Undo Arduino Encryption With An Oscilloscope

Cryptography ain’t easy. Seemingly small details like how many times a computationally intensive loop runs can give the game away. [Lord Feistel] gives us a demo of how this could work with nothing more than poorly designed code, a resistor, and an oscilloscope.

The hardware side is, as mentioned, really simple. Put a resistor inline with the Arduino and monitor the voltage drop across the resistor with the scope. When the chip is working hard, it consumes more current, and code sections that take longer will show up as longer dips.

On the software end, it’s only a little more complicated.  The RSA encryption scheme involves a lot of exponentiation and modulo-taking. Here, [Lord Feistel] is targeting a naive way of computing the exponents quickly, and demonstrates how you can read the exponent straight out the chip’s power demand.

Implementing this attack against a real-world RSA algorithm, in the context of the Arduino doing other stuff, will be harder. And we don’t know if the algorithm implemented in “standard” Arduino libraries is smarter than this one. (If you know, let us know in the comments.) But still, this is a cool example of just how simple and straightforward it can be to eavesdrop on bad code.

If you only need to bypass encryption instead of breaking it, check out [Lord Feistel]’s other tutorial on power glitching that we featured previously. If you haven’t played around with the hardware side of security, it gets deep pretty quickly, but you can at least dip your toes in the shallow end with what you’ve got in your closet.

This Week In Security: Blast-RADIUS, Gitlab, And Plormbing

The RADIUS authentication scheme, short for “Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service”, has been widely deployed for user authentication in all sorts of scenarios. It’s a bit odd, in that individual users authenticate to a “RADIUS Client”, sometimes called a Network Access Server (NAS). In response to an authentication request, a NAS packages up the authentication details, and sends it to a central RADIUS server for verification. The server then sends back a judgement on the authentication request, and if successful the user is authenticated to the NAS/client.

The scheme was updated to its current form in 1994, back when MD5 was considered a cryptographically good hash. It’s been demonstrated that MD5 has problems, most notably a chosen-prefix collision attack demonstrated in 2007. The basis of this collision attack is that given two arbitrary messages, it is possible to find a pair of values that, when appended to the end of those messages, result in matching md5 hashes for each combined message. It turns out this is directly applicable to RADIUS.
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Ticketmaster SafeTix Reverse-Engineered

Ticketmaster is having a rough time lately. Recently, a hacker named [Conduition] managed to reverse-engineer their new “safe” electronic ticket system. Of course, they also had the recent breach where more than half a billion accounts had personal and financial data leaked without any indication of whether or not the data was fully encrypted. But we’re going to focus on the former, as it’s more technically interesting.

Ticketmaster’s stated goals for the new SafeTix system — which requires the use of a smartphone app — was to reduce fraud and ticket scalping. Essentially, you purchase a ticket using their app, and some data is downloaded to your phone which generates a rotating barcode every 15 seconds. When [Conduition] arrived at the venue, cell and WiFi service was totally swamped by everyone trying to load their barcode tickets. After many worried minutes (and presumably a few choice words) [Conduition] managed to get a cell signal long enough to update the barcode, and was able to enter, albeit with a large contingent of similarly annoyed fans trying to enter with their legally purchased tickets.

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This Week In Security: Hide Yo SSH, Polyfill, And Packing It Up

The big news this week was that OpenSSH has an unauthorized Remote Code Execution exploit. Or more precisely, it had one that was fixed in 2006, that was unintentionally re-introduced in version 8.5p1 from 2021. The flaw is a signal handler race condition, where async-unsafe code gets called from within the SIGALARM handler. What does that mean?
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A Cute Sentry Scans Your Net For Scullduggery

As long as we get to make our own network security tools, why not make them look cute? Netgotchi may not be much more than an ESP8266 running network scans and offering up a honeypot service, but it smiles while sits on your desk and we think that’s swell.

Taking inspiration from a recent series of red-team devices that make hacking adorable, most obviously pwnagotchi (and arguably Flipper), Netgotchi lives on the light side of the Force. Right now, it enumerates the devices on your network and can alert you when anything sketchy joins in. We can totally imagine customizing this to include other network security or health checks, and extending the available facial expressions accordingly.

You might not always be thinking about your network, and if you’re like us, that’s probably just fine. But we love standalone displays that show one thing in an easily digestable manner, and this fits the bill, with a smile.

This Week In Security: Kaspersky Ban, Project Naptime, And More

The hot news this week is that Kaspersky is banned in the USA. More specifically, Kaspersky products will be banned from sale in the US starting on September 29. This ban will extend to blocking software updates, though it’s unclear how that will actually be accomplished. It’s reasonable to assume that payment processors will block payments to Kaspersky, but will ISPs be required to block traffic that could contain antivirus updates?

WordPress Plugin Backdoor

A Quartet of WordPress plugins have been found to have recently included backdoor code. It’s a collection of five Open Source plugins, seemingly developed by unrelated people. Malicious updates first showed up on June 21st, and it appears that all five plugins are shipping the same malicious code.

Rabbit AI API

The Rabbit R1 was released to less than thunderous applause. The idea is a personal AI device, but the execution has been disappointing, to the point of reviewers suggesting some of the earlier claims were fabricated. Now it seems there’s a serious security issue, in the form of exposed API keys that have *way* too many privileges.

The research seems to be done by the rabbitude group, who found the keys back in May. Of the things allowed by access to the API keys, the most worrying for user privacy was access to every text-to-speech call. Rabbitude states in their June 25 post, that “rabbit inc has known that we have had their elevenlabs (tts) api key for a month, but they have taken no action to rotate the api keys.” On the other hand, rabbit pushed a statement on the 26th, claiming they were just then made aware of the issue, and made the needed key rotations right away.

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Llama.ttf Is AI, In A Font

It’s a great joke, and like all great jokes it makes you think. [Søren Fuglede Jørgensen] managed to cram a 15 M parameter large language model into a completely valid TrueType font: llama.ttf. Being an LLM-in-a-font means that it’ll do its magic across applications – in your photo editor as well as in your text editor.

What magic, we hear you ask? Say you have some text, written in some non-AI-enabled font. Highlight that, and swap over to llama.ttf. The first thing it does is to change all “o” characters to “ø”s, just like [Søren]’s parents did with his name. But the real magic comes when you type a length of exclamation points. In any normal font, they’re just exclamation points, but llama.ttf replaces them with the output of the TinyStories LLM, run locally in the font. Switching back to another font reveals them to be exclamation points after all. Bønkers!

This is all made possible by the HarfBuzz font extensions library. In the name of making custom ligatures and other text shaping possible, HarfBuzz allows fonts to contain Web Assembly code and runs it in a virtual machine at rendering time. This gives font designers the flexibility to render various Unicode combinations as unique glyphs, which is useful for languages like Persian. But it can just as well turn all “o”s into “ø”s or run all exclamation points through an LLM.

Something screams mischief about running arbitrary WASM while you type, but we remind you that since PostScript, font rendering engines have been able to run code in order to help with the formatting problem. This ability was inherited by PDF, and has kept malicious PDFs in the top-10 infiltration vectors for the last fifteen years. [Citation needed.] So if you can model a CPU in PDF, why not an LLM in TTF? Or a Pokemon clone in an OpenType font?

We don’t think [Søren] was making a security point here, we think he was just having fun. You can see how much fun in his video demo embedded below.

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