Weaponized Networked Printing is Now a Thing

It’s a fairly safe bet that a Venn diagram of Hackaday readers and those who closely follow the careers of YouTube megastars doesn’t have a whole lot of overlap, so you’re perhaps blissfully unaware of the man who calls himself PewDiePie. As such, you might not know that a battle between himself and another YouTube channel which uploads Bollywood music videos has reached such a fever pitch that his fans have resorted to guerrilla hacking to try to sway public opinion towards their side. It’s perhaps not the dystopian future we imagined, but it just might be the one we deserve.

To briefly summarize the situation, a hacker known only by the handle TheHackerGiraffe decided to help out Dear Leader by launching an automated attack against 50,000 Internet connected printers. When the hack was successful, the printer would spit out a page of digital propaganda (complete with fist ASCII art) that urged the recipient to go on YouTube and pledge their support for PewDiePie. There’s some debate about how many of the printers TheHackerGiraffe targeted actually delivered their payload, but judging by reactions throughout social media, it was enough to get the message out.

While the stunt itself may have come as a surprise, the methodology wasn’t. In fact, the only surprising element to the security researchers who’ve weighed in on the situation is that this hasn’t happened more often. It certainly isn’t the first time somebody’s done it, but the fact that this time its been connected to such a high profile Internet celebrity is putting more eyes on the problem then there have been in the past. Now that the proverbial cat is out of the bag, there are even websites springing up which claim to be purveyors of “Printer Advertising”. Odds are good this won’t be the last time somebody’s printer starts running off more than TPS reports.

We here at Hackaday don’t have much interest in the battle for YouTube supremacy. We’re just pulling for Dave Jones’s EEVBlog channel to join AvE in breaking a million subscribers. But we’re very interested in the technology which made this attack possible, how likely it is we’re going to see more people exploit it, and what are we supposed to do now that even our own printers can be turned against us?

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Hack My House: Opening Raspberry Pi to the Internet, but Not the Whole World

If you’ve followed along with our series so far, you know we’ve set up a network of Raspberry Pis that PXE boot off a central server, and then used Zoneminder to run a network of IP cameras. Now that some useful services are running in our smart house, how do we access those services when away from home, and how do we keep the rest of the world from spying on our cameras?

Before we get to VPNs and port forwarding, there is a more fundamental issue: Do you trust your devices? What exactly is the firmware on those cheap cameras really doing? You could use Wireshark and a smart switch with port mirroring to audit the camera’s traffic. How much traffic would you need to inspect to feel confident the camera never sends your data off somewhere else?

Thankfully, there’s a better way. One of the major features of surveillance software like Zoneminder is that it aggregates the feeds from the cameras. This process also has the effect of proxying the video feeds: We don’t connect directly to the cameras in order to view them, we connect to the surveillance software. If you don’t completely trust those cameras, then don’t give them internet access. You can make the cameras a physically separate network, only connected to the surveillance machine, or just set their IP addresses manually, and don’t fill in the default route or DNS. Whichever way you set it up, the goal is the same: let your surveillance software talk to the cameras, but don’t let the cameras talk to the outside world.

Edit: As has been pointed out in the comments, leaving off a default route is significantly less effective than separate networks. A truly malicious peice of hardware could easily probe for the gateway.

This idea applies to more than cameras. Any device that doesn’t need internet access to function, can be isolated in this way. While this could be considered paranoia, I consider it simple good practice. Join me after the break to discuss port forwarding vs. VPNs.

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Building a Proof of Concept Hardware Implant

You’ve no doubt heard about the “hardware implants” which were supposedly found on some server motherboards, which has led to all sorts of hand-wringing online. There’s no end of debate about the capabilities of such devices, how large they would need to be, and quite frankly, if they even exist to begin with. We’re through the looking-glass now, and there’s understandably a mad rush to learn as much as possible about the threat these types of devices represent.

EEPROM (left) can be edited to enable SMBus access on this card (header to the right)

[Nicolas Oberli] of Kudelski Security wanted to do more than idly speculate, so he decided to come up with a model of how an implanted hardware espionage device could interact with the host system. He was able to do this with off the shelf hardware, meaning anyone who’s so inclined can recreate this “Hardware Implant Playset” in their own home lab for experimentation. Obviously this is not meant to portray a practical attack in terms of the hardware itself, but gives some valuable insight into how such a device might function.

One of the most obvious attack vectors for hardware implants is what’s known as the Baseboard Management Controller (BMC). This is a chip used on modern motherboards to allow for remote control and monitoring of the system’s hardware, and promises to be a ripe target for attackers. There are a few sideband channels which can be used by the BMC chip to talk to other chips. To keep things simple [Nicolas] focused on the older I2C-derived SMBus (rather than the newer and more complex NC-SI), demonstrating what can be done once you have control of that bus.

Only problem was, he didn’t have a motherboard with a BMC to experiment with. After a little research, the answer came in the form of the Intel EXPI9301CTBLK network card, which features the 82574L SMBus chip. This allows for experimenting with a subset of SMBus functionality on any machine with a PCI-E slot. Even better, the card has an SMBus header on the top to plug into. [Nicolas] describes in detail how he enabled the SMBus interface by modifying the card’s EEPROM, which then allowed him to detect it with his HydraBus.

With the hardware setup, the rest of the write-up focuses on what you can do with direct control of SMBus on the network card. [Nicolas] demonstrates not only creating and sending Ethernet packets, but also intercepting an incoming packet. In both cases, a running instance of tcpdump on the host computer fails to see the packets even exist.

