[HD Moore] recently posted an article on Rapid 7’s blog about an interesting security problem. They’ve been doing some research into the security of automated tank gauges (ATGs). These devices are used at gas stations and perform various functions including monitoring fuel levels, tracking deliveries, or raising alarms. [Moore] says that ATGs are used at nearly every fueling station in the United States, but they are also used internationally. It turns out these things are often not secured properly.
Many ATG’s have a built-in serial port for programming and monitoring. Some systems also have a TCP/IP card, or even a serial to TCP/IP adapter. These cards allow technicians to monitor the system remotely. The most common TCP port used in these systems is port 10001. Some of these systems have the ability to be password protected, but Rapid 7’s findings indicate that many of them are left wide open.
The vulnerability was initial reported to Rapid 7 by [Jack Chadowitz]. He discovered the problem due to his work within the industry and developed his own web portal to help people test their own systems. [Jack] approached Rapid 7 for assistance in investigating the issue on a much larger scale.
Rapid 7 then scanned every IPv4 address looking for systems with an open port 10001. Each live system discovered was then sent a “Get In-Tank Inventory Report” request. Any system vulnerable to attack would respond with the station name, address, number of tanks, and fuel types. The scan found approximately 5,800 systems online with no password set. Over 5,300 of these stations are in the United States.
Rapid 7 believes that attackers may be able to perform such functions as to reconfigure alarm thresholds, reset the system, or otherwise disrupt operation of the fuel tank. An attacker might be able to simulate false conditions that would shut down the fuel tank, making it unavailable for use. Rapid 7 does not believe this vulnerability is actively being exploited in the wild, but they caution that it would be difficult to tell the difference between an attack and a system failure. They recommend companies hide their systems behind a VPN for an additional layer of security.
Two Cornell students have designed their own multi-factor authentication system. This system uses a PIN combined with a form of voice recognition to authenticate a user. Their system is not as simple as speaking a passphrase, though. Instead, you have to sing the correct tones into the lock.
The system runs on an ATMEL MEGA1284P. The chip is not sophisticated enough to be able to easily identify actual human speech. The team decided to focus their effort on detecting pitch instead. The result is a lock that requires you to sing the perfect sequence of pitches. We would be worried about an attacker eavesdropping and attempting to sing the key themselves, but the team has a few mechanisms in place to protect against this attack. First, the system also requires a valid PIN. An attacker can’t deduce your PIN simply by listening from around the corner. Second, the system also maintains the user’s specific voice signature.
The project page delves much more deeply into the mathematical theory behind how the system works. It’s worth a read if you are a math or audio geek. Check out the video below for a demonstration. Continue reading “SingLock Protects Your Valuables From Shy People”
One-time passwords (OTP) are often used in America but not so much in Europe. For our unfamiliar readers, OTP tokens like the one shown above generate passwords that are only valid for one login session or transaction, making them invulnerable to replay attacks. [Dmitry] disassembled one eToken (Aladin PASS) he had lying around and managed to reprogram it for his own needs.
Obviously, these kind of devices don’t come with their schematics and layout files so [Dmitry] had to do some reverse engineering. He discovered six holes in a 3×2 arrangement on the PCB so he figured that they must be used to reprogram the device. However, [Dmitry] also had to find which microcontroller was present on the board as its only marking were “HA4450” with a Microchip logo. By cross-referencing the number of pins, package and peripherals on Microchip parametric search tool he deduced it was a PIC16F913. From there, it was just a matter of time until he could display what he wanted on the LCD.
We love seeing tiny consumer hardware hacked like this. Most recently we’ve been enthralled by the Trandscend Wi-Fi SD card hacking which was also one of [Dmitry’s] hacks.
[Elliot] put together an intriguing proof-of-concept script that uses repeated deauthentication packet bursts to jam WiFi access points. From what we can tell it’s a new way to use an old tool. Aircrack-ng is a package often seen in WiFi hacking. It includes a deauthentication command which causes WiFi clients to stop using an access point and attempt to reauthenticate themselves. [Elliot’s] attack involves sending repeated deauthenitcation packets which in essence never allows a client to pass any data because they will always be tied up with authentication.
After the break you can see a video demonstration of how this works. The script detects access points in the area. The attacker selects which ones to jam and the script then calls the Aircrack-ng command. If you’ve got an idea on how to protect against this type of thing, we’d love to hear about. Leave your thoughts in the comments.
Continue reading “WiFi Jamming Via Deauthentication Packets”