This Week In Security: VxWorks, Expensive Email Fraud, And What’s In Your Wallet?

This has been an interesting week. First off, security researchers at Armis discovered a set of serious vulnerabilities in the vxWorks Real Time Operating System (RTOS). Released under a name that sounds like the title of a western or caper movie, Urgent/11. Not familiar with vxWorks? It’s a toss-up as to whether vxWorks or Linux is more popular for embedded devices. Several printer brands, Arris modems, Sonicwall firewalls, and a whole host of other industrial and medical devices run the vxWorks RTOS.

Several of these vulnerabilities are in the network stack, rather than in applications. The worst offender is CVE-2019-12256, a vulnerability in error handling. An ICMP error response is generated from an incoming packet, and assumptions are made about that incoming packet. When data is copied from that packet into the ICMP error, the length is not first checked, allowing unconfined memory write. If this sounds familiar, it should. We covered a similar vulnerability in Apple’s XNU kernel not long ago.

This particular vulnerability can compromise a vxWorks machine even without an opened port. The saving grace of that vulnerability applies here: a maliciously crafted packet is necessarily malformed, and won’t navigate public routing. In other words, it’s LAN only, and can’t be sent over the internet.

They come in through the firewall.

A second class of vulnerability, where the name comes from, is related to the TCP urgent pointer. This rarely used TCP feature was intended to allow more up-to-date information to supersede data still being processed. Not only has TCP urgent not been widely used, the specifications were not written particularly well, with the various RFC documents describing conflicting implementations. It’s surprising that vxWorks supports it at all, but isn’t particularly surprising that their implementation is flawed. Manipulation of the data stream can cause a length integer to underflow. The nature of binary arithmetic means that underflowing an unsigned integer causes it to wrap around to maximum value, which can lead to writing packet data in the buffer in unexpected memory locations. These vulnerabilities require an established TCP connection, but the researchers describe several scenarios where that could be accomplished by an attacker.

The last RCE vulnerability they describe is in the DHCP client, ipdhcpc. This is a very simple vulnerability. One section of code allocates a buffer for DHCP options, but allocates 24 bytes fewer than the maximum size. An attacker could use this 24 byte overflow to manipulate the data structure and potentially jump execution into manipulated memory.

Update (2019-08-02 09:15 UTC-7): Hackaday received a statement from SonicWall that they made a patch for this vulnerability back on July 19th:

Ensuring the security of our customers is a responsibility we take seriously at SonicWall and we work vigilantly to always keep our customers secure. SonicWall physical firewall appliances running certain versions of SonicOS contain vulnerabilities in code utilized for remote management. At this time, there is no indication that the discovered vulnerabilities are being exploited in the wild. The patches are available now and we strongly advised our partners and end users July 19 th to apply the SonicOS patch immediately.

https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2019-0009

Capital One: What’s in Your Data

Capital One made use of Amazon AWS for storing customer data. This isn’t surprising, many companies have turned to Amazon’s seemingly inexhaustible cloud computing platform for storing large data sets. It seems, however, that Capital One failed to configure the security properly on that bucket. (As many other companies have done.) Information was leaked for over an estimated 100 million customers. A former Amazon employee has been arrested, and seems to have posted at least a portion of that data in a Github gist.

Reading between the lines, it seems that this was a very simple mistake. Perhaps credentials were leaked, or the S3 bucket was publicly available. That particular detail has not been released. There is something to be said for Capital One’s response to the incident. They were anonymously informed of the existence of the gist on July 17, using their responsible disclosure process. By the 29th, they had fixed the misconfiguration, coordinated with law enforcement, and publicly announced the breach. A twelve day turn-around is an impressive response, particularly when so many companies have tried to hide or ignore similar breaches.

Cabarrus County, NC

It seemed simple enough. The general contractor for the county’s new school building needed to update bank account information. The appropriate forms were signed and filed, and the information was updated. Nothing seemed amiss unto two months later, when the contractor notified the county that they had missed a scheduled payment of 2.5 million dollars. But the transaction went through, and the money was transferred to the account on file.

Yes, the transfer went through, but the the county had been hit with a social engineering scam. The report refers to it as an Email Account Compromise (EAC) scam, which seems to indicate that the scammer first gained access to a legitimate email account of the contractor in question. Alternatively, an attacker could simply spoof the sender’s email address, and set a different reply-to field. Unless a user was particularly watching for such a scheme, it would be easy to overlook the discrepancy. In any case, even after recovering some of the transferred money, the county seems to be out about $1.7 million. These scams are becoming more and more popular, so remember, don’t believe anything you read in an email.

