Apple Passwords: They All ‘Just Work’

January 12, 2018 by Brian Benchoff 40 Comments

When the Macintosh was released some thirty-odd years ago, to Steve Jobs’ triumphant return in the late 90s, there was one phrase to describe the simplicity of using a Mac. ‘It Just Works’. Whether this was a reference to the complete lack of games on the Mac (Marathon shoutout, tho) or a statement to the user-friendliness of the Mac, one thing is now apparent. Apple has improved the macOS to such a degree that all passwords just work. That is to say, security on the latest versions of macOS is abysmal, and every few weeks a new bug is reported.

The first such security vulnerability in macOS High Sierra was reported by [Lemi Ergin] on Twitter. Simply, anyone could login as root with an empty password after clicking the login button several times. The steps to reproduce were as simple as opening System Preferences, Clicking the lock to make changes, typing ‘root’ in the username field, and clicking the Unlock button. It should go without saying this is incredibly insecure, and although this is only a local exploit, it’s a mind-numbingly idiotic exploit. This issue was quickly fixed by Apple in the Security Update 2017-001

The most recent password flaw comes in the form of unlocking the App Store preferences that can be unlocked with any password. The steps to reproduce on macOS High Sierra are simply:

Click on System Preferences
Click on App Store
Click the padlock icon
Enter your username and any password
Click unlock

This issue has been fixed in the beta of macOS 10.13.3, which should be released within a month. The bug does not exist in macOS Sierra version 10.12.6 or earlier.

This is the second bug in macOS in as many months where passwords just work. Or don’t work, depending on how cheeky you want to be. While these bugs have been overshadowed with recent exploits of Intel’s ME and a million blog posts on Meltdown, these are very, very serious bugs that shouldn’t have happened in the first place. And, where there are two, there’s probably more.

We don’t know what’s up with the latest version of the macOS and the password problems, but we are eagerly awaiting the Medium post from a member of the macOS team going over these issues. We hope to see that in a decade or two.

Spectre And Meltdown: Attackers Always Have The Advantage

January 10, 2018 by Roger Cheng 45 Comments

While the whole industry is scrambling on Spectre, Meltdown focused most of the spotlight on Intel and there is no shortage of outrage in Internet comments. Like many great discoveries, this one is obvious with the power of hindsight. So much so that the spectrum of reactions have spanned an extreme range. From “It’s so obvious, Intel engineers must be idiots” to “It’s so obvious, Intel engineers must have known! They kept it from us in a conspiracy with the NSA!”

We won’t try to sway those who choose to believe in a conspiracy that’s simultaneously secret and obvious to everyone. However, as evidence of non-obviousness, some very smart people got remarkably close to the Meltdown effect last summer, without getting it all the way. [Trammel Hudson] did some digging and found a paper from the early 1990s (PDF) that warns of the dangers of fetching info into the cache that might cross priviledge boundaries, but it wasn’t weaponized until recently. In short, these are old vulnerabilities, but exploiting them was hard enough that it took twenty years to do it.

Building a new CPU is the work of a large team over several years. But they weren’t all working on the same thing for all that time. Any single feature would have been the work of a small team of engineers over a period of months. During development they fixed many problems we’ll never see. But at the end of the day, they are only human. They can be 99.9% perfect and that won’t be good enough, because once hardware is released into the world: it is open season on that 0.1% the team missed.

The odds are stacked in the attacker’s favor. The team on defense has a handful of people working a few months to protect against all known and yet-to-be discovered attacks. It is a tough match against the attackers coming afterwards: there are a lot more of them, they’re continually refining the state of the art, they have twenty years to work on a problem if they need to, and they only need to find a single flaw to win. In that light, exploits like Spectre and Meltdown will probably always be with us.

Let’s look at some factors that paved the way to Intel’s current embarrassing situation.

