There’s a problem in the
unrar utility, and as a result, the Zimbra mail server was vulnerable to Remote Code Execution by simply sending an email. So first,
unrar is a source-available command-line application made by RarLab, the same folks behind WinRAR. CVE-2022-30333 is the vulnerability there, and it’s a classic path traversal on archive extraction. One of the ways this attack is normally pulled off is by extracting a symlink to the intended destination, which then points to a location that should be restricted.
unrar has code hardening against this attack, but is sabotaged by its cross-platform support. On a Unix machine, the archive is checked for any symbolic links containing the
../ pattern. After this check is completed, a function runs to convert any Windows paths to Unix notation. As such, the simply bypass is to include symlinks using
..\ traversal, which don’t get caught by the check, and then are converted to working directories.
That was bad enough, but Zimbra made it worse by automatically extracting
.rar attachments on incoming emails, in order to run a virus and spam check. That extraction isn’t sandboxed, so an attacker’s files are written anywhere on the filesystem the
zimbra user can write. It’s not hard to imagine how this turns into a full RCE very quickly. If you have an
unrar binary based on RarLab code, check for version 6.1.7 or 6.12 of their binary release. While Zimbra was the application specifically called out, there are likely to be other cases where this could be used for exploitation.
Continue reading “This Week In Security: Zimbra RCE, Routers Under Attack, And Old Tricks In WebAssembly”
[Eaton Zveare] purchased a Jacuzzi hot tub, and splurged for the SmartTub add-on, which connects the whirlpool to the internet so you can control temperature, lights, etc from afar. He didn’t realize he was about to discover a nightmare of security problems. Because as we all know, in IoT, the S stands for security. In this case, the registration email came from smarttub.io, so it was natural to pull up that URL in a web browser to see what was there. The page presented a login prompt, so [Eaton] punched in the credentials he had just generated. “Unauthorized” Well that’s not surprising, but what was very odd was the flash of a dashboard that appeared just before the authorization complaint. Could that have been real data that was unintentionally sent? A screen recorder answered that question, revealing that there was indeed a table loaded up with valid-looking data.
This approach seems to gain admin access to all of the SmartTub admin controls, though [Eaton] didn’t try actually making changes to see if he had write access, too. This was enough to demonstrate the flaw, and making changes would be flirting with that dangerous line that separates research from computer crime. The real problem started when he tried to disclose the vulnerability. SmartTub didn’t have a security contact, but an email to their support email address did elicit a reply asking for details. And after details were supplied, complete radio silence. Exasperated, he finally turned to Auth0, asking them to intervene. Their solution was to pull the plug on one of the two URL endpoints. Finally, after six months of trying to inform Jacuzzi and SmartTub of their severe security issues, both admin portals were secured.
Continue reading “This Week In Security: IoT In The Hot Tub, App Double Fail, And FreeBSD BadBeacon”
We’ve covered a lot of ransomware here, but we haven’t spent a lot of time looking at the decryptor tools available to victims. When ransomware gangs give up, or change names, some of them release a decryption tool for victims who haven’t paid. It’s not really a good idea to run one of those decryptors, though. The publishers don’t have a great track record for taking care of your data, after all. When a decryptor does get released, and is verified to work, security researchers will reverse engineer the tool, and release a known-good decryption program.
The good folks at No More Ransom are leading the charge, building such tools, and hosting a collection of them. They also offer Crypto Sheriff, a tool to identify which ransomware strain got your files. Upload a couple encrypted files, and it will inform you exactly what you’re dealing with, and whether there is a decryptor available. The site is a cooperation between the Dutch police, Interpol, Kaspersky, and McAfee. It may surprise you to know that they recommend reporting every ransomware case to the authorities. I can confirm that at the very least, the FBI in the US are very interested in keeping track of the various ransomware attacks — I’ve fielded a surprise call from an agent following up on an infection.
The OpenSSL project has fixed a pair of vulnerabilities, CVE-2021-3711 and CVE-2021-3712 with release 1.1.11l. The first is a possible buffer overflow caused by a naive length calculation function. A “fixed” length header is actually dynamic, so a carefully crafted plaintext can overflow the allocated buffer. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Ransomware Decryption, OpenSSL, And USBGadget Spoofing”
Yesterday we did a run down of Transmission 2 as part of a series of posts covering the ARG that we ran throughout April. Today I’m going to reveal all the details in Transmission 3, how we put it together and what the answers were.
In classic Hackaday fashion we hadn’t planned any of this, so by this point all our initial ideas we already used up and we were now running out of creativity so it was a real slog to get Transmission 3 out the gate. However we somehow managed it and opened Transmission 3 by posting a series of 5 images of space telescopes:
Continue reading “Hackaday Space: Transmission 3 Puzzles Explained”