Maybe we really were better off with ASCII. Back in my day, we had space for 256 characters, didn’t even use 128 of them, and we took what we got. Unicode opened up computers to the languages of the world, but also opened an invisible backdoor. This is a similar technique to last week’s Trojan Source story. While Trojan Source used right-to-left encoding to manipulate benign-looking code, this hack from Certitude uses Unicode characters that appear to be whitespace, but are recognized as valid variable names.
The extra comma might give you a clue that something is up, but unless you’re very familiar with a language, you might dismiss it as a syntax quirk and move on. Using the same trick again allows the hidden malicious code to be included on a list of commands to run, making a hard-to-spot backdoor.
The second trick is to use “confusable” characters like ǃ, U+01C3. It looks like a normal exclamation mark, so you wouldn’t bat an eye at if(environmentǃ=ENV_PROD){, but in this case, environmentǃ is a new variable. Anything in this development-only block of code is actually always enabled — imagine the chaos that could cause.
Neither of these are ground-breaking vulnerabilities, but they are definitely techniques to be wary of. The authors suggest that a project could mitigate these Unicode techniques by simply restricting their source code to containing only ASCII characters. It’s not a good solution, but it’s a solution. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Unicode Strikes, NPM Again, And First Steps To PS5 Crack”→
We talk about ransomware gangs quite a bit, but there’s another shadowy, loose collection of actors in that arena. Emsisoft sheds a bit of light on the network of researchers and law enforcement that are working behind the scenes to frustrate ransomware campaigns.
Darkside is an interesting case study. This is the group that made worldwide headlines by hitting the Colonial Pipeline, shutting it down for six days. What you might not realize is that the Darkside ransomware software had a weakness in its encryption algorithms, from mid December 2020 through January 12, 2021. Interestingly, Bitdefender released a decryptor on January 11. I haven’t found confirmation, but the timing seems to indicate that the release of the decryptor triggered Darkside to look for and fix the flaw in their encryption. (Alternatively, it’s possible that it was released in response the fix, and time zones are skewing the dates.)
Emsisoft is very careful not to tip their hand when they’ve found a vulnerability in a ransomware. Instead, they have a network of law enforcement and security professionals that they share information with. This came in handy again when the Darkside group was spun back up, under the name BlackMatter.
Not long after the campaign was started again, a similar vulnerability was reintroduced in the encryption code. The ransomware’s hidden site, used for negotiating payment for decryption, seems to have had a vulnerability that Emsisoft was able to use to keep track of victims. Since they had a working decryptor, they were able to reach out directly, and provide victims with decryption tools.
This changed when the link to BlackMatter’s portal leaked on Twitter. It seems like many people hold ransomware gangs in less-than-high regard, and took the opportunity to inform BlackMatter of this fact, using that portal. In response, BlackMatter took down that portal site, cutting off Emsisoft’s line of information. Since then, the encryption vulnerability has been fixed, Emisoft can’t listen in on BlackMatter anymore, and they released the story to encourage BlackMatter victims to contact them. They also suggest that ransomware victims always contact law enforcement to report the incident, as there may be a decryptor that isn’t public yet. Continue reading “This Week In Security: The Battle Against Ransomware, Unicode, Discourse, And Shrootless”→
There was a time, not quite so long ago, when a computer was a beige box that sat on your desk. Before that, computers were big enough to double as desks, and even farther back, they took up a whole room. Today? Well today it’s complicated. Single-board computers (SBCs) like the Raspberry Pi put a full desktop experience in the palm of your hand, for a price that would have been unfathomable before the smartphone revolution increased demand for high-performance ARM chips.
But compared to the tiny open hardware Linux SBC that lives inside the WiFiWart, even the Raspberry Pi looks massive. Developed by [Walker] as a penetration testing tool, the custom computer is housed in an enclosure designed to make it look like a traditional (if a bit large) USB phone charger. In fact, it doesn’t just look like a USB charger, it actually is one. The internal power supply is not only capable of converting AC into the various DC voltages required to run the miniature Linux box, but also features a USB port where you can plug in your phone to charge it.