The Weird and Wacky

And to round out this week’s news, yet another [Satoshi Nakamoto] candidate has been found: Linus Torvalds. While it appears to be a serious suggestion, I’ll just note that the author doesn’t have his name attached to this article. He does make one interesting observation — git is the killer blockchain app. You see, I tend to compare blockchain to the laser. Both were very clever inventions, but didn’t have any immediate uses. They were solutions in search of a problem. This article points out that core concepts of blockchain are present in git, which seems to be an accurate and clever observation. So what is blockchain good for? Git!

And the most useless security news of the week? The CAN bus on airplanes is exploitable when an attacker has unsupervised physical access. Yes, people with unsupervised physical access can do bad things to airplanes. Think about what they could do if they brought a wrench.

This Week In Security: Selfblow, Encryption Backdoors, Killer Apps, And The VLC Apocalypse That Wasn’t

Selfblow (Don’t google that at work, by the way) is a clever exploit by [Balázs Triszka] that affects every Nvidia Tegra device using the nvtboot bootloader — just about all of them except the Nintendo Switch. It’s CVE 2019-5680, and rated at an 8.2 according to Nvidia, but that high CVE rating isn’t entirely reflective of the reality of the situation. Taking advantage of the vulnerability means writing to the boot device, which requires root access, as well as a kernel flag set to expose the boot partitions to userspace. This vulnerability was discovered as part of an effort by [Balázs] and other LineageOS developers to build an open source bootloader for Nvidia Tegra devices.

The Tegra boot process is a bit different, having several stages and a dedicated Boot and Power Management CPU (BPMP). A zero-stage ROM loads nvtboot to memory and starts it executing on the BPMP. One of the tasks of nvtboot is to verify the signature of the next bootloader step, nvtboot-cpu. The file size and memory location are embedded in the nvtboot-cpu header. There are two problems here that together make this vulnerability possible. The first is that the bootloader binary is loaded to its final memory location before the signature verification is performed. The code is written to validate the bootloader signature before starting it executing on the primary CPU, so all is well, right? Continue reading “This Week In Security: Selfblow, Encryption Backdoors, Killer Apps, And The VLC Apocalypse That Wasn’t”

An Open Hardware Rubber Ducky

No it’s not an open source version of Bert’s favorite bathtime toy (though seriously, let us know if you see one), the PocketAdmin by [Radik Bechmetov] is intended to be an alternative to the well-known “USB Rubber Ducky” penetration testing tool from Hak5. It might look like a standard USB flash drive, but underneath that black plastic enclosure is a whole lot of digital mischief waiting to spill out.

The general idea is that the PocketAdmin appears to the host computer as either a USB Human Interface Device (keyboard, mouse, etc) or a USB Mass Storage Device. In either event, the user has the ability to craft custom payloads which can exploit the operating system’s inherent trust in locally connected devices. The most common example is mimicking a USB keyboard that starts “typing” once connected to the computer.

You can even configure what vendor and product IDs the PocketAdmin advertises, allowing you to more accurately spoof various devices. [Radik] has included some other interesting features, such as the ability to launch different payloads depending on the detected operating system. That way it won’t waste time trying to bang out Windows commands when it’s connected to a Linux box.

The hardware is designed to be as easy and cheap to replicate as possible. The heavy lifting is done by a STM32F072C8T6 microcontroller, coupled with a W25Q256FVFG 32MiB flash chip to store the payloads. Beyond that, the BOM consists mainly of passives and a few obvious bits like the male USB connector. [Radik] has even provided a link to where you can buy the convincing looking USB “flash drive” enclosure.

We’ve seen low-cost DIY versions of the USB Rubber Ducky in the past, but PocketAdmin is interesting in that it seems like [Radik] is looking to break new ground with this project rather than just copy what’s already been done. This will definitely be one to watch as the 2019 Hackaday Prize heats up.

Use A Digital Key To Deter Lockpicking

Spending an hour or two around any consumer-level padlock or house deadbolt lock with a simple lockpicking kit will typically instill a good amount of panic and concern about security. While it’s true that any lock can be defeated, it’s almost comically easy to pick basic locks like this. So, if you’re looking for a level of security that can’t be defeated in two minutes with a tiny piece of metal, you might want to try something a little more advanced.

