Security Hacks

1515 Articles

This Week In Security: The Shai-Hulud Worm, ShadowLeak, And Inside The Great Firewall

September 19, 2025 by 5 Comments

Hardly a week goes by that there isn’t a story to cover about malware getting published to a repository. Last week it was millions of downloads on NPM, but this week it’s something much more concerning. Malware published on NPM is now looking for NPM tokens, and propagating to other NPM packages when found. Yes, it’s a worm, jumping from one NPM package to another, via installs on developer machines.

It does other things too, like grabbing all the secrets it can find when installed on a machine. If the compromised machine has access to a Github account, a new repo is created named Shai-Hulud, borrowed from the name of the sandworms from Dune. The collected secrets and machine info gets uploaded here, and a workflow also uploads any available GitHub secrets to the webhook.site domain.

How many packages are we talking about? At least 187, with some reports of over 500 packages compromised. The immediate attack has been contained, as NPM has worked to remove the compromised packages, and apparently has added filtering code that blocks the upload of compromised packages.

So far there hasn’t been an official statement on the worm from NPM or its parent companies, GitHub or Microsoft. Malicious packages uploaded to NPM is definitely nothing new. But this is the first time we’ve seen a worm that specializes in NPM packages. It’s not a good step for the trustworthiness of NPM or the direct package distribution model.

Continue reading “This Week In Security: The Shai-Hulud Worm, ShadowLeak, And Inside The Great Firewall” →

The Inside Story Of The UK’s Great CB Petrol Scam

September 19, 2025 by 20 Comments

Looking at gasoline prices today, it’s hard to believe that there was a time when 75 cents a gallon seemed outrageous. But that’s the way it was in the 70s, and when it tripped over a dollar, things got pretty dicey. Fuel theft was rampant, both from car fuel tanks — remember lockable gas caps? — and even from gas stations, where drive-offs became common, and unscrupulous employees found ways to trick the system into dispensing free gas.

But one method of fuel theft that escaped our attention was the use of CB radios to spoof petrol pumps, which [Ringway Manchester] details in his new video. The scam happened in the early 80s, only a few years after CB became legal in the UK but quite a while since illegal use had exploded. The trick involved a CB transceiver equipped with a so-called “burner,” a high-power and highly illegal linear amplifier used to boost the radiated power of the signal. When keyed up in the vicinity of dispensers with digital controls, the dispensing rate on the display would appear to slow down markedly, while the pump itself stayed at the same speed. The result was more fuel dispensed than the amount reported to the cashier.

If this sounds apocryphal, [Ringway] assures us that it wasn’t. When the spoofing was reported, authorities up to and including Scotland Yard investigated and found that it was indeed plausible. The problem appeared to be the powerful RF signal interfering with the pulses from the flowmeter on the dispenser. The UK had both 27 MHz and 934 MHz CB at the time; [Ringway] isn’t clear which CB band was used for the exploit, but we’d guess it was the former, in which case we can see how the signals would interfere. Another thing to keep in mind is that CB radios in the UK were FM, as opposed to AM and SSB in the United States. So we wonder if the same trick would have worked here.

At the end of the day, no matter how clever you are about it, theft is theft, and things probably aren’t going to go well for you if you try to pull this off today. Besides, it’s not likely that pumps haven’t been hardened against these sorts of attacks. Still, if you want a look inside a modern pump to see if you can find any weaknesses, have at it. Just don’t tell them where you heard about it.

Continue reading “The Inside Story Of The UK’s Great CB Petrol Scam” →

This Week In Security: NPM, Kerbroasting, And The Rest Of The Story

September 12, 2025 by 9 Comments

Two billion downloads per week. That’s the download totals for the NPM packages compromised in a supply-chain attack this week. Ninety-nine percent of the cloud depends on one of the packages, and one-in-ten cloud environments actually included malicious code as a result of the hack. Take a moment to ponder that. In a rough estimate, ten percent of the Internet was pwned by a single attack.

What extremely sophisticated technique was used to pull off such an attack? A convincing-looking phishing email sent from the newly registered npmjs.help domain. [qix] is the single developer of many of these packages, and in the midst of a stressful week, fell for the scam. We could refer to the obligatory XKCD 2347 here. It’s a significant problem with the NPM model that a single developer falling for a phishing email can expose the entire Internet to such risk. Continue reading “This Week In Security: NPM, Kerbroasting, And The Rest Of The Story” →

This Week In Security: DNS Oops, Novel C2s, And The Scam Becomes Real

September 5, 2025 by 7 Comments

Something rather significant happened on the Internet back in May, and it seems that someone only noticed it on September 3rd. [Youfu Zhang] dropped a note on one of the Mozilla security mailing lists, pointing out that there was a certificate issued by Fina for 1.1.1.1. That IP address may sound familiar, and you may have questions.

