McTerminals Give The Hamburglar A Chance

The golden arches of a McDonald’s restaurant are a ubiquitous feature of life in so many parts of the world, and while their food might not be to all tastes their comforting familiarity draws in many a weary traveler. There was a time when buying a burger meant a conversation with a spotty teen behind the till, but now the transaction is more likely to take place at a terminal with a large touch screen. These terminals have caught the attention of [Geoff Huntley], who has written about their surprising level of vulnerability.

When you’re ordering your Big Mac and fries, you’re in reality standing in front of a Windows PC, and repeated observation of start-up reveals that the ordering application runs under an administrator account. The machine has a card reader and a receipt printer, and it’s because of this printer that the vulnerability starts. In a high-traffic restaurant the paper rolls often run out, and the overworked staff often leave the cabinets unlocked to facilitate access. Thus an attacker need only gain access to the machine to reset it and they can be in front of a touch screen with administrator access during boot, and from that start they can do anything. Given that these machines handle thousands of card transactions daily, the prospect of a skimming attack becomes very real.

The fault here lies in whoever designed these machines for McDonalds, instead of putting appropriate security on the software the whole show relies on the security of the lock. We hope that they don’t come down on the kids changing the paper, and instead get their software fixed. Meanwhile this isn’t the first time we’ve peered into some McHardware.

SATAn Turns Hard Drive Cable Into Antenna To Defeat Air-Gapped Security

It seems like [Mordechai Guri]’s lab at Ben-Gurion University is the place where air-gapped computers go to die, or at least to give up their secrets. And this hack using a computer’s SATA cable as an antenna to exfiltrate data is another example of just how many side-channel attacks the typical PC makes available.

The exploit, deliciously designated “SATAn,” relies on the fact that the SATA 3.0 interface used in many computers has a bandwidth of 6.0 Gb/s, meaning that manipulating the computer’s IO would make it possible to transmit data from an air-gapped machine at around 6 GHz. It’s a complicated exploit, of course, and involves placing a transmitting program on the target machine using the usual methods, such as phishing or zero-day exploits. Once in place, the transmitting program uses a combination of read and write operations on the SATA disk to generate RF signals that encode the data to be exfiltrated, with the data lines inside the SATA cable acting as antennae.

SATAn is shown in action in the video below. It takes a while to transmit just a few bytes of data, and the range is less than a meter, but that could be enough for the exploit to succeed. The test setup uses an SDR — specifically, an ADALM PLUTO — and a laptop, but you can easily imagine a much smaller package being built for a stealthy walk-by style attack. [Mordechai] also offers a potential countermeasure for SATAn, which basically thrashes the hard drive to generate RF noise to mask any generated signals.

While probably limited in its practical applications, SATAn is an interesting side-channel attack to add to [Dr. Guri]’s list of exploits. From optical exfiltration using security cameras to turning power supplies into speakers, the vulnerabilities just keep piling up.

Continue reading “SATAn Turns Hard Drive Cable Into Antenna To Defeat Air-Gapped Security”

This Week In Security: Asterisk, TikTok, Gitlab, And Finally A Spam Solution

There’s an ongoing campaign that’s compromising FreePBX systems around the world. It seems to be aimed specifically at Elastix systems, using CVE-2021-45461, a really nasty Remote Code Execution (RCE) from December of last year. This flaw was a 0-day, as it was discovered by analyzing a compromised FreePBX system. It’s unclear if the campaign described in last week’s report was using the 0-day back in December, or if it was launched as a result of the public disclosure of the bug.

Regardless, the CVE is a URL parameter sent to the Rest Phone Apps service. This module is intended to run right on the screen of VoIP phones, and allow end users to set features like Do Not Disturb without having to punch in star codes, or visit a web page. Because of the use case, any FreePBX deployment that supports VoIP phones connecting from outside the network, that use this feature, would need these ports open. The best way to secure that would be to enforce connections over a VPN, which only some phones natively support.