This project stemmed from an idea to use a YubiKey, a USB hardware token typically used for two-factor authentication, for physical locks instead. The prototype was built around an Arduino UNO, and all of the code and build instructions are available on the project’s site. The creator, [rprinz08], does not have one built inside of a secure enclosure so that would remain an exercise for the reader, but the proof-of-concept is interesting and certainly useful.

While digital keys like this can have their own set of problems (as all locks do), this would be a great solution for anyone needing to lock up anything where physical keys are a liability or a nuisance, where logging is important, or where many people need access to the same lock. The open source code and well-known platform make it easy for anyone to build, too.

This Week In Security: Ransomware Keys, IOS Woes, And More

Remember the end of GandCrab we talked about a couple weeks back? A new wrinkle to this story is the news that a coalition of law enforcement agencies and security researchers have released a decrypter and the master decryption keys for that ransomware. It’s theorized that researchers were able to breach the command and control servers where the master keys were stored. It’s yet to be known whether this breach was the cause for the retirement, or was a result of it.

Apple’s Secure Enclave is Broken?

A Youtube video and Reddit thread show a way to bypass the iPhone’s TouchID and FaceID, allowing anyone to access the list of saved passwords. The technique for breaking into that data? Tap the menu option repeatedly, and cancel the security prompts. Given enough rapid tries, the OS gives up on the validation and simply shows the passwords!

The iPhone has an onboard security chip, the Secure Enclave, that is designed to make this sort of problem nearly impossible. The design specification dictates that data like passwords are encrypted, and the only way to decrypt is to use the Enclave. The purpose is to mitigate the impact of programming bugs like this one. It seems that the issue is limited to the iOS 13 Beta releases, and you’d expect bugs in beta, but a bug like this casts some doubt on the effectiveness of Apple’s Security Enclave.

URL Scheme Hijacking

Our next topic is also iOS related, though it’s possible the same issue could effect Android phones: URL scheme problems. The researchers at Trend Micro took a look at how iOS handles conflicting app URLs. Outside of the normal http: and https: URLs, applications can register custom URL schemes in order to simplify inter-process communication. The simplest example is something like an email address and the mailto: scheme. Even on a desktop, using one of these links will open a different application to handle that request. What could go wrong?

One weakness in using URL schemes like this is that not all apps properly validate what launched the request, and iOS allows multiple apps to use the same URL scheme. In the example given, a malicious app could register the same URL handler as the target, and effectively launch a man-in-the-middle attack.

Bluekeep, and Patching Systems

It has been five weeks since Bluekeep, the Remote Desktop Protocol vulnerability, was revealed. Approximately 20% of the vulnerable systems exposed to the internet have been patched. Bitsight has been running scans of the remaining vulnerable machines, and estimates about 800,000 remaining vulnerable systems. You may remember this particularl vulnerability was considered so problematic that even the NSA released a statement encouraging patching. So far, there hasn’t been a worm targeting the vulnerability, but it’s assumed that at least some actors have been using this vulnerability in attacks.

The Demise Of The Password

Although we hackers will sometimes deliberately throw away our passwords and then try and hack our own phones / WIFI systems for self amusement, for many people including the actual inventor of the password, Fernardo “Corby” Corbató (1926-2019), passwords have become extremely burdensome and dis-functional.

Sadly, Fernando (according to the internet) died on July 12th, and equally sadly, part of his legacy was the ordeal of his “having a three-page crib sheet to stay on top of his own 150+ passwords”.

We’re all used to being badgered by websites to use complex passwords with a minimum length and a minimum number of upper case characters, lower case characters, numerical digits and non alphanumeric characters AND being told at the workplace to use different passwords than at other places AND to being told to change our passwords regularly. The fact that somebody like Fernando had 150 passwords is not surprising.

However, there is some hope, as according to Alex Weinert of Microsoft, in his recent synopsis, “When it comes to composition and length, your password (mostly) doesn’t matter”. This may well sound counter-intuitive but Microsofts’s own research suggests that inter-webs gurus should focus more on “multi-factor authentication (MFA), or great threat detection” rather than badgering the user.

The research goes into quite a bit of detail about passwords and concludes that the biggest threat to password security is when criminals obtain data from insecure ‘breached’ sites, in which case it would not matter if your word was written in hieroglyphics, it would be of no consequence at all. Another interesting conclusion was that by making passwords so intractable this encouraged people such as Fernando himself to write them all down, only for someone to rummage through their office desk (technically known as ‘dumpster diving’) and copy them.

Maybe the end of the password will now swiftly be upon us as technology enables biometrics such as ocular based identifications to be more widely used, but then again we’ve all watched those films where the protagonist scoops the eyeball out of a person’s skull to gain entry to a secure area.

