This Week In Security: Medical Backdoors, Strings, And Changes At Let’s Encrypt

There are some interesting questions afoot, with the news that the Contec CMS8000 medical monitoring system has a backdoor. And this isn’t the normal debug port accidentally left in the firmware. The CISA PDF has all the details, and it’s weird. The device firmware attempts to mount an NFS share from an IP address owned by an undisclosed university. If that mount command succeeds, binary files would be copied to the local filesystem and executed.

Additionally, the firmware sends patient and sensor data to this same hard-coded IP address. This backdoor also includes a system call to enable the eth0 network before attempting to access the hardcoded IP address, meaning that simply disabling the Ethernet connection in the device options is not sufficient to prevent the backdoor from triggering. This is a stark reminder that in the firmware world, workarounds and mitigations are often inadequate. For instance, you could set the gateway address to a bogus value, but a slightly more sophisticated firmware could trivially enable a bridge or alias approach, completely bypassing those settings. There is no fix at this time, and the guidance is pretty straightforward — unplug the affected devices.

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A Great Use For AI: Wasting Scammers Time!

We may have found the killer app for AI. Well, actually, British telecom provider O2 has. As The Guardian reports, they have an AI chatbot that acts like a 78-year-old grandmother and receives phone calls. Of course, since the grandmother—Daisy, by name—doesn’t get any real phone calls, anyone calling that number is probably a scammer. Daisy’s specialty? Keeping them tied up on the phone.

While this might just seem like a prank for revenge, it is actually more than that. Scamming people is a numbers game. Most people won’t bite. So, to be successful, scammers have to make lots of calls. Daisy can keep one tied up for around 40 minutes or more.

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This Week In Security: DeepSeek’s Oopsie, AI Tarpits, And Apple’s Leaks

DeepSeek has captured the world’s attention this week, with an unexpected release of the more-open AI model from China, for a reported mere $5 million training cost. While there’s lots of buzz about DeepSeek, here we’re interested in security. And DeepSeek has made waves there, in the form of a ClickHouse database unintentionally opened to the world, discovered by the folks from Wiz research. That database contained chat history and log streams, and API keys and other secrets by extension.

Finding this database wasn’t exactly rocket science — it reminds me of my biggest bug bounty win, which was little more than running a traceroute and a port scan. In this case it was domain and sub domain mapping, and a port scan. The trick here was knowing to try this, and then understanding what the open ports represented. And the ClickHouse database was completely accessible, leaking all sorts of sensitive data. Continue reading “This Week In Security: DeepSeek’s Oopsie, AI Tarpits, And Apple’s Leaks”

This Week In Security: ClamAV, The AMD Leak, And The Unencrypted Power Grid

Cisco’s ClamAV has a heap-based buffer overflow in its OLE2 file scanning. That’s a big deal, because ClamAV is used to scan file attachments on incoming emails. All it takes to trigger the vulnerability is to send a malicious file through an email system that uses ClamAV.

The exact vulnerability is a string termination check that can fail to trigger, leading to a buffer over-read. That’s a lot better than a buffer overflow while writing to memory. That detail is why this vulnerability is strictly a Denial of Service problem. The memory read results in process termination, presumably a segfault for reading protected memory. There are Proof of Concepts (PoCs) available, but so far no reports of the vulnerability being used in the wild.
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Bambu Connect’s Authentication X.509 Certificate And Private Key Extracted

Hot on the heels of Bambu Lab’s announcement that it would be locking down all network access to its X1-series 3D printers with new firmware, the X.509 certificate and private key from the Bambu Connect application have now been extracted by [hWuxH]. This application was intended to be the sole way for third-party software to send print jobs to Bambu Lab hardware as we previously reported.

The Bambu Connect app is a fairly low-effort Electron-based affair, with some attempt at obfuscation and encryption, but not enough to keep prying eyes out. The de-obfuscated main.js file can be found here (archived), with the certificate and private key clearly visible. These are used to encrypt HTTP traffic with the printer, and is the sole thing standing in the way of tools like OrcaSlicer talking with authentication-enabled Bambu Lab printers.

As for what will be the next steps by Bambu Lab, it’s now clear that security through obfuscation is not going to be very effective here. While playing whack-a-mole with (paying) users who are only interested in using their hardware in the way that they want is certainly an option, this might be a wake-up call for the company that being more forthcoming with their userbase would be in anyone’s best interest.

We await Bambu Lab’s response with bated breath.

New Bambu Lab Firmware Update Adds Mandatory Authorization Control System

As per a recent Bambu Lab blog post, its FDM printers in the X1 series will soon receive a firmware update that adds mandatory authentication for certain operations, starting with the firmware update on January 23rd for the aforementioned FDM printers. These operations include performing firmware upgrades, initiating a print job (LAN or cloud), remote video access and adjusting parameters on the printer. Using the printer directly and starting prints from an SD card are not affected.

As reasoning for this new feature Bambu Lab points to recent exploits that gave strangers access to people’s printers, though cheekily linking to an article on an Anycubic printer exploit. While admittedly a concern, this mostly affects internet-exposed printers, such as those that are tied into a ‘cloud’ account. Even so, LAN-based printing also falls under this new mandatory authentication system, with Bambu Lab offering a new tool called Bambu Connect for those who insist on using non-Bambu Lab branded software like OrcaSlicer. This allows for exported G-code files to be sent to a (property authenticated) Bambu Lab printer.

For those who do not wish to use this feature, not upgrading the firmware is currently the only recourse. Although this firmware update is only for X1-series printers, Bambu Lab promised that it’ll arrive for their other printers too in due time. While Bambu Lab printer owners consider installing the alternative X1 Plus firmware, the peanut gallery can discuss the potential security issues (or lack thereof) of an open Fluidd or similar UI on their LAN-connected, Klipper-based FDM printers.

Thanks to [mip] for the tip.

This Week In Security: Rsync, SSO, And Pentesting Mushrooms

Up first, go check your machines for the rsync version, and your servers for an exposed rsync instance. While there are some security fixes for clients in release 3.4.0, the buffer overflow in the server-side rsync daemon is the definite standout. The disclosure text includes this bit of nightmare fuel: “an attacker only requires anonymous read access to a rsync server, such as a public mirror, to execute arbitrary code on the machine the server is running on.”

A naive search on Shodan shows a whopping 664,955 results for rsync servers on the Internet. Red Hat’s analysis gives us a bit more information. The checksum length is specified by the remote client, and an invalid length isn’t properly rejected by the server. The effect is that an attacker can write up to 48 bytes into the heap beyond the normal checksum buffer space. The particularly dangerous case is also the default: anonymous access for file retrieval. Red Hat has not identified a mitigation beyond blocking access.

If you run servers or forward ports, it’s time to look at ports 873 and 8873 for anything listening. And since that’s not the only problem fixed, it’s really just time to update to rsync 3.4.0 everywhere you can. While there aren’t any reports of this being exploited in the wild, it seems like attempts are inevitable. As rsync is sometimes used in embedded systems and shipped as part of appliances, this particular bug threatens to have quite the long tail. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Rsync, SSO, And Pentesting Mushrooms”