Feeling the cost of commercial options like the YubiKey and Nitrokey were too high, [TheStaticTurtle] started researching DIY alternatives. He found an open source project allows the STM32F103 to act as a USB cryptographic token for GNU Privacy Guard, which was a start. All he had to do was build a suitable device to install it on.
The first step was to test the software out on the popular “Blue Pill” development board, which [TheStaticTurtle] documents in the write-up should anyone want to give it a try themselves. The ST-Link V2 was already a supported target, so it only took some relatively minor tweaks to get running and add support for a simple push button. The output of gpg --card-status showed the device was working as expected, so with the software sorted, it was time to take a closer look at the hardware.
To create his “TurtleAuth” dongle, [TheStaticTurtle] started with the basic layout of the Blue Pill and added in a TTP223E touch control IC. The original Micro USB port was also swapped for a male USB-A connector so the device could be plugged directly into a computer. An upper PCB, containing the status LEDs and touch pad, was then designed so it would fit over the main board as an enclosure of sorts. While the sides are still open, the device looks robust enough to handle life in a laptop bag at least.
[Daniel, Adi, and Eran], students researchers at Tel Aviv University and the Weizmann Institute of Science have successfully extracted 4096-bit RSA encryption keys using only the sound produced by the target computer. It may sound a bit like magic, but this is a real attack – although it’s practicality may be questionable. The group first described this attack vector at Eurocrypt 2004. The sound used to decode the encryption keys is produced not by the processor itself, but by the processor’s power supply, mainly the capacitors and coils. The target machine in this case runs a copy of GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG).
During most of their testing, the team used some very high-end audio equipment, including Brüel & Kjær laboratory grade microphones and a parabolic reflector. By directing the microphone at the processor air vents, they were able to extract enough sound to proceed with their attack. [Daniel, Adi, and Eran] started from the source of GnuPG. They worked from there all the way down to the individual opcodes running on the x86 processor in the target PC. As each opcode is run, a sound signature is produced. The signature changes slightly depending on the data the processor is operating on. By using this information, and some very detailed spectral analysis, the team was able to extract encryption keys. The complete technical details of the attack vector are available in their final paper (pdf link).
Once they had the basic methods down, [Daniel, Adi, and Eran] explored other attack vectors. They were able to extract data using ground fluctuations on the computers chassis. They even were able to use a cell phone to perform the audio attack. Due to the cell phone’s lower quality microphone, a much longer (on the order of several hours) time is needed to extract the necessary data.
Thankfully [Daniel, Adi, and Eran] are white hat hackers, and sent their data to the GnuPG team. Several countermeasures to this attack are already included in the current version of GnuPG.