Remember Dieselgate, the scandal where certain diesel vehicles would detect an emissions test, and run cleaner for it, “cheating” the test? Traingate may just put that one into perspective. We’ll tell the story from the beginning, but buckle up for a wild and astonishing ride. It all starts with Polish trains getting a maintenance overhaul. These trains were built by Newag, who bid on the maintenance contract, but the contract was won by another company, SPS. This sort of overhaul involves breaking each train into its components, inspecting, lubricating, etc, and putting it all back together again. The first train went through this process, was fully reassembled, and then refused to move. After exhausting all of the conventional troubleshooting measures, SPS brought in the hackers.
Continue reading “This Week In Security: Traingate, DNS, And JMP Slides”
Author: Jonathan Bennett523 Articles
Binary Clock Kit Blips Again
Back in 1978, the world was a bit different. There was no Raspberry Pi, no Internet, and not even an ESP32 to build projects with. And rather than order electronics kits from Tindie or Adafruit, [Dr. Francitosh] selected this binary clock with his mother from a catalog, and made the order via mail. Simpler times. The good Doctor, AKA [Greg Smith], was a young electronics tinkerer, and his mother wanted a good project-in-a-box to show off his skills. Thus, a Greymark Binary Clock was ordered and assembled. Then, sadly, the beloved clock crashed from its proud mantle position, doomed to never to blink or blip again. Or was it?
Continue reading “Binary Clock Kit Blips Again”
This Week In Security: LogoFail, National DNS Poison, And DNA
When there’s a vulnerability in a system library, we install updates, and go on with our lives. When there’s a vulnerability in a Java library, jars get rebuilt, and fixed builds slowly roll out. But what happens when there’s a vulnerability in a library used in firmware builds? And to make it even more fun, it’s not just a single vulnerability. All three major firmware vendors have problems when processing malicious images. And LogoFail isn’t limited to x86, either. UEFI Arm devices are vulnerable, too.
Continue reading “This Week In Security: LogoFail, National DNS Poison, And DNA”
This Week In Security: Owncloud, NXP, 0-Days, And Fingerprints
We’re back! And while the column took a week off for Thanksgiving, the security world didn’t. The most pressing news is an issue in Owncloud, that is already under active exploitation.
The problem is a library that can be convinced to call phpinfo()
and include the results in the page response. That function reveals a lot of information about the system Owncloud is running on, including environment variables. In something like a Docker deployment, those environment variables may contain system secrets like admin username and password among others.
Now, there is a bit of a wrinkle here. There is a public exploit, and according to research done by Greynoise Labs, that exploit does not actually work against default installs. This seems to describe the active exploitation attempts, but the researcher that originally found the issue has stated that there is a non-public exploit that does work on default installs. Stay tuned for this other shoe to drop, and update your Owncloud installs if you have them. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Owncloud, NXP, 0-Days, And Fingerprints”
This Week In Security: SSH, FTP, And Reptar
It’s time to strap on our propeller beanies, because we’re going to talk crypto. The short version is that some SSH handshakes can expose enough information for a third party to obtain the host’s private signing key. That key is the one that confirms you are connecting to the SSH server you think you are, and if the key validation fails, you get a big warning:
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @
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IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!
The math that makes this warning work is public-private key cryptography. The problem we’re talking about today only shows up in RSA authentication. Specifically those that use the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) to quickly calculate the modulos needed to generate the cryptographic signature. If something goes wrong during that calculation, you end up with a signature that is mathematically related to the secret key in a different way than intended. The important point is that knowing this extra value *significantly* weakens the security of the secret key.
This attack has been known for quite some time, but the research has been aimed at causing the calculation fault through power vaults or even memory attacks like Rowhammer. There has also been progress on using a lattice attack against captured handshakes, to make the attack practical with less known information. The real novel element of this week’s approach (pdf) is that it has been tested against SSH.
The paper’s authors performed weekly scans of the entire IPv4 public network space, capturing the handshake from any listening SSH server, and also had 5 years of historic data to draw from. And the results are mixed. There is a Cisco SSH server string that is extremely common in the dataset, and only once did one of these machines send a miscalculated handshake. Possibly a random ram bit flip to blame. And on the other hand, the string “SSH-2.0-Zyxel SSH server” had so many bad signatures, it suggests a device that *always* sends a miscalculated signature. Continue reading “This Week In Security: SSH, FTP, And Reptar”
This Week In Security: Find My Keylogger, Zephyr, And Active Exploitation
Keyloggers. Such a simple concept — you secretly record all the characters typed on a keyboard, and sort through it later for interesting data. That keyboard sniffer could be done in software, but a really sneaky approach is to implement the keylogger in hardware. Hardware keyloggers present a unique problem. How do you get the data back to whoever’s listening? One creative solution is to use Apple’s “Find My” tracking system. And if that link won’t let you read the story, a creative solution for that issue is to load the page with javascript disabled.
This is based on earlier work from [Fabian Bräunlein], dubbed “Send My”. As an aside, this is the worst naming paradigm, and Apple should feel bad for it. At the heart of this cleverness is the fact that Apple used the standard Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) radio protocol, and any BLE device can act like an Apple AirTag. Bits can be encoded into the reported public key of the fake AirTag, and the receiving side can do a lookup for the possible keys.
A fake AirTag keylogger manages to transfer 26 characters per second over the “Find My” system, enough to keep up with even the fastest of typists, given that no keyboard is in use all the time. Apple has rolled out anti-tracking protections, and the rolling key used to transmit data also happens to completely defeat those protections. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Find My Keylogger, Zephyr, And Active Exploitation”
Perfect Dark: Recompiled
There’s an interesting renaissance of Nintendo 64 gaming, powered by the ability to decompile N64 ROMs back into C code using Ghidra. There are projects around multiple classic games, taking the Ghidra output and renaming the generic function and variable names. There are two approaches to these projects, sometimes happening in parallel. The first is to perfectly recreate the original work, and get a bit-perfect binary that matches the original ROM. The other approach is to fix bugs, optimize the code, and add new features, often porting to new platforms in the process. Right now, we’re seeing the latter happen with 2000’s Perfect Dark.
There is a project by [Ryan Dwyer] to produce a matching C codebase, and that project is functionally complete with an over 99% bit-perfect output. But as impressive as that is, we’re interested in making code even better, and that’s what [fgsfdsfgs] has accomplished with the Perfect Dark port.
The game now runs on Windows or Linux, has mouse support, and runs at a solid 60 frames per second (FPS) at multiple screen resolutions. Want an ultra-widescreen Perfect Dark experience? The upgraded rendering engine handles it wonderfully. Mods? No problem. In the future, the developer is also looking to support high-definition textures.
To play, you do have to provide your own legally sourced copy of the original Perfect Dark game. That is the only way this project is remotely legal, and we suspect that even then it’s in a somewhat grey zone, as a derivative work of a copyrighted game. Big N hasn’t shut the project down, but the Mario 64 port was killed for attempting the same thing. We’ll hope for the best, and enjoy the nostalgia trip in the meanwhile!