Continue reading “Spectre And Meltdown: Attackers Always Have The Advantage” →

Getting A Handle On Meltdown Update Impact, Stay Tuned For Spectre

January 9, 2018 by Roger Cheng 31 Comments

When news broke on Meltdown and Spectre ahead of the original disclosure plan, word spread like wildfire and it was hard to separate fact from speculation. One commonly repeated claim was that the fix would slow down computers by up to 30% for some workloads. A report released by Microsoft today says that “average users” with post-2015 hardware won’t notice the difference. Without getting into specific numbers, they mention that they expect folks running pre-2015 hardware to experience noticeable slowdowns with the patches applied.

The impact from Meltdown updates are easier to categorize: they slow down the transition from an user’s application level code to system level kernel code. The good news: such transitions were already a performance killjoy before Meltdown came along. There exists an extensive collection of tools (design patterns, libraries, and APIs) to help software developers reduce the number of user-kernel transitions.

Performance sensitive code that were already written to minimize kernel transitions will suffer very little from Meltdown updates. This includes most games and mainstream applications. The updates will have a greater impact on the minority of applications that frequently jump between kernel and user worlds. Antivirus software (with their own problems) have reasons to do so, and probably will end up causing most of the slowdowns seen by normal users.

Servers, with their extensive disk and networking IO — and thus kernel usage — are going to have a much worse time, even as seen through Microsoft’s rosy spectacles. So much so that Microsoft is recommending that admins “balance the security versus performance tradeoff for your environment”.

The impact from Spectre updates are harder to pin down. Speculative execution and caching are too important in modern CPUs to “just” turn off. The fixes will be more complex and we’ll have to wait for them to roll out (bumps and all) before we have a better picture.

The effects might end up being negligible as some tech titans are currently saying, and that probably will fit your experience, unless you’re running a server farm. But even if they’re wrong, you’ll still be comfortably faster than an Intel 486 or a Raspberry Pi.

Do any of you have numbers yet?

[via The Verge]

Raspberry Pi Ain’t Afraid Of No Spectre And Will Not Meltdown

January 9, 2018 by Roger Cheng 43 Comments

While there’s broad agreement that Meltdown and Spectre attacks are really bad news at a fundamental level, there is disagreement on its immediate practical impact in the real world. Despite reassurance that no attacks have been detected in the wild and there’s time to roll out the full spectrum of mitigation, some want to find protection right now. If you’re interested in an usable and easy to set up modern desktop that’s free of Meltdown or Spectre threats, a Raspberry Pi can provide the immunity you seek.

[Eben Upton] explained the side channel attacks using fragments of Python for illustration, which was an enlightening read independent of the Raspberry Pi pitch. While these ARM cores perform speculative instruction fetches, they don’t speculatively execute them or modify the cache. Under the current circumstances, that makes all the difference in the world.

A clever security researcher may yet find a way to exploit speculative fetches in the future, and claiming that Raspberry Pi has superior security would be a stretch. The platform has its own set of security problems, but today Meltdown/Spectre is not among them. And that just might be enough to sway some decisions.

If you need to stay in the x86 world, look over what it’d take to to rewind back to an Intel 486.

Thanks to [D00med] for sharing the link in a comment to our overview article.

Lowering JavaScript Timer Resolution Thwarts Meltdown And Spectre

January 6, 2018 by Roger Cheng 35 Comments

The computer security vulnerabilities Meltdown and Spectre can infer protected information based on subtle differences in hardware behavior. It takes less time to access data that has been cached versus data that needs to be retrieved from memory, and precisely measuring time difference is a critical part of these attacks.

Our web browsers present a huge potential surface for attack as JavaScript is ubiquitous on the modern web. Executing JavaScript code will definitely involve the processor cache and a high-resolution timer is accessible via browser performance API.

Web browsers can’t change processor cache behavior, but they could take away malicious code’s ability to exploit them. Browser makers are intentionally degrading time measurement capability in the API to make attacks more difficult. These changes are being rolled out for Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer. Apple has announced Safari updates in the near future that is likely to follow suit.

