FLOSS Weekly Episode 776: Dnsmasq, Making The Internet Work Since 1999

This week Jonathan Bennett and Simon Phipps sit down with Simon Kelley to talk about Dnsmasq! That’s a piece of software that was first built to get a laptop online over LapLink, and now runs on most of the world’s routers and phones. How did we get here, and what does the future of Dnsmasq look like? For now, Dnsmasq has a bus factor of one, which is a bit alarming, given how important it is to keeping all of us online. But the beauty of the project being available under the GPL is that if Simon Kelley walks away, Google, OpenWRT, and other users can fork and continue maintenance as needed. Give the episode a listen to learn more about Dnsmasq, how it’s tied to the Human Genome Project, and more!

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This Week In Security: Loop DOS, Flipper Responds, And More!

Here’s a fun thought experiment. UDP packets can be sent with an arbitrary source IP and port, so you can send a packet to one server, and could aim the response at another server. What happens if that response triggers another response? What if you could craft a packet that continues that cycle endlessly? That is essentially the idea behind Loop DoS (Denial of Service).

This unique avalanche of packets has been managed using specific implementations of several different network services, like TFTP, DNS, and NTP. There are several CVEs being used to track the issue, but CVE-2024-2169 is particularly odd, with the description that “Implementations of UDP application protocol are vulnerable to network loops.” This seems to be a blanket CVE for UDP, which is particularly inappropriate given that the first DoS of this sort was first reported in 2009 at the latest.

More details are available in a Google Doc. There some interesting tidbits there, like the existence of cross-protocol loops, and several legacy protocols that are vulnerable by design. The important thing to remember here is you have to have an accessible UDP port for this sort of attack to take place, so if you’re not using it, firewall it.

Flipper Flips Back

We’ve covered the saga of the Flipper Zero vs the Canadian government, in the context of car theft. The short version is that Canada has seen an uptick of car thefts from organized crime. Rather than meaningfully dealing with this problem, the Canadian government went looking for scapegoats, and found the Flipper Zero.

Well now, Flipper has responded, and put simply, the message is “stop the madness”. There has never been a confirmed case of using a flipper to steal a car, and it’s very unlikely it’s ever happened. On a modern car with proper rolling-code security, it’s not meaningfully possible to use the Flipper Zero for the theft. The two primary ways criminals actually steal cars are with dedicated keyfob repeaters and CAN bus hackers.

There is a petition to sign, and for Canadians, Flipper suggests contacting your local member of parliament. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Loop DOS, Flipper Responds, And More!”

FLOSS Weekly Episode 775: Meshtastic Central

This week, Jonathan Bennett and Rob Campbell chat with Ben Meadors and Adam McQuilkin to talk about what’s new with Meshtastic! There’s a lot. To start with, your favorite podcast host has gotten roped into doing development for the project. There’s a new Rust client, there’s a way to run the firmware on Linux Native, and there’s a shiny new web-based flasher tool!

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This Week In Security: Apple Backdoors Curl, Tor’s New Bridge, And GhostRace

OK, that headline is a bit of a cheap shot. But if you run the curl binary that Apple ships, you’re in for a surprise if you happen to use the --cacert flag. That flag specifies that TLS verification is only to be done using the certificate file specified. That’s useful to solve certificate mysteries, or to make absolutely sure that you’re connecting to the server you expect.

What’s weird here is that on a MacOS, using the Apple provided curl binary, --cacert doesn’t limit the program to the single certificate file. On an Apple system, the verification falls back to the system’s certificate store. This is an intentional choice by Apple, but not one that’s aimed particularly at curl. The real magic is in Apple’s SSL library, which forces the use of the system keychain.

The current state of things is that this option is simply not going to do the right thing in the Apple provided binary. It’s documented with the note that “this option is supported for backward compatibility with other SSL engines, but it should not be set.” It’s an unfortunate situation, and we’re hopeful that a workaround can be found to restore the documented function of this option. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Apple Backdoors Curl, Tor’s New Bridge, And GhostRace”

FLOSS Weekly Episode 774: Let’s Get Rusty

This week, Jonathan Bennett chats with Herbert Wolverson about Rust! Is it really worth the hype? Should you have written that in Rust? What’s up with “if let some” anyways? And what’s the best way to get started with this exciting language? We also cover comparisons with other languages like Ada, what drives us crazy about Cargo, and the fascinating world of kernel development!

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This Week In Security: Blame The Feds, Emergency Patches, And The DMA

The temptation to “take the money and run” was apparently too much for the leadership of the AlphV ransomware crime ring. You may have heard of this group as being behind the breach of Change Healthcare, and causing payment problems for nearly the entire US Healthcare system. And that hack seems to be key to what’s happened this week.

It’s known that a $22 million payment made it through the bitcoin maze to the AlphV wallet on the 1st. It’s believed that this is a payment from Change Healthcare to recover ransomed files. An important detail here is that AlphV is a ransomware-as-a-service provider, and the actual hacking is done by “affiliates”, who use that service, and AlphV handles the infrastructure, maintaining the actual malware, and serving as a payment processor. That last one is key here.

A couple days after that big payment landed in the AlphV account, a seizure notice went up on the AlphV TOR site, claiming that it had been taken down by the FBI and associated agencies. There was something a bit odd about it, though. See, the FBI did seize the AlphV Tor site back in December. The seizure notice this time was an exact copy, as if someone had just done a “save page as”, and posted the copy.

There is precedent for a ransomware group to close up shop and disappear after hitting a big score. The disruption AlphV enabled in the US health care system painted a big target on them, and it didn’t take a tactical genius to realize it might be good to lay low for a while. Pocketing the entire $22 million ransom probably didn’t hurt either. The particularly nasty part is that the affiliate that actually pulled off the attack still claims to have four terabytes of sensitive data, and no incentive to not release it online. It’s not even entirely clear that Change Healthcare actually received a decryption key for their data. You do not want to deal with these people.

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FLOSS Weekly Episode 773: NodeBB — Don’t Do The Math

This week, Jonathan Bennett and Jeff Massie talk with Julian Lam about NodeBB! It’s modern forum software that actually has some neat tricks up its proverbial sleeves. From forking of forum threads when conversations differ, to new integration with ActivityPub and Mastodon. It’s forums like you’ve never quite seen them.

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