It’s easy to get carried away about passwords and security hype, but it should not be forgotten that Fernardo Corbató was an eminent computer scientist who pioneered ‘Time sharing’ on computers, as detailed in this Hackaday article: Retrotectacular: Time Sharing.

This Week In Security: Censoring Researchers, The Death Of OpenPGP, Dereferencing Nulls, And Zoom Is Watching You

Last week the schedule for our weekly security column collided with the Independence Day holiday. The upside is that we get a two-for-one deal this week, as we’re covering two weeks worth of news, and there is a lot to cover!

[Petko Petrov], a security researcher in Bulgaria, was arrested last week for demonstrating an weakness he discovered in a local government website. In the demonstration video, he stated that he attempted to disclose the vulnerability to both the software vendor and the local government. When his warnings were ignored, he took to Facebook to inform the world of the problem.

From the video, it appears that a validation step was performed on the browser side, easily manipulated by the end user. Once such a flaw is discovered, it becomes trivial to automate the process of scraping data from the vulnerable site. The vulnerability found isn’t particularly interesting, though the amount of data exposed is rather worrying. The bigger story is that as of the latest reports, the local government still intends to prosecute [Petko] for downloading data as part of demonstrating the attack.

Youtube Censorship

We made a video about launching fireworks over Wi-Fi for the 4th of July only to find out @YouTube gave us a strike because we teach about hacking, so we can't upload it. YouTube now bans: "Instructional hacking and phishing: Showing users how to bypass secure computer systems"

In related news, Google has begun cracking down on “Instructional Hacking and Phishing” videos. [Kody] from the Null Byte Youtube channel found himself locked out of his own channel, after receiving a strike for a video discussing a Wifi vulnerability.

The key to getting a video unblocked seems to be generating lots of social media attention. Enough outcry seems to trigger a manual review of the video in question, and usually results in the strike being rescinded.

Improved Zip Bomb

A zip bomb is a small zip file that unzips into a ridiculously large file or collection of files. While there are obvious nefarious uses for such a file, it has also become something of a competition, crafting the most extreme zip bomb. The previous champion was 42.zip, a recursive zip file that when fully extracted, weighs in at 42 petabytes. A new contender may have just taken the crown, and without using zip file recursion.

[David Fifield] discovered a pair of ZIP tricks. First being that multiple files can be constructed from a single “kernel” of compressed data. The second is that file headers could also be part of files to be decompressed. It’s clever work, and much easier to understand when looking at the graphics he put together. From those two points, the only task left is to optimize. Taking advantage of the zip64 format, the final compression ratio was approximately 98 million to one.

Breaking OpenPGP Keyservers

OpenPGP as we know it is on the ropes. OpenPGP is the technique that allows encryption and verification of emails through cryptographic signatures. It’s the grandaddy of modern secure communication, and still widely used today. One of the features of OpenPGP is that anyone can upload their public key to keyservers hosted around the world. Because of the political climate in the early 90’s when OpenPGP was first developed, it was decided that a baked-in feature of the keyserver was that uploaded keys could never be deleted.

Another feature of OpenPGP keys is that one user can use their key to sign another user’s key, formally attesting that it is valid. This creates what is known as a “web of trust”. When an OpenPGP instance validates a signature, it also validates all the attestations attached to that signature. Someone has spammed a pair of OpenPGP certificates with tens of thousands of signatures. If your OpenPGP client refreshes those signatures, and attempts to check the validations, it will grind to a halt under the load. Loading the updated certificate permanently poisons the offline key-store. In some cases, just the single certificate can be deleted, but some users have had to delete their entire key store.

It’s now apparent that parts of the OpenPGP infrastructure hasn’t been well maintained for quite some time. [Robert J. Hansen] has been spearheading the public response to this attack, not to mention one of the users directly targeted. In a follow-up post, he alluded to the need to re-write the keyserver component of OpenPGP, and the lack of resources to do so.

It’s unclear what will become of the OpenPGP infrastructure. It’s likely that the old keyserver network will have to be abandoned entirely. An experimental keyserver is available at keys.openpgp.org that has removed the spammed signatures.

Beware the QR Codes

Link shorteners are a useful way to avoid typing out a long URL, but have a downside — you don’t know what URL you’re going to ahead of time. Thankfully there are link unshorteners, like unshorten.it. Paste a shortlink and get the full URL, so you don’t accidentally visit a shady website because you clicked on a shortened link. [Nick Guarino] over at cofense.com raises a new alarm: QR codes can similarly lead to malicious or questionable websites, and are less easily examined before scanning. His focus is primarily how a QR code can be used to bypass security products, in order to launch a fishing attack.

