This Week In Security: TPM And BootGuard, Drones, And Coverups

May 12, 2023 by 17 Comments

Full disk encryption is the go-to solution for hardening a laptop against the worst-case scenario of physical access. One way that encryption can be managed is through a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a chip on the motherboard that manages the disk encryption key, and only hands it over for boot after the user has authenticated. We’ve seen some clever tricks deployed against these discrete TPMs, like sniffing the data going over the physical traces. So in theory, an integrated TPM might be more secure. Such a technique does exist, going by the name fTPM, or firmware TPM. It uses a Trusted Execution Environment, a TEE, to store and run the TPM code. And there’s another clever attack against that concept (PDF).

It’s chip glitching via a voltage fault. This particular attack works against AMD processors, and the voltage fault is triggered by injecting commands into the Serial Voltage Identification Interface 2.0 (SVI2). Dropping the voltage momentarily to the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP) can cause a key verification step to succeed even against an untrusted key, bypassing the need for an AMD Root Key (ARK) signed board firmware. That’s not a simple process, and pulling it off takes about $200 of gear, and about 3 hours. This exposes the CPU-unique seed, the board NVRAM, and all the protected TPM objects.

So how bad is this in the real world? If your disk encryption only relies on an fTPM, it’s pretty bad. The attack exposes that key and breaks encryption. For something like BitLocker that can also use a PIN, it’s a bit better, though to really offer more resistance, that needs to be a really long PIN: a 10 digit PIN falls to a GPU in just 4 minutes, in this scenario where it can be attacked offline. There is an obscure way to enable an “enhanced PIN”, a password, which makes that offline attack impractical with a secure password.

And if hardware glitching a computer seems to complicated, why not just use the leaked MSI keys? Now to be fair, this only seems to allow a bypass of Intel’s BootGuard, but it’s still a blow. MSI suffered a ransomware-style breach in March, but rather than encrypt data, the attackers simply threatened to release the copied data to the world. MSI apparently refused to pay up, and source code and signing keys are now floating in the dark corners of the Internet. There have been suggestions that this leak impacts the entire line of Intel processors, but it seems likely that MSI only had their own signing keys to lose. But that’s plenty bad, given the lack of a revocation system or automatic update procedure for MSI firmware. Continue reading “This Week In Security: TPM And BootGuard, Drones, And Coverups” →

Reverse Engineering An Oil Burner Comms Board, With A Few Lucky Breaks

May 11, 2023 by 3 Comments

Here’s a question for you: How do you reverse engineer a circuit when you don’t even have it in hand? It’s an interesting problem, and it adds a level of difficulty to the already iffy proposition that reverse engineering generally presents. And yet, not only did [themole] find a way to replicate a comms board for his oil burner, he extended and enhanced the circuit for integration into his home automation network.

By way of backstory, [themole] has a wonky Buderus oil burner, which occasionally goes into safety mode and shuts down. With one too many cold showers as a result, he looked for ways to communicate with the burner controller. Luckily, Buderus sells just the thing — a serial port module that plugs into a spare slot in the controller. Unluckily, the board costs a bundle, and that’s even if you can find it. So armed with nothing but photos of the front and back of the board, the finding of which was a true stroke of luck, he set about figuring out the circuit.

With only a dozen components or so and a couple of connectors, the OEM board gave up its secrets pretty easily; it’s really just a level shifter to make the boiler talk RS-232. But that’s a little passé these days, and [the78mole] was more interested in a WiFi connection. So his version of the card includes an ESP32 module, which handles wireless duties as well as the logic needed to talk to the burner using the Buderus proprietary protocol. The module plugs right into the burner controller and connects it to ESPHome, so no more cold showers for [themole].

We thought this one was pretty cool, especially the way [themole] used the online photos of the board to not only trace the circuit but to get accurate — mostly — measurements of the board using an online measuring tool. That’s a tip we’ll keep in our back pocket.

Thanks to [Jieffe] for the tip.

