SATAn Turns Hard Drive Cable Into Antenna To Defeat Air-Gapped Security

July 22, 2022 by Dan Maloney 18 Comments

It seems like [Mordechai Guri]’s lab at Ben-Gurion University is the place where air-gapped computers go to die, or at least to give up their secrets. And this hack using a computer’s SATA cable as an antenna to exfiltrate data is another example of just how many side-channel attacks the typical PC makes available.

The exploit, deliciously designated “SATAn,” relies on the fact that the SATA 3.0 interface used in many computers has a bandwidth of 6.0 Gb/s, meaning that manipulating the computer’s IO would make it possible to transmit data from an air-gapped machine at around 6 GHz. It’s a complicated exploit, of course, and involves placing a transmitting program on the target machine using the usual methods, such as phishing or zero-day exploits. Once in place, the transmitting program uses a combination of read and write operations on the SATA disk to generate RF signals that encode the data to be exfiltrated, with the data lines inside the SATA cable acting as antennae.

SATAn is shown in action in the video below. It takes a while to transmit just a few bytes of data, and the range is less than a meter, but that could be enough for the exploit to succeed. The test setup uses an SDR — specifically, an ADALM PLUTO — and a laptop, but you can easily imagine a much smaller package being built for a stealthy walk-by style attack. [Mordechai] also offers a potential countermeasure for SATAn, which basically thrashes the hard drive to generate RF noise to mask any generated signals.

While probably limited in its practical applications, SATAn is an interesting side-channel attack to add to [Dr. Guri]’s list of exploits. From optical exfiltration using security cameras to turning power supplies into speakers, the vulnerabilities just keep piling up.

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Ethernet Cable Turned Into Antenna To Exploit Air-Gapped Computers

October 27, 2021 by Dan Maloney 30 Comments

Good news, everyone! Security researcher [Mordechai Guri] has given us yet another reason to look askance at our computers and wonder who might be sniffing in our private doings.

This time, your suspicious gaze will settle on the lowly Ethernet cable, which he has used to exfiltrate data across an air gap. The exploit requires almost nothing in the way of fancy hardware — he used both an RTL-SDR dongle and a HackRF to receive the exfiltrated data, and didn’t exactly splurge on the receiving antenna, which was just a random chunk of wire. The attack, dubbed “LANtenna”, does require some software running on the target machine, which modulates the desired data and transmits it over the Ethernet cable using one of two methods: by toggling the speed of the network connection, or by sending raw UDP packets. Either way, an RF signal is radiated by the Ethernet cable, which was easily received and decoded over a distance of at least two meters. The bit rate is low — only a few bits per second — but that may be all a malicious actor needs to achieve their goal.

To be sure, this exploit is quite contrived, and fairly optimized for demonstration purposes. But it’s a pretty effective demonstration, but along with the previously demonstrated hard drive activity lights, power supply fans, and even networked security cameras, it adds another seemingly innocuous element to the list of potential vectors for side-channel attacks.

[via The Register]

GPU Turned Into Radio Transmitter To Defeat Air-Gapped PC

April 24, 2020 by Dan Maloney 31 Comments

Another week, another exploit against an air-gapped computer. And this time, the attack is particularly clever and pernicious: turning a GPU into a radio transmitter.

The first part of [Mikhail Davidov] and [Baron Oldenburg]’s article is a review of some of the basics of exploring the RF emissions of computers using software-defined radio (SDR) dongles. Most readers can safely skip ahead a bit to section 9, which gets into the process they used to sniff for potentially compromising RF leaks from an air-gapped test computer. After finding a few weak signals in the gigahertz range and dismissing them as attack vectors due to their limited penetration potential, they settled in on the GPU card, a Radeon Pro WX3100, and specifically on the power management features of its ATI chipset.

With a GPU benchmarking program running, they switched the graphics card shader clock between its two lowest power settings, which produced a strong signal on the SDR waterfall at 428 MHz. They were able to receive this signal up to 50 feet (15 meters) away, perhaps to the annoyance of nearby hams as this is plunk in the middle of the 70-cm band. This is theoretically enough to exfiltrate data, but at a painfully low bitrate. So they improved the exploit by forcing the CPU driver to vary the shader clock frequency in one megahertz steps, allowing them to implement higher throughput encoding schemes. You can hear the change in signal caused by different graphics being displayed in the video below; one doesn’t need much imagination to see how malware could leverage this to exfiltrate pretty much anything on the computer.

