This Week In Security: EvilVideo, Crowdstrike, And InSecure Boot

First up this week is the story of EvilVideo, a clever telegram exploit that disguises an APK as a video file. The earliest record we have of this exploit is on June 6th when it was advertised on a hacking forum.

Researchers at ESET discovered a demo of the exploit, and were able to disclose it to Telegram on June 26th. It was finally patched on July 11. While it was advertised as a “one-click” exploit, that’s being a bit generous, as the ESET demo video shows. But it was a clever exploit. The central trick is that an APK file can be sent in a Telegram chat, and it displays what looks like a video preview. Tap the “video” file to watch it, and Telegram prompts you to play it with an external player. But it turns out the external player in this case is Android itself, which prompts the target to install the APK. Sneaky.

Continue reading “This Week In Security: EvilVideo, Crowdstrike, And InSecure Boot”

Hacking An IoT Camera Reveals Hard-Coded Root Password

Hacking — at least the kind where you’re breaking into stuff — is very much a learn-by-doing skill. There’s simply no substitute for getting your hands dirty and just trying something. But that doesn’t mean you can’t learn something by watching, with this root password exploit on a cheap IP video camera being a good look at the basics.

By way of background on this project, [Matt Brown] had previously torn into a VStarcam CB73 security camera, a more or less generic IP camera that he picked up on the cheap, and identified a flash memory chip from which he extracted the firmware. His initial goal was to see if the camera was contacting sketchy servers, and while searching the strings for the expected unsavory items, he found hard-coded IP addresses plus confirmation that the camera was running some Linux variant.

With evidence of sloppy coding practices, [Matt] set off on a search for a hard-coded root password. The second video covers this effort, which started with finding UART pins and getting a console session. Luckily, the bootloader wasn’t locked, which allowed [Matt] to force the camera to boot into a shell session and find the root password hash. With no luck brute-forcing the hash, he turned to Ghidra to understand the structure of a suspicious program in the firmware called encoder. After a little bit of poking and some endian twiddling, he was able to identify the hard-coded root password for every camera made by this outfit, and likely others as well.

Granted, the camera manufacturer made this a lot easier than it should have been, but with a lot of IoT stuff similarly afflicted by security as an afterthought, the skills on display here are probably broadly applicable. Kudos to [Matt] for the effort and the clear, concise presentation that makes us want to dig into the junk bin and get hacking.

Continue reading “Hacking An IoT Camera Reveals Hard-Coded Root Password”

This Week In Security: Snowflake, The CVD Tension, And Kaspersky’s Exit — And Breaking BSOD

In the past week, AT&T has announced an absolutely massive data breach. This is sort of a multi-layered story, but it gives me an opportunity to use my favorite piece of snarky IT commentary: The cloud is a fancy way to talk about someone else’s servers. And when that provider has a security problem, chances are, so do you.

The provider in question is Snowflake, who first made the news in the Ticketmaster breach. As far as anyone can tell, Snowflake has not actually been directly breached, though it seems that researchers at Hudson Rock briefly reported otherwise. That post has not only been taken down, but also scrubbed from the wayback machine, apparently in response to a legal threat from Snowflake. Ironically, Snowflake has confirmed that one of their former employees was compromised, but Snowflake is certain that nothing sensitive was available from the compromised account.

At this point, it seems that the twin problems are that big organizations aren’t properly enforcing security policy like Two Factor Authentication, and Snowflake just doesn’t provide the tools to set effective security policy. The Mandiant report indicates that all the breaches were the result of credential stealers and other credential-based techniques like credential stuffing. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Snowflake, The CVD Tension, And Kaspersky’s Exit — And Breaking BSOD”

Linksys Velop Routers Caught Sending WiFi Creds In The Clear

A troubling report from the Belgian consumer protection group Testaankoop: several models of Velop Pro routers from Linksys were found to be sending WiFi configuration data out to a remote server during the setup process. That would be bad enough, but not only are these routers reporting private information to the mothership, they are doing it in clear text for anyone to listen in on.

Testaankoop says that while testing out the Pro WiFi 6E and Pro 7 versions of Velop routers, they discovered that unencrypted packets were being sent to a server hosted by Amazon Web Services (AWS). In these packets, they discovered not only the SSID of the user’s wireless network, but the encryption key necessary to join it. There were also various tokens included that could be used to identify network and user.

