Diving Into Starlink’s User Terminal Firmware

The average Starlink user probably doesn’t spend a lot of time thinking about their hardware after getting the dish aligned and wiring run. To security researchers, however, it’s another fascinating device to tinker with as they reverse-engineer the firmware and try to both find out what makes it tick, as well as how to break it. This is essentially the subject of [Carlo Ramponi]’s article over at Quarkslab as he digs into the firmware architecture and potential weaknesses in its internal communication.

The user terminal hardware itself is a quite standard AArch64 ARM-based SoC, along with the proprietary communication interface, all of which is controlled by the Linux-based firmware. Dumping the firmware itself was made easy thanks to existing work by researchers at the KU Leuven, involving dumping the contents of the onboard eMMC storage. After this the firmware architecture could be analyzed, which turned out to consist out of mostly C++-based binaries, but with a single big binary for the user front-end written in Go.

Communication between these processes is handled through a custom inter-process protocol called ‘Slate Sharing’, all of which is coordinated via the core User Terminal Control process. It are these Slate IPC messages which form the most likely attack surface for a fuzzing attack, with the SoftwareUpdateRequest command being an interesting target as it would seem to not require authentication since it doesn’t address a specific user. This work is part of [Carlo]’s master’s thesis, and should form the basis of further research on the Starlink User Terminal firmware.

GTA 6 Hacker Found To Be Teen With Amazon Fire Stick In Small Town Hotel Room

International cybercrime, as portrayed by the movies and mass media, is a high-stakes game of shadowy government agencies and state-sponsored hacking groups. Hollywood casting will wheel out a character in a black hoodie and shades, probably carrying a metallic briefcase as they board an executive jet.

These things aren’t supposed to happen in a cheap hotel room in your insignificant hometown, but the story of a British teen being nabbed leaking the closely guarded details of Grand Theft Auto 6 in a Travelodge room in Bicester, Oxfordshire brings the action from the global into the local for a Hackaday scribe. Bicester is a small town best known for a tacky outlet mall and as a commuter dormitory stop on the line to London Marylebone, it’s not exactly Vice City.

The teen in question is one [Arion Kurtaj], breathlessly reported by the BBC as part of the Lapsus$ gang, which is a sensationalist way of talking up a group of kids expert at computer infiltration but seemingly inept at being criminals. After compromising British telcos he was exposed by another group and nabbed by the authorities, before being moved to the hotel for his own safety.

Here the story becomes more interesting for Hackaday readers, because though denied access to a computer he purchased an Amazon Fire stick presumably at the Argos in the Sainsburys next door, and plugged it into the Travelodge TV. Using this he was able to access cloud services, we’re guessing a virtual Linux environment or similar, before continuing to compromise further organisations including Rockstar Games to leak that GTA 6 footage. He’s yet to be sentenced, but we’re guessing that he’ll continue to spend some time at His Majesty’s pleasure.

The moment of excitement in one’s hometown and the sensationalist reporting aside, we can’t help feeling sad that a teen with that level of talent evidently wasn’t given the support and encouragement by Oxfordshire’s education system necessary to put it to better use. Let’s hope when he’s older and wiser the teenage conviction won’t prevent him from having a useful career in the field.

Bypassing Bitlocker With A Logic Analzyer

Security Engineer [Guillaume Quéré] spends the day penetration testing systems for their employer and has pointed out and successfully exploited a rather obvious weakness in the BitLocker full volume encryption system, which as the linked article says, allows one to simply sniff the traffic between the discrete TPM chip and CPU via an SPI bus. The way Bitlocker works is to use a private key stored in the TPM chip to encrypt the full volume key that in turn was used to encrypt the volume data. This is all done by low-level device drivers in the Windows kernel and is transparent to the user.

TPM chip pins too small? Just find something else on the bus!

The whole point of BitLocker was to prevent access to data on the secured volume in the event of a physical device theft or loss. Simply pulling the drive and dropping it into a non-secured machine or some other adaptor would not provide any data without the key stored by the TPM. However, since that key must pass as plaintext from the TPM to the CPU during the boot sequence, [Guillaume] shows that it is quite straightforward — with very low-cost tools and free software — to simply locate and sniff out this TPM-to-CPU transaction and decode the datastream and locate the key. Using little more than a cheapo logic analyser hooked up to some conveniently large pins on a nearby flash chip (because the SCK, MISO, and MOSI pins are shared with the TPM) the simple TIS was decoded enough to lock onto the bytes of the TPM frame. This could then be decoded with a TPM stream decoder web app, courtesy of the TPM2-software community group. The command to look for is the TPM_CC.Unseal which is the request from the CPU to the TPM to send over that key we’re interested in. After that just grabbing and decoding the TPM response frame will immediately reveal the goods.

