympathetic victim apart from perhaps the Internal Revenue Service? Then again, we’re not in the ransomware business, so maybe this attack makes good financial sense. And really, judging by the business model of the primary target of these attacks, a company called CDK Global, it was probably a smart move. We had no idea that there was such a thing as a “Dealer Management System” that takes care of everything from financing to service, and that shutting down one company’s system could cripple an entire industry, but there it is.

Continue reading “Hackaday Links: June 23, 2024”

This Week In Security: MOAB, Microsoft, And Printers

This week, news has broken of the Mother of All Breaches, MOAB. It’s 12 terabytes and 26 billion records, averaging about 500 bytes each. Now note that a record here is likely not a discrete email address, but simply a piece of data — a row on the database.

Now before we all lose our minds over this, there’s an important detail to take note of: These aren’t new leaks. This is a compilation of leaks, and as far as researchers have checked, there aren’t any new leaks disclosed here. This was someone’s database of accumulated leak data, accidentally re-leaked via an unsecured database. [Troy Hunt] goes so far as to speculate that it could be from a breach search service, which sounds pretty plausible.

There was yet another release of credentials late last week that hasn’t attracted as much attention, but seems to represent a much bigger issue. The Naz.api data set isn’t a breach where a company was hacked, and their entire user database was stolen. Instead, this one is combination of a credential stuffing list and stealer logs.

Credential stuffing is basically a smarter brute force attack, where the credentials from one breach are tried on multiple other sites. Such a list is just the results where guesses were successful. The really interesting bit is that this dataset seems to include stealer logs. Put simply, that’s the results of malware that scrapes victim machines for credentials.

Naz.api has over 70 million unique email addresses, and it looks like about a third of them are new, at least according to the Haveibeenpwned dataset. Now that’s significant, though not really worthy of the MOAB title, either. Continue reading “This Week In Security: MOAB, Microsoft, And Printers”

This Week In Security: Browser Exploits, Play Protect, And Turn ON Your Firewall!

Google Chrome has done a lot of work on JavaScript performance, pushing the V8 engine to more and more impressive feats. Recently, that optimization has one more piece, the Maglev compiler, which sits between Sparkplug and TurboFan, as a mid-tier optimization step. With a Just In Time (JIT) system, the time saving of code optimization steps has to be carefully weighed against the time costs, and Maglev is another tool in that endless hunt for speed. And with anything this complicated, there’s the occasional flaw found in the system. And of course, because we’re talking about it here, it’s a security vulnerability that results in Remote Code Execution (RCE).

The trick is to use Maglev’s optimization against it. Set up a pair of classes, such that B extends A. Calling new B() results in an attempt to use the constructor from A. Which works, because the compiler checks to make sure that the constructors match before doing so. There’s another way to call a constructor in JS, something like Reflect.construct(B, [], Array);. This calls the B constructor, but indicates that the constructor should return an Array object. You may notice, there’s no array in the A class below. Tricking the compiler into using the parent class constructor in this fashion results in the array being uninitialized, and whatever happens to be in memory will set the length of the array. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Browser Exploits, Play Protect, And Turn ON Your Firewall!”