While the report doesn’t go into too much detail, it seems this information is being sent as part of the configuration process when using the official Linksys mobile application. If you want to avoid having your information bounced around the Internet, you can still use the router’s built-in web configuration menus from a browser on the local network — just like in the good old days.

The real kicker here is the response from Linksys, or more accurately, the lack thereof. Testaankoop says they notified them of their discovery back in November of 2023, and got no response. There’s even been firmware updates for the affected routers since then, but the issue is still unresolved.

Testaankoop ends the review by strongly recommending users avoid these particular models of Linksys Velop routers, which given the facts, sounds like solid advice to us. They also express their disappointment in how the brand, a fixture in the consumer router space for decades, has handled the situation. If you ask us, things started going downhill once they stopped running Linux on their hardware.

Undo Arduino Encryption With An Oscilloscope

Cryptography ain’t easy. Seemingly small details like how many times a computationally intensive loop runs can give the game away. [Lord Feistel] gives us a demo of how this could work with nothing more than poorly designed code, a resistor, and an oscilloscope.

The hardware side is, as mentioned, really simple. Put a resistor inline with the Arduino and monitor the voltage drop across the resistor with the scope. When the chip is working hard, it consumes more current, and code sections that take longer will show up as longer dips.

On the software end, it’s only a little more complicated.  The RSA encryption scheme involves a lot of exponentiation and modulo-taking. Here, [Lord Feistel] is targeting a naive way of computing the exponents quickly, and demonstrates how you can read the exponent straight out the chip’s power demand.

Implementing this attack against a real-world RSA algorithm, in the context of the Arduino doing other stuff, will be harder. And we don’t know if the algorithm implemented in “standard” Arduino libraries is smarter than this one. (If you know, let us know in the comments.) But still, this is a cool example of just how simple and straightforward it can be to eavesdrop on bad code.

If you only need to bypass encryption instead of breaking it, check out [Lord Feistel]’s other tutorial on power glitching that we featured previously. If you haven’t played around with the hardware side of security, it gets deep pretty quickly, but you can at least dip your toes in the shallow end with what you’ve got in your closet.

This Week In Security: Blast-RADIUS, Gitlab, And Plormbing

The RADIUS authentication scheme, short for “Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service”, has been widely deployed for user authentication in all sorts of scenarios. It’s a bit odd, in that individual users authenticate to a “RADIUS Client”, sometimes called a Network Access Server (NAS). In response to an authentication request, a NAS packages up the authentication details, and sends it to a central RADIUS server for verification. The server then sends back a judgement on the authentication request, and if successful the user is authenticated to the NAS/client.

The scheme was updated to its current form in 1994, back when MD5 was considered a cryptographically good hash. It’s been demonstrated that MD5 has problems, most notably a chosen-prefix collision attack demonstrated in 2007. The basis of this collision attack is that given two arbitrary messages, it is possible to find a pair of values that, when appended to the end of those messages, result in matching md5 hashes for each combined message. It turns out this is directly applicable to RADIUS.
Continue reading “This Week In Security: Blast-RADIUS, Gitlab, And Plormbing”

Ticketmaster SafeTix Reverse-Engineered

Ticketmaster is having a rough time lately. Recently, a hacker named [Conduition] managed to reverse-engineer their new “safe” electronic ticket system. Of course, they also had the recent breach where more than half a billion accounts had personal and financial data leaked without any indication of whether or not the data was fully encrypted. But we’re going to focus on the former, as it’s more technically interesting.

Ticketmaster’s stated goals for the new SafeTix system — which requires the use of a smartphone app — was to reduce fraud and ticket scalping. Essentially, you purchase a ticket using their app, and some data is downloaded to your phone which generates a rotating barcode every 15 seconds. When [Conduition] arrived at the venue, cell and WiFi service was totally swamped by everyone trying to load their barcode tickets. After many worried minutes (and presumably a few choice words) [Conduition] managed to get a cell signal long enough to update the barcode, and was able to enter, albeit with a large contingent of similarly annoyed fans trying to enter with their legally purchased tickets.

Continue reading “Ticketmaster SafeTix Reverse-Engineered”