TippingPoint’s Zero Day Initiative reported a critical vulnerability affecting Firefox 3.0 yesterday. It includes the 2.0 versions as well. It’s unreleased and Mozilla is working on a fix already. Whatever the exploit is, it does require the user to visit a malicious site or click a link to executed. It came in 5 hours after the FF3 release, but since it affects previous versions, we wonder if the researcher was just sitting on it to be first. The Zero Day Initiative pays researchers for the exploits they submit.
In honor of Firefox 3.0 download day, Waxy.org has posted the full Code Rush documentary. It spans March ’98 to April ’99, as the Mozilla team publishes the first source code and then the eventual AOL acquisition of Netscape. Embedded above is a short clip of [Jamie Zawinski] pushing the code live at 10AM on March 31, 1998. The hour documentary is well worth watching.
If you’re unsure about moving from FF2 to 3, MultiFireFox still works perfectly fine with the new release.
Download Squad highlighted the xB Browser today. It’s a product offered by XeroBank and is the successor to the TorPark project. The browser anonymizes your browsing using the Tor network and doesn’t remember passwords, sites visited, or any other personal information. Scripts and plugins are disallowed by default, since they could be used to identify you. Remember that Tor just anonymizes; you’re still at the mercy of the exit nodes when it comes to security.
That’s just the free version though. Subscribers to XeroBank have access to an anonymous mail server and VPN service. If you’re a subscriber your bowser session is tunneled through XeroBank’s pool of servers and not the Tor network. We think they should have maintained a separate product name since this distinction isn’t clear outside of the FAQ.
[Rich] over at Securosis takes us through some of his browser paranoia exercises. He uses different browser profiles for different types of web activities. Based on potential risk, various tasks are separated to protect from CSRF attacks and more. Everyday browsing with low risk passwords is done in one. RSS reading with no passwords is done in another. He runs his personal blog in a browser dedicated just to that.
For high risk research, he uses virtual machines to further minimize any potential nasty code getting through. Very high risk sites are browsed through a non-persistent read-only Linux virtual machine. While these techniques can be less effective if the entire OS is comprised, they can still provide a few layers of additional security.
Fellow browser paranoia sufferers may want to consider Firefox plug-ins like NoScript and memory protection from Diehard.