For the infosec folks in the audience, the applications for the WiFiWart are obvious. Just plug this thing in somewhere inconspicuous, and you’ve got a foot in the door. The dual WiFi interfaces mean you can connect to a target network on one card and use the second to spin up a fake access point or exfiltrate data. Plus with a quad-core Cortex-A7 ARM processor running at 1.2 GHz and a healthy 1 GB of DDR3, you’ll have enough power to run many security tools locally.
But of course, nothing keeps you from using the WiFiWart for non-security purposes. That’s what has us particularly excited, as you can never have enough open hardware Linux boards. Especially ones this tiny. Removed from its wall charger disguise, the brains of the WiFiWart could be used for all kinds of projects. Plus, not only is the final design open source, but [Walker] made sure to only use free and open source tools to create it. Keeping his entire workflow open means it will be easier for the community to utilize and improve upon his initial design, which in the end, is the whole idea behind the open hardware movement and efforts such as the Hackaday Prize.
In a brilliant write-up, [Stephen Tong] brings us his “Use-After-Free for Dummies“. It’s a surprising tale of a vulnerability that really shouldn’t exist, and a walkthrough of how to complete a capture the flag challenge. The vulnerable binary is running on a Raspberry Pi, which turns out to be very important. It’s a multithreaded application that uses lock-free data sharing, through pair of integers readable by multiple threads. Those ints are declared using the volatile keyword, which is a useful way to tell a compiler not to optimize too heavily, as this value may get changed by another thread.
On an x86 machine, this approach works flawlessly, as all the out-of-order execution features are guaranteed to be globally transparent. Put another way, even if thread one can speed up execution by modifying shared memory ahead of time, the CPU will keep the shared memory changes in the proper order. When that shared memory is controlling concurrent access, it’s really important that ordering happens the way you expect it. What was a surprise to me is that the ARM platform does not provide that global memory ordering. While the out-of-order execution will be transparent to the thread making changes, other threads and processes may observe those actions out of order. An example may help:
volatile int value;
volatile int ready;
// Thread 1
value = 123; // (1)
ready = 1; // (2)
// Thread 2
while (!ready); // (3)
print(value); // (4)
Good news, everyone! Security researcher [Mordechai Guri] has given us yet another reason to look askance at our computers and wonder who might be sniffing in our private doings.
This time, your suspicious gaze will settle on the lowly Ethernet cable, which he has used to exfiltrate data across an air gap. The exploit requires almost nothing in the way of fancy hardware — he used both an RTL-SDR dongle and a HackRF to receive the exfiltrated data, and didn’t exactly splurge on the receiving antenna, which was just a random chunk of wire. The attack, dubbed “LANtenna”, does require some software running on the target machine, which modulates the desired data and transmits it over the Ethernet cable using one of two methods: by toggling the speed of the network connection, or by sending raw UDP packets. Either way, an RF signal is radiated by the Ethernet cable, which was easily received and decoded over a distance of at least two meters. The bit rate is low — only a few bits per second — but that may be all a malicious actor needs to achieve their goal.
To be sure, this exploit is quite contrived, and fairly optimized for demonstration purposes. But it’s a pretty effective demonstration, but along with the previously demonstrated hard drive activity lights, power supply fans, and even networked security cameras, it adds another seemingly innocuous element to the list of potential vectors for side-channel attacks.
The government of Argentina has a national ID card system, and as a result maintains a database containing data on every citizen in the country. What could possibly go wrong? Predictably, an attacker has managed to gain access to the database, and is offering the entire dataset for sale. The Argentinian government has claimed that this wasn’t a mass breach, and only a handful of credentials were accessed. This seems to be incorrect, as the seller was able to provide the details of an arbitrary citizen to the journalists investigating the story.
Patch Tuesday
Microsoft has released their monthly round of patches for October, and there are a couple doozies. CVE-2021-40486 is an RCE in Microsoft Word, and this flaw can trigger via the preview pane. CVE-2021-38672 and CVE-2021-40461 are both RCE vulnerabilities in Hyper-V. And finally, CVE-2021-40449 is a privilege upgrade actively being used in the wild, more on that in a moment. Oh, and you thought the Print Nightmare was over? CVE-2021-36970 is yet another print spooler vulnerability. The unfortunate thing about the list of Microsoft vulnerabilities is that there is hardly any information available about them.