First off, yes, TLS certificates can be issued for IP addresses. You can even get a numeric TLS certificate for your IP address, via Lets Encrypt. And second, 1.1.1.1 sounds familiar because that’s CloudFlare’s public DNS resolver. On that address, Cloudflare notably makes use of DoH, a charming abbreviation for DNS over HTTPS. The last important detail is that Cloudflare didn’t request or authorize the certificate. Significant indeed.

This is a high-profile example of the major weakness of the TLS certificate system. There are over 300 trusted certificate authorities in the Microsoft Root Certificate Program, Financijska agencija (Fina) being one of them. All it takes is for one of those trusted roots to issue a bad certificate, to compromise that system. That it took four months for someone to discover and point out the problem isn’t great. Continue reading “This Week In Security: DNS Oops, Novel C2s, And The Scam Becomes Real” →

Ask Hackaday: Now You Install Your Friends’ VPNs. But Which One?

September 3, 2025 by 75 Comments

Something which may well unite Hackaday readers is the experience of being “The computer person” among your family or friends. You’ll know how it goes, when you go home for Christmas, stay with the in-laws, or go to see some friend from way back, you end up fixing their printer connection or something. You know that they would bridle somewhat if you asked them to do whatever it is they do for a living as a free service for you, but hey, that’s the penalty for working in technology.

Bad Laws Just Make People Avoid Them

There’s a new one that’s happened to me and no doubt other technically-minded Brits over the last few weeks: I’m being asked to recommend, and sometimes install, a VPN service. The British government recently introduced the Online Safety Act, which is imposing ID-backed age verification for British internet users when they access a large range of popular websites. The intent is to regulate access to pornography, but the net has been spread so wide that many essential or confidential services are being caught up in it. To be a British Internet user is to have your government peering over your shoulder, and while nobody’s on the side of online abusers, understandably a lot of my compatriots want no part of it. We’re in the odd position of having 4Chan and the right-wing Reform Party alongside Wikipedia among those at the front line on the matter. What a time to be alive.

Continue reading “Ask Hackaday: Now You Install Your Friends’ VPNs. But Which One?” →

This Week In Security: DEF CON Nonsense, Vibepwned, And 0-days

August 29, 2025 by 6 Comments

DEF CON happened just a few weeks ago, and it’s time to cover some of the interesting talks. This year there were two talks in particular that are notable for being controversial. Coincidentally both of these were from Track 3. The first was the Passkeys Pwned, a talk by SquareX about how the passkey process can be hijacked by malware.

[Dan Goodin] lays out both the details on Passkeys, and why the work from SquareX isn’t the major vulnerability that they claim it is. First, what is a Passkey? Technically it’s a public/private keypair that is stored by the user’s browser. A unique keypair is generated for each new website, and the site stores the public key. To authenticate with the Passkey, the site generates a random string, the browser signs it with the private key, and the site checks it against the public key. I stand by my early opinion, that Passkeys are effectively just passwords, but with all the best-practices mandated.

So what is the claim presented at DEF CON? Malicious code running in the context of the browser tab can hijack the passkey process. In the demonstrated attack flow, a browser extension caused the Passkey login to fail, and prompted the user to generate a new Passkey. This is an interesting observation, and a clever attack against Passkeys, but is not a vulnerability in the Passkey spec. Or more accurately, it’s an accepted limitation of Passkeys, that they cannot guarantee security in the presence of a compromised browser. Continue reading “This Week In Security: DEF CON Nonsense, Vibepwned, And 0-days” →

This Week In Security: Anime Catgirls, Illegal AdBlock, And Disputed Research

August 22, 2025 by 28 Comments

You may have noticed the Anime Catgirls when trying to get to the Linux Kernel’s mailing list, or one of any number of other sites associated with Open Source projects. [Tavis Ormandy] had this question, too, and even wrote about it. So, what’s the deal with the catgirls?

The project is Anubis, a “Web AI Firewall Utility”. The intent is to block AI scrapers, as Anubis “weighs the soul” of incoming connections, and blocks the bots you don’t want. Anubis uses the user agent string and other indicators to determine what an incoming connection is. But the most obvious check is the in-browser hashing. Anubis puts a challenge string in the HTTP response header, and JavaScript running in the browser calculates a second string to append this challenge. The goal is to set the first few bytes of the SHA-256 hash of this combined string to 0.

[Tavis] makes a compelling case that this hashing is security theatre — It makes things appear more secure, but doesn’t actually improve the situation. It’s only fair to point out that his observation comes from annoyance, as his preferred method of accessing the Linux kernel git repository and mailing list are now blocked by Anubis. But the economics of compute costs clearly demonstrate that this SHA-256 hashing approach will only be effective so long as AI companies don’t add the 25 lines of C it took him to calculate the challenge. The Anubis hashing challenge is literally security by obscurity.

Continue reading “This Week In Security: Anime Catgirls, Illegal AdBlock, And Disputed Research” →