It’s a fascinating hack, and hats off to [Davidov] and [Oldenburg] for revealing this weakness. We’ll have to throw this on the pile with all the other side-channel attacks [Samy Kamkar] covered in his 2019 Supercon talk.

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Getting Data Out Of Air-Gapped Networks Through The Power Cable

August 1, 2017 by Jenny List 28 Comments

If you are an organisation that is custodian of sensitive information or infrastructure, it would be foolhardy of you to place it directly on the public Internet. No matter how good your security might be, there is always the risk that a miscreant could circumvent it, and perform all sorts of mischief. The solution employed therefore is to physically isolate such sensitive equipment from the rest of the world, creating an air gap. Nothing can come in and nothing can go out, or so goes the theory.

Well, that’s the theory, anyway. [Davidl] sends us some work that punches a hole in some air-gapped networks, allowing low-speed data to escape the air gap even if it doesn’t allow the reverse.

So how is this seemingly impossible task performed? The answer comes through the mains electrical infrastructure, if the air gap is bridged by a mains cable then the load on that mains cable can be modulated by altering the work undertaken by a computer connected to it. This modulation can then be detected with a current transformer, or even by compromising a UPS or electricity meter outside the air gap.

Of course, the Hackaday readership are all upstanding and law-abiding citizens of good standing, to whom such matters are of purely academic interest. Notwithstanding that, the article goes into the subject in great detail, and makes for a fascinating read.

We’ve touched on this subject before with such various techniques as broadcast radio interference and the noise from a fan, as well as with an in-depth feature.

Hacking The Aether: How Data Crosses The Air-Gap

February 2, 2017 by Pedro Umbelino 35 Comments

It is incredibly interesting how many parts of a computer system are capable of leaking data in ways that is hard to imagine. Part of securing highly sensitive locations involves securing the computers and networks used in those facilities in order to prevent this. These IT security policies and practices have been evolving and tightening through the years, as malicious actors increasingly target vital infrastructure.

Sometimes, when implementing strong security measures on a vital computer system, a technique called air-gapping is used. Air-gapping is a measure or set of measures to ensure a secure computer is physically isolated from unsecured networks, such as the public Internet or an unsecured local area network. Sometimes it’s just ensuring the computer is off the Internet. But it may mean completely isolating for the computer: removing WiFi cards, cameras, microphones, speakers, CD-ROM drives, USB ports, or whatever can be used to exchange data. In this article I will dive into air-gapped computers, air-gap covert channels, and how attackers might be able to exfiltrate information from such isolated systems.

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Hackaday Podcast Episode 283: Blinding Lasers, LEDs, And ETs

August 9, 2024 by Al Williams 3 Comments

Hackaday Editors Elliot Williams and Al Williams reflect on the fact that, as humans, we have–at most–two eyes and no warp drives. While hacking might not be the world’s most dangerous hobby, you do get to work with dangerous voltages, temperatures, and frickin’ lasers. Light features prominently, as the guys talk about LED data interfaces, and detecting faster-than-light travel.

There’s also a USB sniffer, abusing hot glue, and some nostalgia topics ranging from CRT graphics to Apollo workstations (which have nothing directly to do with NASA). The can’t miss articles this week cover hacking you and how you make the red phone ring in the middle of a nuclear war.

Check out the links below if you want to follow along, and as always, tell us what you think about this episode in the comments!

As always, please download the file to archive in your doomsday bunker.

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A Bend Sensor Developed With 3D Printer Filament

April 13, 2024 by Jenny List 6 Comments

PhD students spend their time pursuing whatever general paths their supervisor has given them, and if they are lucky, it yields enough solid data to finally write a thesis without tearing their hair out. Sometimes along the way they result in discoveries with immediate application outside academia, and so it was for [Paul Bupe Jr.], whose work resulted in a rather elegant and simple bend sensor.

The original research came when shining light along flexible media, including a piece of transparent 3D printer filament. He noticed that when the filament was bent at a point that it was covered by a piece of electrical tape there was a reduction in transmission, and from this he was able to repeat the effect with a piece of pipe over a narrow air gap in the medium.

Putting these at regular intervals and measuring the transmission for light sent along it, he could then detect a bend. Take three filaments with the air-gap-pipe sensors spaced to form a Gray code, and he could digitally read the location.

He appears to be developing this discovery into a product. We’re not sure which is likely to be more stress, writing up his thesis, or surviving a small start-up, so we wish him luck.