Upon finding a vulnerable endpoint, the campaign starts by dropping a webshell in several locations, all obfuscated slightly differently. It then creates multiple root-level user accounts, and adds a Cron job to maintain access. There is a surprising amount of obfuscation and stealth features in this family of malware, making it difficult to point to a single Indicator Of Compromise. If you run a FreePBX system that may have the Phone Apps module running, it’s time to go through it with a fine-toothed comb.

What’s The Deal with TikTok?

The FCC has once again called for TikTok to be de-listed from the Google Play Store and the Apple App store. What is going on with TikTok? It’s just an app for filming and sharing silly videos, right? There are essentially two potential problems with TikTok, and both of them trace back to the app’s parent company residing in China.

Here in the US we have National Security Letters, and China seems to have a more straightforward system, where “everything is seen in China,” as said by a member of TikTok’s Trust and Safety Department. TikTok uses quite a few permissions, some of which seem a bit overzealous. If you’re a person of interest to the Chinese government, could those permissions be used to surveil you? Absolutely. Just like a US based app could, as a result of a National Security Letter.

The second problem is a bit more subtle, and may stray towards a conspiracy theory, but is worth considering. TikTok has videos about every subject imaginable, from every possible viewpoint. What if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wanted a specific rumor to gain traction in the US? Just a little pressure on the video recommendation algorithm would make videos about that topic trend. Instant public opinion lever.

There’s likely a missing piece of the story here, in the form of some classified intel. Until enough time goes by that a Freedom of Information Act request can unlock the rest of the story, it’s going to be unclear how much of the TikTok threat is legitimate, and how much is geo-political wrangling.

Oh, and if you thought you could just go open up the Google Play Store and see the exact permissions the TikTok app uses, Google has made the unfortunate decision to hide permissions until you actually do the install. That sounds like a terrible decision and, after a brief outcry, it seems like Google agrees. Just before this article went to the presses, Google announced that they were walking back this decision.

Gitlab RCE

Gitlab fixed a very serious problem in its 4th of July round of minor version releases, and [Nguyễn Tiến Giang (Jang)] really wanted to understand what was going on with this one. So much so, that he set up a debuggable install of Gitlab and recreated the issue, bringing us along for the ride. The flaw is in importing an existing Gitlab project, where the archive name is appended directly to a command string. If you can manipulate the value given for the archive name, and avoid tripping on any of the checks intended to prevent it, you can trivially insert shell code that will be run on the underlying server. Avoiding the traps is a big part of the work to actually make this into an real PoC. Read the post for full details on the debugging journey.

Calendar Spam Finally Fixed

Consider yourself lucky if you’ve missed out on the scourge that is Calendar spam. Google Calendar is great, because anyone can send you an email with an invite, and the event automatically shows up on your calendar. In retrospect, it seems obvious that this would be used for spam. Regardless, after multiple years of the spam problem, Google is finally rolling out a feature, to only add invitations to your calendar from known senders. Now if you get asked, or suffer from spam yourself, you know to look under event settings, and make the setting change. Finally!

Photo of the head unit , with "Hacked by greenluigi1" in the center of the UI

Hacker Liberates Hyundai Head Unit, Writes Custom Apps

[greenluigi1] bought a Hyundai Ioniq car, and then, to our astonishment, absolutely demolished the Linux-based head unit firmware. By that, we mean that he bypassed all of the firmware update authentication mechanisms, reverse-engineered the firmware updates, and created subversive update files that gave him a root shell on his own unit. Then, he reverse-engineered the app framework running the dash and created his own app. Not just for show – after hooking into the APIs available to the dash and accessible through header files, he was able to monitor car state from his app, and even lock/unlock doors. In the end, the dash got completely conquered – and he even wrote a tutorial showing how anyone can compile their own apps for the Hyundai Ionic D-Audio 2V dash.

In this series of write-ups [greenluigi1] put together for us, he walks us through the entire hacking process — and they’re a real treat to read. He covers a wide variety of things: breaking encryption of .zip files, reprogramming efused MAC addresses on USB-Ethernet dongles, locating keys for encrypted firmware files, carefully placing backdoors into a Linux system, fighting cryptic C++ compilation errors and flag combinations while cross-compiling the software for the head unit, making plugins for proprietary undocumented frameworks; and many other reverse-engineering aspects that we will encounter when domesticating consumer hardware.