Continue reading “Bypassing Bitlocker With A Logic Analzyer”

This Week In Security: WinRAR, DNS Disco, And No Silver Bullets

So what does WinRAR, day trading, and Visual Basic have in common? If you guessed “elaborate malware campaign aimed at investment brokers”, then you win the Internet for the day. This work comes from Group-IB, another cybersecurity company with a research team. They were researching a malware known as DarkMe, and found an attack on WinRAR being used in the wild, using malicious ZIP files being spread on a series of web forums for traders.

Among the interesting tidbits of the story, apparently at least one of those forums locked down the users spreading the malicious files, and they promptly broke into the forum’s back-end and unlocked their accounts. The vulnerability itself is interesting, too. A rigged zip file is created with identically named image file and folder containing a script. The user tries to open the image, but because the zip is malformed, the WinRAR function gets confused and opens the script instead.

Based on a user’s story from one of those forums, it appears that the end goal was to break into the brokers’ trading accounts, and funnel money into attacker accounts. The one documented case only lost $2 worth of dogecoin.

There was one more vulnerability found in WinRAR, an issue when processing malicious recovery volumes. This can lead to code execution due to a memory access error. Both issues were fixed with release 6.23, so if you still have a WinRAR install kicking around, make sure it’s up to date! Continue reading “This Week In Security: WinRAR, DNS Disco, And No Silver Bullets”

Liberté, égalité, Fraternité: France Loses Its Marbles On Internet Censorship

Over the years we’ve covered a lot of attempts by relatively clueless governments and politicians to enact think-of-the-children internet censorship or surveillance legislation, but there’s a law from France in the works which we think has the potential to be one of the most sinister we’ve seen yet.

It flew under our radar so we’re grateful to [0x1b5b] for bringing it to our attention, and it concerns a proposal to force browser vendors to incorporate French government censorship and spyware software in their products. We’re sure that most of our readers will understand the implications of this, but for anyone not versed in online privacy and censorship  this is a level of intrusion not even attempted by China in its state surveillance programme. Perhaps most surprisingly in a European country whose people have an often-fractious relationship with their government, very few French citizens seem to be aware of it or what it means.

It’s likely that if they push this law through it will cause significant consternation over the rest of the European continent. We’d expect those European countries with less liberty-focused governments to enthusiastically jump on the bandwagon, and we’d also expect the European hacker community to respond with a plethora of ways for their French cousins to evade the snooping eyes of Paris. We have little confidence in the wisdom of the EU parliament in Brussels when it comes to ill-thought-out laws though, so we hope this doesn’t portend a future dark day for all Europeans. We find it very sad to see in any case, because France on the whole isn’t that kind of place.

Header image: Pierre Blaché CC0.

This Week In Security: TunnelCrack, Mutant, And Not Discord

Up first is a clever attack against VPNs, using some clever DNS and routing tricks. The technique is known as TunnelCrack (PDF), and every VPN tested was vulnerable to one of the two attacks, on at least one supported platform.
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This Week In Security: It’s Con Season

It must be Blackhat/DEFCON season. Up first in the storm of named vulnerabilities, we have Downfall. The PDF has the juicy details here. It’s quite similar to the Zenbleed issue from last week, in that it abuses speculative execution to leak data via a hidden register. Unlike Zenbleed, this isn’t direct access, but using cache timing analysis to extract individual bytes using a FLUSH+RELOAD approach.

The key to the vulnerability is the gather instruction, which pulls data from multiple locations in memory, often used to run a followup instruction on multiple bytes of data at once. The gather instruction is complex, takes multiple clock cycles to execute, and uses several tricks to execute faster, including managing buffers to avoid multiple reads. In certain cases, that instruction can be interrupted before it completes, leaving the data in the cache. And this data can be speculatively accessed and the values leaked through timing analysis.

This flaw affects 6th generation Intel Core processors through 11th. Mitigations are already rolling out via a microcode update, but do carry a performance hit for gather instructions. Continue reading “This Week In Security: It’s Con Season”