This Week In Security: Oracle Opera, Passkeys, And AirTag RFC

May 5, 2023 by 10 Comments

There’s a problem with Opera. No, not that kind of opera. The Oracle kind. Oracle OPERA is a Property Management Solution (PMS) that is in use in a bunch of big-name hotels around the world. The PMS is the system that handles reservations and check-ins, talks to the phone system to put room extensions in the proper state, and generally runs the back-end of the property. It’s old code, and handles a bunch of tasks. And researchers at Assetnote found a serious vulnerability. CVE-2023-21932 is an arbitrary file upload issue, and rates at least a 7.2 CVSS.

It’s a tricky one, where the code does all the right things, but gets the steps out of order. Two parameters, jndiname and username are encrypted for transport, and the sanitization step happens before decryption. The username parameter receives no further sanitization, and is vulnerable to path traversal injection. There are two restrictions to exploitation. The string encryption has to be valid, and the request has to include a valid Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) name. It looks like these are the issues leading Oracle to consider this flaw “difficult to exploit vulnerability allows high privileged attacker…”.

The only problem is that the encryption key is global and static. It was pretty straightforward to reverse engineer the encryption routine. And JDNI strings can be fetched anonymously from a trio of endpoints. This lead Assetnote to conclude that Oracle’s understanding of the flaw is faulty, and a much higher CVSS score is appropriate. Particularly with this Proof of Concept code, it is relatively straightforward to upload a web shell to an Opera system.

The one caveat there is that an attacker has to get network access to that install. These aren’t systems intended to be exposed to the internet, and my experience is that they are always on a dedicated network connection, not connected to the rest of the office network. Even the interconnect between the PMS and phone system is done via a serial connection, making this network flaw particularly hard to get to. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Oracle Opera, Passkeys, And AirTag RFC” →

LoRa Goes To The Moon

May 3, 2023 by 12 Comments

LoRa is a communications method that allows for long range radio contacts to be made using typically low-powered devices. This shouldn’t be surprising given that LoRa is short for “long range” which typically involves distances on the order of a few kilometers. However, a group of students are taking the “long range” moniker to the extreme by attempting to send and receive a signal with a total path of around 768,000 kilometers by using some specialized equipment to bounce a LoRa signal off of the moon and receive it back on Earth.

Earth-Moon-Earth (EME) communications are typically done by amateur radio operators as a hobby, since the development of communications satellites largely rendered other uses of this communication pathway obsolete. A directional antenna and a signal typically on the order of 1 kW are often used to compensate for the extremely high path losses. Using LoRa, which makes use of chirp spread spectrum modulation, they hope to reduce this power requirement significantly. The signals are being generated and received on a set of HackRF One devices fed into a series of amplifiers, and the team is also employing a set of large dish antennas, one in New Jersey and another in Alaska, to send and receive the messages.

The software used is the open-source SDRAngel which is useful for controlling the HackRF and moving the LoRa signal up to 1296 MHz. Normally LoRa is operated on an unlicensed band, but this method allows for finer control of not only frequency but also bandwidth, which helps reduce the impacts of path loss. Right now they have not yet completed their contacts with the Alaska station (partially due to that antenna being covered in snow) but we hope to hear more news in the future. In the meantime, take a look at some more traditional long-range communications using this protocol with more manageable-sized antennas.

Image courtesy of NASA, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

This Week In Security: Session Puzzling, Session Keys, And Speculation

April 28, 2023 by 7 Comments

Last week we briefly mentioned a vulnerability in the Papercut software, and more details and a proof of concept have been published. The vulnerability is one known as session puzzling. That’s essentially where a session variable is used for multiple purposes, or gets incorrectly set. In Papercut, it was possible to trigger the SetupCompleted class on a server that had already finished that initial setup process. And part of SetupCompleted validated the session of the current user. In a normal first-setup case, that might make sense, but as anyone could trigger that code, it allowed anonymous users to jump straight to admin.