This marks a hacker’s victory over yet another computer in our life that we aren’t meant to modify, and a meticulously documented victory at that — helping each one of us fight back against “unmodifiable” gadgets like these. After reading these tutorials, you’ll leave with a good few new techniques under your belt. We’ve covered head units hacks like these before, for instance, for Subaru and Nissan, and each time it was a journey to behold.

This Week In Security: Retbleed, Post-Quantum, Python-atomicwrites, And The Mysterious Cuteboi

Yet another entry in the “why we can’t have nice things” category, Retbleed was announced this week, as yet another speculative execution vulnerability. This one is mitigated in hardware for AMD’s Zen 3 and Intel Generation 9 and later. For earlier devices the performance hit in mitigation is quite painful. What exactly makes this different from previous weaknesses, and why didn’t the previous mitigations cover this problem?
Continue reading “This Week In Security: Retbleed, Post-Quantum, Python-atomicwrites, And The Mysterious Cuteboi”

Screenshot of the RSA calculator, showing the fields that you can fill into and the results as they propagate through the calculation

Lift The Veil On RSA With This RSA Calculator

Encryption algorithms can be intimidating to approach, what’s with all the math involved. However, once you start digging into them, you can break the math apart into smaller steps, and get a feel of what goes into encryption being the modern-day magic we take for granted. Today, [Henry Schmale] writes to us about his small contribution to making cryptography easier to understand – lifting the veil on the RSA asymmetric encryption technique through an RSA calculator.

With [Henry]’s calculator, you can only encrypt and decrypt a single integer, but you’re able to view each individual step of an RSA calculation as you do so. If you want to understand what makes RSA and other similar algorithms tick, this site is an excellent starting point. Now, this is not something you should use when roll your crypto implementations – as cryptographers say in unison, writing your own crypto from scratch is extremely inadvisable. [Henry] does say that this calculator could be useful for CTF players, for instance, but it’s also undeniably an accessible learning tool for any hacker out there wishing to understand what goes on under the wraps of the libraries we use.

In modern day, cryptography is instrumental to protecting our freedoms, and it’s a joy to see people work towards explaining the algorithms used. The cryptography tools we use day-to-day are also highly valuable targets for governments and intelligence agencies, willing to go to great lengths to subvert our communication security – so it’s even more important that we get acquianted with the tools that protect us. After all, it only takes a piece of paper to encrypt your communications with someone.

This Week In Security:Breaking CACs To Fix NTLM, The Biggest Leak Ever, And Fixing Firefox By Breaking It

To start with, Microsoft’s June Security Patch has a fix for CVE-2022-26925, a Man-In-The-Middle attack against NTLM. According to NIST, this attack is actively being exploited in the wild, so it landed on the KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities) Catalog. That list tracks the most important vulnerabilities to address, and triggers a mandated patch install no later than July 22nd. The quirk here is that the Microsoft Patch that fixes CVE-2022-26925 also includes a fix for a couple certificate vulnerabilities including CVE-2022-2693, Certifried. That vulnerability was one where a machine certificate could be renamed to the same as a domain controller, leading to organization-wide compromise.

The fix that rolled out in June now requires that a “strong certificate mapping” be in place to tie a user to a certificate. Having the same common name is no longer sufficient, and a secure value like the Security IDentifier (SID) must be mapped from certificate to user in Active Directory. The patch puts AD in a compatibility mode, which accepts the insecure mapping, so long as the user account predates the security certificate. This has an unintended consequence of breaking how the US Government uses CACs (Common Access Cards) to authenticate their users. Government agencies typically start their onboarding by issuing a CAC, and then establishing an AD account for that user. That makes the certificate older, which means the newest patch rejects it. Thankfully there’s a registry key that can be set, allowing the older mapping to still work, though likely with a bit of a security weakness opened up as a result. Continue reading “This Week In Security:Breaking CACs To Fix NTLM, The Biggest Leak Ever, And Fixing Firefox By Breaking It”