Here at Hackaday, we have a soft spot for security dongles. When a new two-factor-authentication dongle is open source, uses USB and NFC, and supports FIDO2, the newest 2FA standard, we take notice. That just happens to be exactly what [Conor Patrick] is funding on Kickstarter.
We’ve looked at [Conor]’s first generation hardware key, and the process of going from design to physical product. With that track record, the Solo security key promises to be more than the vaporware that plagues crowdfunding services.
Another player, Yubikey, has also recently announced a new product that supports FIDO2 and NFC. While Yubikey has stepped away from their early open source policy, Solo is embracing the open source ethos. The Kickstarter promises the release of both the software and hardware design as fully open, using MIT and CC BY-SA licenses.
For more information, see the blog post detailing the project goals and initial design process. As always, caveat emptor, but this seems to be a crowdfunding project worth taking a look at.
In case you’re looking for a variety of IRC client implementations, or always wondered how botnets and other malware looks on the inside, [maestron] has just the right thing for you. After years of searching and gathering the source code of hundreds of real-world botnets, he’s now published them on GitHub.
With C++ being the dominant language in the collection, you will also find sources in C, PHP, BASIC, Pascal, the occasional assembler, and even Java. And if you want to consider the psychological aspect of it, who knows, seeing their malicious creations in their rawest form might even give you a glimpse into the mind of their authors.
These sources are of course for educational purposes only, and it should go without saying that you probably wouldn’t want to experiment with them outside a controlled environment. But in case you do take a closer look at them and are someone who generally likes to get things in order, [maestron] is actually looking for ideas how to properly sort and organize the collection. And if you’re more into old school viruses, and want to see them run in a safe environment, there’s always the malware museum.
Intel just moved some high level people around to form a dedicated security group.
When news of Meltdown and Spectre broke, Intel’s public relations department applied maximum power to their damage control press release generators. The initial message was one of defiance, downplaying the impact and implying people are over reacting. This did not go over well. Since then, we’ve started seeing a trickle of information from engineering and even direct microcode updates for people who dare to live on the bleeding edge.
All the technical work to put out the immediate fire is great, but for the sake of Intel’s future they need to figure out how to avoid future fires. The leadership needs to change the company culture away from an attitude where speed is valued over all else. Will the new security group have the necessary impact? We won’t know for quite some time. For now, it is encouraging to see work underway. Fundamental problems in corporate culture require a methodical fix and not a hack.
Editor’s note: We’ve changed the title of this article to better reflect its content: that Intel is making changes to its corporate structure to allow a larger voice for security in the inevitable security versus velocity tradeoff.
PHPMailer, one of the most used classes for sending emails from within PHP, has a serious vulnerability in versions less than 5.2.18 (current version). The security researcher [Dawid Golunski] just published a limited advisory stating that PHPMailer suffers from a critical flaw that might lead an attacker to achieve remote code execution in the context of the web server user. PHPMailer is used by several open-source projects, among them are: WordPress, Drupal, 1CRM, SugarCRM, Yii and Joomla. A fix has been issued and PHPMailer is urging all users to upgrade their systems.
To trigger this vulnerability (CVE-2016-10033) it seems that the attacker only has to make the web application send out an email using the vulnerable PHPMailer class. Depending on the application itself, this can be accomplished in different ways, such as contact/feedback forms, registration forms, password email resets and so on.
Upon a quick diff analysis, we found that the vulnerable code seems to lie in the following lines of the class.phpmailer.php:
Continue reading “Santa Knows If Your Contact Form Uses PHPMailer < 5.2.18”
[Donncha O’Cearbhaill] has successfully exploited two flaws in Apport, the crash report mechanism in Ubuntu. Apport is installed by default in all Ubuntu Desktop installations >= 12.10 (Quantal). Inspired by [Chris Evan] work on exploiting 6502 processor opcodes on the NES, [Donncha] describes the whole process of finding and exploiting a 0-day on a modern linux system.