After these changes, the time stamp returned by performance.now will be less precise due to lower resolution. Some browsers are going a step further and degrade the accuracy by adding a random jitter. There will also be degradation or outright disabling of other features that can be used to infer data, such as SharedArrayBuffer.

These changes will have no impact for vast majority of users. The performance API are used by developers to debug sluggish code, the actual run speed is unaffected. Other features like SharedArrayBuffer are relatively new and their absence would go largely unnoticed. Unfortunately, web developers will have a harder time tracking down slow code under these changes.

Browser makers are calling this a temporary measure for now, but we won’t be surprised if they become permanent. It is a relatively simple change that blunts the immediate impact of Meltdown/Spectre and it would also mitigate yet-to-be-discovered timing attacks of the future. If browser makers offer a “debug mode” to restore high precision timers, developers could activate it just for their performance tuning work and everyone should be happy.

This is just one part of the shock wave Meltdown/Spectre has sent through the computer industry. We have broader coverage of the issue here.

Learn To Reverse Engineer X86_64 Binaries

January 6, 2018 by Sven Gregori 16 Comments

Opening up things, see how they work, and make them do what you want are just the basic needs of the average hacker. In some cases, a screwdriver and multimeter will do the job, but in other cases a binary blob of random software is all we have to work with. Trying to understand an unknown binary executable is an exciting way to discover a system’s internal functionality.

While the basic principles of software reverse engineering are universal across most platforms, the details can naturally vary for different architectures. In the case of the x86 architecture, [Leonora Tindall] felt that most tutorials on the subject focus mostly on 32-bit and not so much on the 64-bit specifics. Determined to change that, she ended up with an extensive introduction tutorial for reverse engineering x86_64 binaries starting at the very basics, then gradually moving forward using crackme examples. Covering simple string analysis and digging through disassembled binaries to circumvent fictional security, the tutorial later introduces the Radare2 framework.

All example source code is provided in the accompanying GitHub repository, although it is advised to avoid looking at them to keep it more interesting and challenging. And in case you are looking for more challenges later on, or generally prefer a closer connection to the hardware, these MSP430 based capture the flag online challenges might be worth to look at next.

Two Factor Authentication With The ESP8266

January 4, 2018 by Tom Nardi 23 Comments

Google Authenticator is a particularly popular smartphone application that can be used as a token for many two factor authentication (2FA) systems by generating a time-based one time password (referred to as TOTP). With Google Authenticator, the combination of your user name and password along with the single-use code generated by the application allows you to securely authenticate yourself in a way that would be difficult for an attacker to replicate.

That sounds great, but what if you don’t have a smartphone? That’s the situation that [Lady Ada] recently found herself in, and rather than going the easy route and buying a hardware 2FA token that’s compatible with Google Authenticator, she decided to build one herself based on the ESP8266. With the hardware and source documented on her site, the makings of an open source Google Authenticator hardware token are available for anyone who’s interested.

Generated codes can also be viewed via serial.

For the hardware, all you need is the ESP8266 and a display. Naturally [Lady Ada] uses her own particular spin on both devices which you can purchase if you want to create an identical device, but the concept will work the same on the generic hardware you’ve probably already got in the parts bin. Software wise, the code is written in CircuitPython, a derivative of MicroPython, which aims to make microcontroller development easier. If you haven’t tried MicroPython before, grab an ESP and give this a roll.

Conceptually, TOTP is relatively simple. You just need to know what time it is, and run an SHA1 hash. The time part is simple enough, as the ESP8266 can connect to the network and get the current time from NTP. The calculation of the TOTP is handled by the Python code once you’ve provided it with the “secret” pulled from the Google Authenticator application. It’s worth noting here that this means your 2FA secrets will be held in clear-text on the ESP8266’s flash, so try not to use this to secure any nuclear launch systems or anything, OK? Then again, if you ever lose it the beauty of 2-factor is you can invalidate the secret and generate a new one.

We’ve covered the ins and outs of 2FA applications before here at Hackaday if you’d like to know more about the concept, in addition to previous efforts to develop a hardware token for Google Authenticator.