Automated Tank Gauges (ATGs) are nifty bits of tech, sitting unseen in just about every gas station. They keep track of fuel levels, temperature, and other bits of information, and sometimes get tied into the automated systems at the station. The problem, is that a bunch of these devices are listening to port 10001 on the Internet, and some of them appear to be misconfigured. How many? Let’s start with the easier question, how many IPs have port 10001 open? Masscan is one of the best tools for this, and [RoseSecurity] found over 85,000 listening devices. An open port is just the start. How many of those respond to connections with the string
In-Tank Inventory Reports? Shodan reports 11,113 IPs as of August of this year. [RoseSecurity] wrote a simple Python script that checked each of those listening IPs came up with a matching number of devices. The scary bit is that this check was done by sending a
Get In-Tank Inventory Report command, and checking for a good response. It seems like that’s 11K systems, connected to the internet, with no authentication. What could possibly go wrong? Continue reading “This Week In Security: 11,000 Gas Stations, TrustZone Hacks Kernel, And Unexpected Fuzzing Finds”
There’s a VMWare problem that’s being exploited in the wild, according to the NSA (PDF). The vulnerability is a command injection on an administrative console. The web host backing this console is apparently running as root, as the vulnerability allows executing “commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system.”
The wrinkle that makes this interesting is that VMWare learned about this vuln from the NSA, which seems to indicate that it was a zero-day being used by a foreign state. The compromise chain they list is also oddly specific, making me suspect that it is a sanitized account of observed attacks.
Microsoft Teams, And the Non-CVE
Vegeris points out that since so many users have a presence in multiple rooms, it would be trivial to use this exploit to build a worm that could infect the majority of Teams users worldwide. The bug was reported privately to Microsoft and fixed back in October. A wormable RCE in a widely used tool seems like a big deal, and should net a high CVE score, right? Microsoft gave two ratings for this attack chain, for the two versions of Teams that it can affect. For the Office365 client, it’s “Important, Spoofing”, which is about as unimportant as a bug can be. The desktop app, at least, was rated “critical” for an RCE. The reason for that seems to be that the sandbox escape only works on the standalone desktop app.
But no CVE was issued for the exploit chain. In the security community, collecting CVEs is an important proof of work for your resume. Microsoft replied that they don’t issue CVEs for products that get updated automatically without user interaction. Kerfuffle ensued. Continue reading “This Week In Security: VMWare, Microsoft Teams, Python Fuzzing, And More”
An issue was discovered in
libarchive through Google’s ClusterFuzz project.
Libarchive is a compression and decompression library, widely used in utilities. The issue here is how the library recovers from a malformed archive. Hitting an invalid header causes the memory in use to be freed. The problem is that it’s possible for file processing to continue even after that working memory has been freed, leading to all kinds of problems. So far an actual exploit hasn’t been revealed, but it’s likely that one is possible. The problem was fixed back in May, but the issue was just announced to give time for that update to percolate down to users.
Of note is the fact that this issue was found through Google’s fuzzing efforts. Google runs the oss-fuzz project, which automatically ingests nightly builds from around 200 open source projects and runs ClusterFuzz against them. This process of throwing random data at programs and functions has revealed over 14,000 bugs.
Continue reading “This Week In Security: Fuzzing Fixes, Foul Fonts, TPM Timing Attacks, And More!”
HDMI is implemented on just about every piece of sufficiently advanced consumer electronics. You can find it in low-end cellphones, and a single board Linux computer without HDMI is considered crippled. There’s some interesting stuff lurking around in the HDMI spec, and at DEF CON, [Joshua Smith] laid the Consumer Electronics Control (CEC) part of HDMI out on the line, and exposed a few vulnerabilities in this protocol that’s in everything with an HDMI port.
CEC is designed to control multiple devices over an HDMI connection; it allows your TV to be controlled from your set top box, your DVD player from your TV, and passing text from one device to another for an On Screen Display. It’s a 1-wire bidirectional bus with 500bits/second of bandwidth. There are a few open source implementations like libCEC, Android HDMI-CEC, and even an Arduino implementation. The circuit to interface a microcontroller with the single CEC pin is very simple – just a handful of jellybean parts.
[Joshua]’s work is based off a talk by [Andy Davis] from Blackhat 2012 (PDF), but greatly expands on this work. After looking at a ton of devices, [Joshua] was able to find some very cool vulnerabilities in a specific Panasonic TV and a Samsung Blu-ray player.
