Well that didn’t take long. The team over at GTVHacker have worked their magic on Chromecast. The HDMI dongle announced by Google last week was so popular they had to cancel their 3-free-months of Netflix perk. We think the thing is worth $35 without it, especially if we end up seeing some awesome hacks from the community.
So far this is just getting your foot in the door by rooting the device. In addition to walking through the exploit the wiki instructions give us a lot more pictures of the internals than we saw from the teardown in yesterday’s links post. There’s an unpopulated pad with seventeen connections on the PCB. You can patch into the serial connections this way, running at a 115200 8n1. But you won’t have terminal access out of the box. The exploit uses a vulnerability in the bootloader to flash a hacked system folder which provides root. After wiping the cache it reboots like normal but now you can access a root shell on port 23.
Continue reading “Chromecast bootloader exploit”
A crack has been found in the armor of Windows RT. This subset of Windows 8 is designed to run on ARM processors. The payload listed in the image above allows you to run unsigned desktop applications on the OS.
We haven’t seen very much about the Windows RT package, so it’s nice to hear [Clrokr’s] thoughts on it. As far as he can tell the system has not been watered down from its Intel-aimed (x86) counterpart. Rather, RT seems to be a direct port with what is called “Code Integrity” mechanisms switched on. There is a kernel-level setting, barricaded behind UEFI’s Secure Boot, which determines the minimum software signing level allowed to run on the device. This is set to zero on a Windows 8 machine, but defaults to 8 on an ARM device. [Clrokr] uses a debugger to insert the code seen above into a DLL file in order to reset that minimum signing value to 0.
Do you have a project in mind for which this is useful? We’d love to hear about it in the comments!
Can anyone argue against this being the least-secure hotel room lock on the market? Regular readers will recognize it as an Onity key card lock. A few months back a glaring flaw in the security was exposed that allows these locks to be opened electronically in less than a second. So we are not surprised to hear that a series of hotel room robberies in Houston are suspected to have been performed using this technique.
The image above is from a demonstration video we saw back in October. That hack used an Arduino-compatible chip inside of a dry erase marker as an end-run around the lock’s electronics. It reinforced the warning sound by [Cody Brocious] when he presented the exploit at this year’s Blackhat conference. The barrel jack on the outside of the door lock doubles as a 1-wire communications port and that is how an attacker can gain access. Investigators can find no other means of entry for these thefts.
We applaud one of the victims in this story. At the end of the article she is asked if the information about the Onity flaw should have been kept secret. She said that if there’s a vulnerability that’s not being fixed people have a right to know about it. Bravo [Janet Wolf]!
iClass is an RFID standard that is aimed at better security through encryption and authentication. While it is more secure than some other RFID implementations, it is still possible to hack the system. But initial iClass exploits were quite invasive. [Brad Antoniewicz] published a post which talks about early attacks on the system, and then demonstrates a better way to exploit iClass readers.
We remember seeing the talk on iClass from 27C3 about a year and a half ago. While the technique was interesting, it was incredibly invasive. An attacker needed multiple iClass readers at his disposal as the method involved overwriting part of the firmware in order to get a partial dump, then patching those image pieces back together. [Brad] makes the point that this is fine with an off-the-shelf system, but high-security installations will be using custom images. This means you would need to get multiple readers off the wall of the building you’re trying to sneak into.
But his method is different. He managed to get a dump of the EEPROM from a reader using an FTDI cable and external power source. If you wan to see how he’s circumventing the PIC read protection you’ll have to dig into the source code linked in his article.
If you’re carrying around an exposed circuit board and a bunch of wires people are going to notice you. But a dry erase marker won’t turn any heads. And this one holds its own little secret. It acts as a master key for hotel room door locks.
This is really more of a repackaging hack. The exploit is already quite well-known. The Onity brand of key card locks most commonly used in hotels have a power jack on the bottom that doubles as a 1-wire communications port. The first published proof of concept used an Arduino board and a simple adapter to unlock any door in under one second. Now that hardware has been reduced in size so that it fits in the hollow shell of a dry erase marker. Even better, the felt tip has been replaced with the appropriately sized barrel jack. Check out the ultra-fast and inconspicuous use of it after the break. We think using this is no more obvious than actually having the key card.
Continue reading “Dry erase marker opens all hotel room doors”
This is the prototype board for [Travis Goodspeed’s] new USB development tool called the Facedancer. He took on the design with USB security exploits in mind, but we think it’s got a lot of potential for plain old development as well.
Kudos on the [Frank Herbert] reference when naming the project. Like the characters from the Dune mythology that can perfectly mimic any person they touch, this device let’s you mimic whatever you can imagine. One the USB ports connects to the victim (or host) the other connects to a development machine. Python can then be used to send USB commands in real time. Think of this as doing the same thing the Bus Pirate does for SPI and i2c, except that it’s doing it on the USB protocol itself. This way you can feel your way through all of the road-bumps of developing a new device (or testing an exploit) without the need to continually compile and flash your hardware.
The proud cry of “I am root” rings true once again, this time on Sony Google TV devices. Although a low-level exploit was found on previous firmware versions, a downgrade process lets you run unsigned kernels on updated TV or Bluray models of the Internet streaming devices.
These systems are Android-based, which currently run version 3.1 Honeycomb. This version patches the previous exploit, but with three different USB sticks you can downgrade, exploit, and upgrade to an altered and unsigned hack of the most recent kernel. This gives you the root access you may have been longing for, but other than the features discussed in the forum thread there’s not a whole lot of changes rolled into the exploit yet.
We’re always looking out for open source projects running on living-room devices and hope that someday we’ll see a branch of XBMC for the GTV. Until then we’ll just have to keep our fingers crossed for the viability of a RaspberryPI XBMC.