The other half of the exploit leverages the “print script” feature, which lets admins write code that runs on printing. A simple java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec('calc.exe'); does the trick to jump from web interface to remote code execution. The indicators of compromise are reasonable generic, including User "admin" logged into the administration interface. and Admin user "admin" modified the print script on printer "".. A Shodan search turns up around 1,700 Papercut servers accessible from the Internet, which prompts the painfully obvious observation that your internal print auditing solution’s web interface definitely should not be exposed online.

Apache Superset

Superset is a nifty data visualization tool for showing charts, graphs, and all sorts of pretty data sets on a dashboard. It also has some weirdness with using web sessions for user management. The session is stored on the user side in a cookie, signed with a secret key. This works great, unless the key used is particularly weak. And guess what, the default configuration of Superset uses a pre-populated secret key. thisismysecretkey is arguably a bad key to start with, but it turns out it’s also shared by more than 70% of the accessible Superset servers.

Continue reading “This Week In Security: Session Puzzling, Session Keys, And Speculation” →

The Modern WWW, Or: Where Do We Want To Go From Here?

April 27, 2023 by 52 Comments

From the early days of ARPANET until the dawn of the World Wide Web (WWW), the internet was primarily the domain of researchers, teachers and students, with hobbyists running their own BBS servers you could dial into, yet not connected to the internet. Pitched in 1989 by Tim Berners-Lee while working at CERN, the WWW was intended as an information management system that’d provide standardized access to information using HTTP as the transfer protocol and HTML and later CSS to create formatted documents inspired by the SGML standard. Even better, it allowed for WWW forums and personal websites to begin to pop up, enabling the eternal joy of web rings, animated GIFs and forums on any conceivable topic.

During the early 90s, as the newly opened WWW began to gain traction with the public, the Mosaic browser formed the backbone of the WWW browsers (‘web browsers’) of the time, including Internet Explorer – which licensed the Mosaic code – and the Mosaic-based Netscape Navigator. With the WWW standards set by the – Berners-Lee-founded – World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the stage appeared to be set for an open and fair playing field for all. What we got instead was the brawl referred to as the ‘browser wars‘, which – although changed – continues to this day.

Today it isn’t Microsoft’s Internet Explorer that’s ruling the WWW while setting the course for new web standards, but instead we have Google’s Chrome browser partying like it’s the early 2000s and it’s wearing an IE mask. With former competitors like Opera and Microsoft having switched to the Chromium browser engine that underlies Chrome, what does this tell us about the chances for alternative browsers and the future of the WWW?

Continue reading “The Modern WWW, Or: Where Do We Want To Go From Here?” →

This Week In Security: Macstealer, 3CX Carnage, And Github’s Lost Key

March 31, 2023 by 6 Comments

There’s a naming overload here, as two bits of security news this week are using the “MacStealer” moniker. We’re first going to talk about the WiFi vulnerability, also known as Framing Frames (pdf). The WPA encryption schemes introduced pairwise encryption, ensuring that not even other authenticated users can sniff each others’ traffic. At least that’s the idea, but this attack finds a couple techniques to bypass that protection.

A bit more background, there are a couple ways that packets can be delayed at the sender side. One of those is the power-save message, that signals the access point that the given client is going into a low power state. “Hold my calls, I’m going to sleep.” That message is a single bit in a frame header. And notably, that bit isn’t covered by WPA encryption or verification. An attacker can send a message, spoof a victim’s MAC address, and the access point marks that client as being in power-save mode.

This observation leads to a question: What happens when the encryption details change between the packet joining the queue, and actually transmitting? Turns out, the specifications on WiFi encryption don’t spell it out, and some implementations do the last thing you’d want, like sending the packets in the clear. Whoops. This behavior was the case in the Linux kernel through version 5.5.0, but starting with 5.6.0, the buffered packets were simply dropped when the encryption key was unavailable. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Macstealer, 3CX Carnage, And Github’s Lost Key” →