On the other hand, Apple just patched CVE-2021-30883, a 0-day that’s being actively exploited in iOS. With the release of the fix, [Saar Amar] has put together a very nice explanation of the bug with PoC. It’s a simple integer overflow when allocating a buffer, leading to an arbitrary memory write. This one is particularly nasty, because it’s not gated behind any permissions, and can be triggered from within app sandboxes. It’s being used in the wild already, so go update your iOS devices now.
Kaspersky brings us a report on a CVE-2021-40449 being used in the wild. It’s part of an attack they’re calling MysterySnail, and seems to originate from IronHusky out of China. The vulnerability is a use-after-free, and is triggered by making a the ResetDC API call that calls its own callback. This layer of recursive execution results in an object being freed before the outer execution has finished with it.
Since the object can now be re-allocated and controlled by the attacker code, the malformed object allows the attacker to run their code in kernel space, achieving privilege escalation. This campaign then does some data gathering and installs a Remote Access Trojan. Several Indicators of Compromise are listed as part of the write-up.
Off to the Races
Google’s Project Zero is back with a clever Linux Kernel hack, an escalation of privilege triggered by a race condition in the pseudoterminal device. Usually abbreviated PTY, this kernel device can be connected to userspace applications on both ends, making for some interesting interactions. Each end has a struct that reflects the status of the connection. The problem is that TIOCSPGRP, used to set the process group that should be associated with the terminal, doesn’t properly lock the terminal’s internal state.
As a result, calling this function on both sides at the same time is a race condition, where the reference count can be corrupted. Once the reference count is untrustworthy, the whole object can be freed, with a dangling pointer left in the kernel. From there, it’s a typical use-after-free bug. The post has some useful thoughts about hardening a system against this style of attack, and the bug was fixed December 2020.
AI vs Pseudorandom Numbers
[Mostafa Hassan] of the NCC Group is doing some particularly fascinating research, using machine learning to test pseudorandom number generators. In the first installment, he managed to break the very simple xorshift128 algorithm. Part two tackles the Mersenne Twister, which also falls to the neural network. Do note that neither of these are considered cryptographic number generators, so it isn’t too surprising that a ML model can determine their internal state. What will be most interesting is the post to come, when he tackles other algorithms thought to be secure. Watch for that one in a future article.
L0phtcrack Becomes Open Source
In a surprise to me, the L0phtcrack tool has been released as open source. L0phtcrack is the password cracking/auditing tool created by [Mudge] and company at L0pht Heavy Industries, about a billion years ago. Ownership passed to @stake, which was purchased by Symantec in 2004. Due to export regulations, Symantec stopped selling the program, and it was reacquired by the original L0pht team.
In April 2020, Terahash announced that they had purchased rights to the program, and began selling and supporting it as a part of their offerings. Terahash primarily builds GPU based cracking hardware, and has been hit exceptionally hard by the chip shortage. As a result of Terahash entering bankruptcy protection, the L0phtcrack ownership has reverted back to L0pht, and version 7.2.0 has been released as Open Source.
Apache 2.4.50 included a fix for CVE-2021-41773. It has since been discovered that this fix was incomplete, and this version is vulnerable to a permutation of the same vulnerability. 2.4.51 is now available, and should properly fix the vulnerability.
The original exploit used .%2e/ as the magic payload, which is using URL encoding to sneak the extra dot symbol through as part of the path. The new workaround uses .%%32%65/. This looks a bit weird, but makes sense when you decode it. URL encoding uses UTF-8, and so %32 decodes to 2, and %65 to e. Familiar? Yep, it’s just the original vulnerability with a second layer of URL encoding. This has the same requirements as the first iteration, cgi-bin has to be enabled for code execution, and require all denied has to be disabled in the configuration files. Continue reading “This Week In Security: The Apache Fix Miss, Github (Malicious) Actions, And Shooting The Messenger”→
In a surprise to me, 