A certain CEC command directed towards the Panasonic TV sent a command to upload new firmware from an SD card. This is somewhat odd, as you would think firmware would be automagically downloaded from an SD card, just like thousands of other consumer electronics devices. For the Samsung Blu-Ray player, a few memcpy() calls were found to be accessed by CEC commands, but they’re not easily exploitable yet.
As far as vulnerabilities go, [Joshua] has a few ideas. Game consoles and BluRay players are ubiquitous, and the holy grail – setting up a network connection over HDMI Ethernet Channel (HEC) – are the keys to the castle in a device no one would ever think of taking a close look at.
Future work includes a refactor of the current code, and digging into more devices. There are millions of CEC-capable devices out on the market right now, and the CEC commands themselves are not standardized. The only way for HDMI CEC to be a reliable tool is to figure out commands for these devices. It’s a lot of work, but makes for a great call to action to get more people investigating this very interesting and versatile protocol.
We dropped in on [Charlie Miller]’s fuzzing seminar at the end of the day yesterday. Fuzzing become a fairly popular topic in the last year and essentially involves giving a program garbage input, hoping that it will break. If it can’t handle the fake data and fails in a non-graceful fashion, you could have found a potentially exploitable bug. Fuzzing is a fairly simple idea, but as Charlie points out, without some thinking while you’re doing it it’s unlikely to be very productive.
Continue reading “ToorCon 9: Real World Fuzzing”
Last week we covered the latest 0-day from NSO group, BLASTPASS. There’s more details about exactly how that works, and a bit of a worrying revelation for Android users. One of the vulnerabilities used was CVE-2023-41064, a buffer overflow in the ImageIO library. The details have not been confirmed, but the timing suggests that this is the same bug as CVE-2023-4863, a Webp 0-day flaw in Chrome that is known to be exploited in the wild.
The problem seems to be an Out Of Bounds write in the
BuildHuffmanTable() function of libwebp. And to understand that, we have to understand libwebp does, and what a Huffman Table has to do with it. The first is easy. Webp is Google’s pet image format, potentially replacing JPEG, PNG, and GIF. It supports lossy and lossless compression, and the compression format for lossless images uses Huffman coding among other techniques. And hence, we have a Huffman table, a building block in the image compression and decompression.
What’s particularly fun about this compression technique is that the image includes not just Huffman compressed data, but also a table of statistical data needed for decompression. The table is rather large, so it gets Huffman compressed too. It turns out, there can be multiple layers of this compression format, which makes the vulnerability particularly challenging to reverse-engineer. The vulnerability is when the pre-allocated buffer isn’t big enough to hold one of these decompressed Huffman tables, and it turns out that the way to do that is to make maximum-size tables for the outer layers, and then malform the last one. In this configuration, it can write out of bounds before the final consistency check.
An interesting note is that as one of Google’s C libraries, this is an extensively fuzzed codebase. While fuzzing and code coverage are both great, neither is guaranteed to find vulnerabilities, particularly well hidden ones like this one. And on that note, this vulnerability is present in Android, and the fix is likely going to wait til the October security update. And who knows where else this bug is lurking. Continue reading “This Week In Security: WebP, Cavium, Gitlab, And Asahi Lina”
The average Starlink user probably doesn’t spend a lot of time thinking about their hardware after getting the dish aligned and wiring run. To security researchers, however, it’s another fascinating device to tinker with as they reverse-engineer the firmware and try to both find out what makes it tick, as well as how to break it. This is essentially the subject of [Carlo Ramponi]’s article over at Quarkslab as he digs into the firmware architecture and potential weaknesses in its internal communication.
The user terminal hardware itself is a quite standard AArch64 ARM-based SoC, along with the proprietary communication interface, all of which is controlled by the Linux-based firmware. Dumping the firmware itself was made easy thanks to existing work by researchers at the KU Leuven, involving dumping the contents of the onboard eMMC storage. After this the firmware architecture could be analyzed, which turned out to consist out of mostly C++-based binaries, but with a single big binary for the user front-end written in Go.
Communication between these processes is handled through a custom inter-process protocol called ‘Slate Sharing’, all of which is coordinated via the core User Terminal Control process. It are these Slate IPC messages which form the most likely attack surface for a fuzzing attack, with the
SoftwareUpdateRequest command being an interesting target as it would seem to not require authentication since it doesn’t address a specific user. This work is part of [Carlo]’s master’s thesis, and should form the basis of further research on the Starlink User Terminal firmware.