He goes on to explain that since SMBus is very similar to I2C and only requires four wires, the techniques shown could easily be moved from the Hydrabus dev board used in the demo, to a small microcontroller like the ATtiny85. But you would still need to find a way to add that microcontroller directly onto the network card without it being obvious to the casual observer.

Our previous coverage of suspected hardware implants sparked considerable discussion, and it looks like no matter what side of the fence you’re on, the debate isn’t going away anytime soon.

Getting Data Out Of Air-Gapped Networks Through The Power Cable

If you are an organisation that is custodian of sensitive information or infrastructure, it would be foolhardy of you to place it directly on the public Internet. No matter how good your security might be, there is always the risk that a miscreant could circumvent it, and perform all sorts of mischief. The solution employed therefore is to physically isolate such sensitive equipment from the rest of the world, creating an air gap. Nothing can come in and nothing can go out, or so goes the theory.

Well, that’s the theory, anyway. [Davidl] sends us some work that punches a hole in some air-gapped networks, allowing low-speed data to escape the air gap even if it doesn’t allow the reverse.

So how is this seemingly impossible task performed? The answer comes through the mains electrical infrastructure, if the air gap is bridged by a mains cable then the load on that mains cable can be modulated by altering the work undertaken by a computer connected to it. This modulation can then be detected with a current transformer, or even by compromising a UPS or electricity meter outside the air gap.

Of course, the Hackaday readership are all upstanding and law-abiding citizens of good standing, to whom such matters are of purely academic interest. Notwithstanding that, the article goes into the subject in great detail, and makes for a fascinating read.

We’ve touched on this subject before with such various techniques as broadcast radio interference and the noise from a fan,  as well as with an in-depth feature.

White-hat Botnet Infects, Then Secures IoT Devices

[Symantec] Reports Hajime seems to be a white hat worm that spreads over telnet in order to secure IoT devices instead of actually doing anything malicious.

[Brian Benchoff] wrote a great article about the Hajime Worm just as the story broke when first discovered back in October last year. At the time, it looked like the beginnings of a malicious IoT botnet out to cause some DDoS trouble. In a crazy turn of events, it now seems that the worm is actually securing devices affected by another major IoT botnet, dubbed Mirai, which has been launching DDoS attacks. More recently a new Mirai variant has been launching application-layer attacks since it’s source code was uploaded to a GitHub account and adapted.

Hajime is a much more complex botnet than Mirai as it is controlled through peer-to-peer propagating commands through infected devices, whilst the latter uses hard-coded addresses for the command and control of the botnet. Hajime can also cloak its self better, managing to hide its self from running processes and hide its files from the device.

The author can open a shell script to any infected machine in the network at any time, and the code is modular, so new capabilities can be added on the fly. It is apparent from the code that a fair amount of development time went into designing this worm.

So where is this all going? So far this is beginning to look like a cyber battle of Good vs Evil. Or it’s a turf war between rival cyber-mafias. Only time will tell.

Prisoners Build DIY Computers and Hack Prison Network

The Internet is everywhere. The latest anecdotal evidence of this is a story of prison inmates that build their own computer and connected it to the internet. Back in 2015, prisoners at the Marion Correctional Institution in Ohio built two computers from discarded parts which they transported 1,100 feet through prison grounds (even passing a security checkpoint) before hiding them in the ceiling of a training room. The information has just been made public after the release of the Inspector General’s report (PDF). This report is fascinating and worth your time to read.

This Ethernet router was located in a training room in the prison. Physical access is everything in computer security.

Prisoners managed to access the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections network using login credentials of a retired prison employee who is currently working as a contract employee. The inmates plotted to steal the identity of another inmate and file tax returns under their name. They also gained access to internal records of other prisoners and checked out websites on how to manufacture drugs and DIY weapons, before prison officers were able to find the hidden computers. From the report:

The ODAS OIT analysis also revealed that malicious activity had been occurring within the ODRC inmate network. ODAS OIT reported, “…inmates appeared to have been conducting attacks against the ODRC network using proxy machines that were connected to the inmate and department networks.” Additionally, ODAS OIT reported, “It appears the Departmental Offender Tracking System (DOTS) portal was attacked and inmate passes were created. Findings of bitcoin wallets, stripe accounts, bank accounts, and credit card accounts point toward possible identity fraud, along with other possible cyber-crimes.”

The prisoners involved knew what they were doing. From the interview with the inmate it seems the computers were set up as a remote desktop bridge between internal computers they were allowed to use and the wider internet. They would use a computer on the inmate network and use a remote desktop to access the illicit computers. These were running Kali Linux and there’s a list of “malicious tools” found on the machines. It’s pretty much what you’d expect to find on a Kali install but the most amusing one listed in the report is “Hand-Crafted Software”.

This seems crazy, but prisoners have always been coming up with new ideas to get one over on the guards — like building DIY tattoo guns, When you have a lot of time on your hands and little responsibility, crazy ideas don’t seem so crazy after all.

Anti-Hack: Free Automated SSL Certificates

You want to put your credit card number into a web site. You know to look for a secure web site. But what does that really prove? And now that so many electronic projects have Web servers (ok, I’ll say it… the Internet of Things), do you need to secure your web server?

There was a time when getting a secure certificate (at least one that was meaningful) cost a pretty penny. However, a new initiative backed by some major players (like Cisco, Google, Mozilla, and many others) wants to give you a free SSL certificate. One reason they can afford to do this is they have automated the verification process so the cost to provide a certificate is very low.

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