This Week In Security: Glibc, Ivanti, Jenkins, And Runc

There’s a fun buffer overflow problem in the Glibc __vsyslog_internal() function. This one’s a real rollercoaster, because logging vulnerabilities are always scary, but at a first look, it seems nearly impossible to exploit. The vulnerability relies on a very long program name, which can overflow an internal buffer. No binaries are going to have a name longer than 1024 bytes, so there’s no problem, right?

Let’s talk about argv. That’s the list of arguments that gets passed into the main() function of every Linux binary when it launches. The first string in that list is the binary name — except that’s a convention, and not particularly enforced anywhere. What really happens is that the execve() system call sets that list of strings. The first argument can be anything, making this an attacker-controlled value. And it doesn’t matter what the program is trying to write to the log, because the vulnerability triggers simply by writing the process name to a buffer.

There is a one-liner to test for a vulnerable Glibc:

exec -a "`printf '%0128000x' 1`" /usr/bin/su < /dev/null

and the Qualys write-up indicates that it can be used for an escalation of privilege attack. The good news is this seems to be a local-only attack. And on top of that, a pair of other lesser severity issues were found and fixed in glibc while fixing this one.
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FLOSS Weekly Episode 768: Open Source Radio

This week Jonathan Bennett and Doc Searls talk with Tony Zeoli about Netmix and the Radio Station WordPress plugin. The story starts with the Netmix startup, one of the first places doing Internet music in the 1990s. That business did well enough to get bought out just before the Dot Com bubble burst in 2000. Today, Tony runs the Radio Station plugin, which is all about putting a station’s show schedule on a WordPress site.

In the process, the trio covers Internet radio history, the licensing complications around radio and streaming, the state of local radio, and more. Is there a long term future for radio? Does Creative Commons solve the licensing mess? Is AI going to start eating radio, too? All this and more!

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This Week In Security: MOAB, Microsoft, And Printers

This week, news has broken of the Mother of All Breaches, MOAB. It’s 12 terabytes and 26 billion records, averaging about 500 bytes each. Now note that a record here is likely not a discrete email address, but simply a piece of data — a row on the database.

Now before we all lose our minds over this, there’s an important detail to take note of: These aren’t new leaks. This is a compilation of leaks, and as far as researchers have checked, there aren’t any new leaks disclosed here. This was someone’s database of accumulated leak data, accidentally re-leaked via an unsecured database. [Troy Hunt] goes so far as to speculate that it could be from a breach search service, which sounds pretty plausible.

There was yet another release of credentials late last week that hasn’t attracted as much attention, but seems to represent a much bigger issue. The Naz.api data set isn’t a breach where a company was hacked, and their entire user database was stolen. Instead, this one is combination of a credential stuffing list and stealer logs.

Credential stuffing is basically a smarter brute force attack, where the credentials from one breach are tried on multiple other sites. Such a list is just the results where guesses were successful. The really interesting bit is that this dataset seems to include stealer logs. Put simply, that’s the results of malware that scrapes victim machines for credentials.

Naz.api has over 70 million unique email addresses, and it looks like about a third of them are new, at least according to the Haveibeenpwned dataset. Now that’s significant, though not really worthy of the MOAB title, either. Continue reading “This Week In Security: MOAB, Microsoft, And Printers”

FLOSS Weekly Episode 767: Owntracks, Are We There Yet?

This week Jonathan Bennett and Jeff Massie talk with JP Mens about Owntracks, the collection of programs that lets you take back control of your own location data. It’s built around the simple idea of taking position data from a mobile phone or other data source, sending it over MQTT to a central server, and logging that data to a simple data store.

From there, you can share it as trips, mark points of interest, play back your movement in a web browser, and more. And because it’s just JSON inside MQTT, it’s pretty trivial to make a connector to interface with other projects, like Home Assistant. We’ve even covered the process!

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This Week In Security: Gitlab, VMware, And PixeFAIL

There’s a Gitlab vulnerability that you should probably pay attention to. Tracked as CVE-2023-7028, this issue allows an attacker to specify a secondary email during a the password reset request. Only one email has to match the one on record, but the password reset link gets sent to both emails. Yikes!

What makes this worse is there is already a Proof of Concept (PoC) released, and it’s a trivial flaw. In an HTTP/S post containing the password reset request, just include two email addresses. Thankfully, a fix is already out. Versions 16.7.2, 16.6.4, and 16.5.6 contain this patch, as well as fixes for a flaw that allowed sneaking unauthorized changes into a previously approved merge request, and an issue with Slack and Mattermost where slash commands could be spoofed.

VMware

We don’t want to over-dramatise this vulnerability, but VMware is calling it an emergency. This one affects VMware vRealize and Aria Automation. According to the the CVSS calculator, it’s a low complexity network flaw, but does require at least some privileges. Hopefully more information will come out about this vulnerability, but for now that’s about all we know.

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FLOSS Weekly Episode 766: WebRTC — The Hack That Connects Everyone To Everything

This week Jonathan Bennett and Dan Lynch talk with Sean DuBois, WebRTC wizard, all about the crazy feats the Pion Go server is capable of, how WebRTC is about to change OBS, and what it looks like to build a successful Open Source Career.

WebRTC is for more than video. The TOR Snowflake project uses Pion to sneak TOR traffic through firewalls even with Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) at play. Since nobody wants to block web conferencing, TOR and even Wireguard can use this to slip though.

Sean is also working on some game-changing patches for OBS Studio, including WHEP support to go along with the newly introduced WHIP feature. This enables direct connections to another OBS client, as well as connection to another WebRTC client like vdo.ninja without running an embedded browser to make it work.

And then there’s WebRTC For The Curious, a free CC0 e-book all about the nuts and bolts of WebRTC. And Broadcast Box, a ready-to-run WebRTC one-to-many broadcasting solution that lets you run your own streaming service. You can connect with Sean at the Real-time Broadcast Discord server for information about all of the projects listed here and more!

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This Week In Security: AI Is Terrible, Ransomware Wrenches, And Airdrop

So first off, go take a look at this curl bug report. It’s a 8.6 severity security problem, a buffer overflow in websockets. Potentially a really bad one. But, it’s bogus. Yes, a strcpy call can be dangerous, if there aren’t proper length checks. This code has pretty robust length checks. There just doesn’t seem to be a vulnerability here.

OK, so let’s jump to the punch line. This is a bug report that was generated with one of the Large Language Models (LLMs) like Google Bard or ChatGPT. And it shouldn’t be a surprise. There are some big bug bounties that are paid out, so naturally people are trying to leverage AI to score those bounties. But as [Daniel Stenberg] point out, LLMs are not actually AI, and the I in LLM stands for intelligence.

There have always been vulnerability reports of dubious quality, sent by people that either don’t understand how vulnerability research works, or are willing to waste maintainer time by sending in raw vulnerability scanner output without putting in any real effort. What LLMs do is provide an illusion of competence that takes longer for a maintainer to wade through before realizing that the claim is bogus. [Daniel] is more charitable than I might be, suggesting that LLMs may help with communicating real issues through language barriers. But still, this suggests that the long term solution may be “simply” detecting LLM-generated reports, and marking them as spam. Continue reading “This Week In Security: AI Is Terrible, Ransomware Wrenches, And Airdrop”