One of the flaws, tracked as CVE-2016-9949, relies on a python code injection in the crash file. Apport blindly uses the python eval() function on an unsanitized field (CrashDB) inside the .crash file. This leads directly to arbitrary python code execution. The other flaw, tracked as CVE-2016-9950, takes advantage of a path traversal attack and the execution of arbitrary Python scripts outside the system hook_dirs. The problem arises when another field (Package) from the crash report file is used without sanitizing when building a path to the package hook files.
CVE-2016-9949 is easily exploitable, if an attacker can trick a user into opening a specially crafted file (apport .crash file), the attacker can execute the python code of his/her choice. Two details make it a very interesting exploit.
The first thing to note is the exploit’s reliability. Given that it is pure python code execution, an attacker doesn’t have to worry about ASLR, Non-Exec Memory, Stack Canaries and other security features that Ubuntu ships by default. As the author notes:
“There are lots of bugs out there which don’t need hardcore memory corruption exploitation skills. Logic bugs can be much more reliable than any ROP chain.”
Another interesting detail is that the exploit file doesn’t need to have the .crash extension, as long as its content starts with the string “ProblemType: ” and the file extension is not associated already with other software, Ubuntu considers it being of mime-type type=”text/x-apport” (for example, .ZlP or .0DF). This significantly improves the chances of an unsuspecting user being fooled into open the file.
Continue reading “Reliably Exploiting Apport In Ubuntu”
It’s probable that most Hackaday readers are aware of their own computer security even if they are not specialists. You’ll have some idea of which ports your machines expose to the world, what services they run, and you’ll know of a heap of possible attack vectors even if you may not know about every last one.
So as part of that awareness, it’s likely you’ll be wary of strange USB devices. If someone drops a Flash drive in the parking lot the chances of one of you blithely plugging it into your laptop is not high at all. USB ports are trusted by your computer and its operating system, and to have access to one is to be given the keys to the kingdom.
Our subject today is a DEF CON talk courtesy of [Dominic White] and [Rogan Dawes] entitled “Universal Serial aBUSe“, and it details a USB attack in which they create an innocuous USB stick that emulates a keyboard and mouse which is shared across a WiFi network via a VNC server. This gives an attacker (who can gain momentary physical access to a USB port to install the device) a way into the machine that completely bypasses all network and other security measures.
Their hardware features an AVR and an ESP8266, the former for USB and HID work and the latter to do the heavy lifting and provide WiFi. They started with a Cactus Micro Rev2, but graduated to their own compatible board to make the device more suitable to pose as a USB stick. Both hardware and software files can be found on their GitHub repository, with the software being a fork of esp-link. They go into significant detail of their development and debugging process, and their write-up should be an interesting read for anyone.
Below the break you can find a video description of the attack. It’s not a shock to know that USB ports have such little defense, but it is a sobering moment to realize how far attacks like this one have come into the realm of what is possible.
Continue reading “Universal Serial Abuse”
Some people really enjoy the kind of computer mouse that would not be entirely out of place in a F-16 cockpit. The kind of mouse that can launch a browser with the gentle shifting of one of its thirty-eight buttons ever so slightly to the left and open their garage door with a shifting to the right of that same button. However, can this power be used for evil, and not just frustrating guest users of their computer?
We’ve heard of the trusted peripheral being repurposed for nefarious uses before. Sometimes they’ve even been modified for more benign purposes. All of these have a common trend. The mouse itself must be physically modified to add the vulnerability or feature. However, the advanced mice with macro support can be used as is for a vulnerability.
The example in this case is a Logitech G-series gaming mouse. The mouse has the ability to store multiple personal settings in its memory. That way someone could take the mouse to multiple computers and still have all their settings available. [Stefan Keisse] discovered that the 100 command limit on the macros for each button are more than enough to get a full reverse shell on the target computer.
Considering how frustratingly easy it can be to accidentally press an auxiliary button on these mice, all an attacker would need to do is wait after delivering the sabotaged mouse. Video of the exploit after the break.
Continue reading “Unexpected Betrayal From Your Right Hand Mouse”