Most QR scanners have an option to automatically navigate to the web page in the code. Turn this option off. Not only could scanning a QR code lead to a malicious web site, but URLs can also launch actions in other apps. This potential problem of QR codes is very similar to the problem of shortened links — the actual payload isn’t human readable prior to interacting with it, when it’s potentially too late.

Dereferencing Pointers for Fun and Profit

On the 10th, the Eset blog, [welivesecurity], covered a Windows local priveledge escalation 0-day being actively exploited in the wild. The exploit highlights several concepts, one of which we haven’t covered before, namely how to use a null pointer dereference in an exploit.

In C, a pointer is simply a variable that holds a memory location. In that memory location can be a data structure, a string, or even a callable function. By convention, when pointers aren’t referring to anything, they are set to NULL. This is a useful way to quickly check whether a pointer is pointing to live data. The process of interacting with a pointer’s data is known a dereferencing the pointer. A NULL pointer dereference, then, is accessing the data referred to by a pointer that is set to NULL. This puts us in the dangerous territory of undefined behavior.

Different compilers, architectures, and even operating systems will potentially demonstrate different behavior when doing something undefined. In the case of C code on 32-bit Windows 7, NULL is indistinguishable from zero, and memory location zero is a perfectly valid location. In this case, we’re not talking about the physical location zero, but logical address zero. In modern systems, each process has a dedicated pool of memory, and the OS manages the offset and memory mapping, allowing the process to use the simpler logical memory addressing.

Windows 7 has a function, “NtAllocateVirtualMemory”, that allows a process to request access to arbitrary memory locations. If a NULL, or zero, is passed to this function as the memory location, the OS simply picks a location to allocate that memory. What many consider a bug is that this function will effectively round down small memory locations. It’s quite possible to allocate memory at logical address 0/NULL, but is considered to be bad behavior. The important takeaway here is that in Windows 7, a program can allocate memory at a location referred to by a null pointer.

On to the vulnerability! The malicious program sets up a popup menu and submenu as part of its GUI. While this menu is still being initialized, the malicious program cancels the request to set up the menu. By timing the cancellation request precisely, it’s possible for the submenu to still be created, but to be a null pointer instead of the expected object. A second process can then trigger the system process to call a function expected to be part of the object. Because Windows allows the allocation of memory page zero, this effectively hands system level execution to the attacker. The full write-up is worth the time to check out.

Zoom Your Way to Vulnerability

Zoom is a popular web-meeting application, aimed at corporations, with the primary selling point being how easy it is to join a meeting. Apparently they worked a bit too hard on easy meeting joins, as loading a malicious webpage on a Mac causes an automatic meeting join with the mic and webcam enabled, so long as that machine has previous connected to a Zoom meeting. You would think that uninstalling the Zoom client would be enough to stop the madness, but installing Zoom also installs a local webserver. Astonishingly, uninstalling Zoom doesn’t remove the webserver, but it was designed to perpetually listen for a new Zoom meeting attempt. If that sounds like a Trojan to you, you’re not wrong.

The outcry over Zoom’s official response was enough to inform them of the error of their ways. They have pushed an update that removes the hidden server and adds a user interaction before joining a meeting. Additionally, Apple has pushed an update that removes the hidden server if present, and prompts before joining a Zoom meeting.

Wireless Keyboards Letting You Down

Have you ever typed your password using a wireless keyboard, and wondered if you just broadcast it in the clear to anyone listening? In theory, wireless keyboards and mice use encryption to keep eavesdroppers out, but at least Logitech devices have a number of problems in their encryption scheme.

Part of the problem seems to be Logitech’s “Unifying” wireless system, and the emphasis on compatibility. One receiver can support multiple devices, which is helpful when eliminating cable clutter, but also weakens the encryption scheme. An attacker only has to be able to monitor the radio signals during pairing, or even monitoring signals while also observing keypresses. Either way, a few moments of processing, and an attacker has both read and write access to the wireless gear.

Several even more serious problems have fixed with firmware updates in the past years, but [Marcus Mengs], the researcher in question, discovered that newly purchased hardware still doesn’t contain the updated firmware. Worse yet, some of the effected devices don’t have an officially supported firmware update tool.

Maybe wired peripherals are the way to go, after all!